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ABSTRACT 
An abstract of the thesis of Paul E. Devore for the Master 
of Arts in History presented on July 6, 1995. 
Title: Return to Unity: The Philosophy of Lo Ch'in-shun. 
After the fall of the Han dynasty (202 B.C.-220 A.O.), 
Confucian thought did not become influential again until the 
end of the T'ang dynasty (618-907) and the beginning of the 
Sung dynasty (960-1279). Its resurgence in the Sung was 
accompanied by, if not completely driven by a newly 
conceived system of metaphysics. Although Sung Confucians 
honored and frequently referred to Confucius and Mencius, 
metaphysics was their central concern. 
Lo Ch'in-shun, a Confucian in the Ming dynasty 
(1368-1644), saw inconsistencies between traditional 
Confucian thought and the thought of Sung Confucians. He 
viewed himself as orthodox and thought it was his duty as a 
Confucian to fight heterodox thought, and to resolve the 
inconsistencies within Confucian thought and return it to 
unity. His philosophy was a product of his approach to 
these duties and is the subject of this study. 
Lo's efforts to return to unity can be seen in his work 
Knowledge Painfully Acquired (K'un-chih chi). After 
2 
discussing Lo's social context, the following four questions 
provide a framework to examine his philosophy: !)Given that 
there is only one Way, what is the Way that runs through the 
realms of heaven-and-earth and man? 2)0f what does human 
nature consist? 3)How is it that Mencius said that human 
nature is good and yet there is evil in the world? and 
4)What is the mind(hsin), and how does a man cultivate it to 
enable him to become a sage? Comparing Lo's views with 
Confucian thinkers who preceded him provides answers to the 
questions, and assists in defining Lo's thought. 
These answers and comparisons show the significant 
shifts away from Sung Confucian thought contained in Lo's 
philosophy, but they also show his desire to return to 
unity. He strove to return to unity not only for himself, 
but more importantly, for the ultimate good of Confucianism 
and society. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The formulation and development of the Neo-Confucian 
metaphysics used by later Confucian scholars began in China 
in the Sung Dynasty (960-1279). Five Confucian scholars 1 
were later recognized as the masters of the Sung and 
credited with the construction of the metaphysics. By the 
end of the Sung, two distinct schools of thought had emerged 
from within Confucianism. Those who followed Lu Hsiang-shan 
(Chiu-yuan, 1139-1193), 2 were grouped with followers of the 
Ming Confucian Wang Yang-ming (Shou-jen, 1472-1529) 3 under 
the rubric of the Lu-Wang school. The other school of 
thought, the Ch'eng-Chu school, centered on the 
philosophies, writings, and commentaries of Ch'eng I 
(1033-1107) and Chu Hsi (1130-1200). The Ch'eng-Chu 
tradition, specifically Chu Hsi's commentaries on the 
Confucian classics, later became the established orthodoxy 
of the Chinese empire. 
1 Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 588-9. The 
five masters of the Sung are Chou Tun-i (Chou Lien-hsi, 
1017-1073), Chang Tsai (Chang Heng-ch'u, 1020-1077), Ch'eng 
Hao (Ch'eng Ming-tao, 1032-1085), Ch'eng I (Ch'eng I-ch'uan, 
1033-1107), and Chu Hsi (Chu Yilan-hui, 1130-1200). 
2 Irene Bloom, trans., Knowledge Painfully Acquired: 
The K'un-chih chi by Lo Ch'in-shun (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1987), 222. 
3 Ibid. I 225. 
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The Lu-Wang school emphasized the mind, and held that 
the knowledge a scholar needed to seek was inherent within 
one's own mind. To obtain this knowledge one needed to 
concentrate on uncovering it within oneself, and not search 
for it in external things. In contrast, the Ch' eng-Chu 
school concentrated on things beyond the self--textual 
materials, human affairs, daily life and the like. The 
differences between the two schools are often spoken of as 
internal versus external, subjective versus objective, or 
"anti-intellectual" versus "intellectual." The two schools 
are conventionally identified as, respectively, Lu-Wang and 
Ch'eng-Chu, and while the division helps to discuss some of 
the differences within Confucianism it is important to bear 
in mind that they are heuristic devices and should not be 
taken as simple divisions with no common ground. 
In the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), Lo Ch'in-shun 
(1465-1547) 4 emerged as a important follower of the 
Ch'eng-Chu tradition. La's significance lay in his 
commitment to orthodoxy and in his philosophy and the 
changes it entailed. Orthodoxy for Lo meant a concern for 
the dispositions, purposes, and motives of his predecessors. 
His goal of returning Confucian thought to a unity caused 
him to make philosophical changes that would allow for 
unity. Two significant changes were in Lo's conception of 
the relationship of li (principle) and ch'i (material 
4 Ibid. I 1. 
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force), and his conception of nature. 
Lo assumed the traditional Confucian goals of working 
within the government to help bring about a harmonious and 
orderly society and the necessity of self-cultivation to 
make that possible. Some orthodox scholars in the Ming may 
have lived and espoused philosophies within the perceived 
confines of the orthodoxy of their day, but did so only to 
further their goals of wealth, power, and status. Other 
orthodox scholars followed the teachings of their Sung 
predecessors diligently, but did so in a manner of blind 
obedience without questioning or thinking. orthodoxy could 
be limited by adhereing to the letter of the law according 
to Chu Hsi's commentaries for material gain or out of blind 
obediance, but Lo looked at the bigger picture and went 
beyond such a limited views. While Neo-Confucian scholars 
of the sung still looked to Confucius, Mencius and the 
written classics, many were primarily devoted to speculative 
philosophy and metaphysics. 
Lo thought it was his duty not only to continue the 
thought of the Ch'eng-Chu tradition, but to develop it and 
to revive the significance of Confucius ( 551-479 B.C.), 
Mencius (371-289 B.C.?). Lo aimed to integrate the thought 
of the Sung with the thought of traditional Confucianism to 
restore a continuity to Confucian thought as a whole. 
Focused on this goal of restoring a continuity to 
Confucian thought as a whole, Lo began to formulate his 
4 
philosophy. As his thought developed, he saw what he 
considered to be inconsistencies and problems in the 
philosophies of Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi. Lo thought highly of 
both men, but felt they had not been able to complete their 
philosophies and resolve the inconsistencies which would 
allow for total continuity. In attempting to remove these 
inconsistencies, Lo's philosophy shifted away some from the 
thought of Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi, even though the final goals 
remained the same. Lo' s thought differed from those he 
sought to follow not because his philosophy was an 
intentional shift away from theirs, but because he furthered 
the process they had begun in bringing a continuity to 
Confucian thought as a whole. Another way of stating this 
search for continuity is that his desire was to "return to 
unity." For Lo, this meant the establishment of a 
continuity from the thought of Confucius and Mencius through 
the five major Neo-Confucian thinkers of the Sung dynasty5 
to his day. 
Irene Bloom, who translated La's K'un-chih chi 
(Knowledge Painfully Acquired), writes of the prominence of 
the idea "returning to unity" or "recovering the ultimate 
unity" as the guiding theme throughout the work. She points 
out that, as an idea, this can be construed historically as 
5 Wm. Theodore deBary I "Neo-Confucian Cultivation and 
the Seventeenth Century 'Enlightenment.'" In Wm. Theodore 
deBary, ed., The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1975), 190. 
5 
well as metaphysically, epistemologically, and morally. 6 
In Lo's view, those who did not perceive the unity of 
all nature or the continuity of knowledge and morality 
inflicted a kind of conceptual injury on the oneness of 
things, which he sought through his philosophy of ch' i. 7 
The effort Lo exerted to "return to unity" himself was 
equaled by and driven by his desire to resolve all the 
contradictions which could be seen as dividing the Sung 
Nee-Confucians from Confucius, Mencius, and their forbearers 
in the classical past. 8 
Lo's attempts to recover the ultimate unity caused his 
philosophy to differ from those in whose footsteps he 
faithfully tried to follow. Yet he placed himself within 
the orthodox Ch'eng-Chu tradition, and believed that he was 
merely putting the finishing touches on what his 
predecessors had been unable to complete. His thought was 
not a departure from the orthodox tradition but more like 
the efforts of a filial son trying to put together a puzzle 
left to him by his ancestors. Undestanding how he did this 
is the intent of this study. 
Although information regarding La's life is relatively 
scarce, it is important to establish the context of his 
thought through the setting of his life, particularly his 
6 Bloom, Knowledge, 21. 
7 Ibid. I 46-7. 
8Ibid., 22. 
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intellectual influences and professional career. Chapter 
One deals primarily with the general social context of the 
Ming and how Lo fit into it. The chapter provides a brief 
summary of Lo's life in government service, Ming society and 
culture, Ming politics, and the role of scholar-officials. 
It contains some of Lo's views of government and what 
government needed to do, the significance of Buddhism and 
Taoism. Other Confucian scholars of Lo's day are discussed 
in order to frame what was distinct about his thought. 
Chapters Two, Three, and Four discuss Lo's philosophy 
within the context of four basic questions addressed by 
eleventh century thinkers. 9 Lo lived in the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries, but the questions are relevant to Lo's 
philosophy because he needed to deal with issues of the Sung 
in order to "return to unity." 
Chapter Two answers the first of Kasoff 's questions and 
develops the basic foundation of Lo's philosophy. The 
question is, given that there is only one Way, what is the 
Way that runs through the realms of heaven-and-earth and 
man? The answer begins with Lo's monistic conception of li 
(principle) and ch' i (material force), with li being an 
aspect of ch' i and not separate from it. This was a 
significant shift away from the positions of Ch'eng I and 
Chu Hsi. The chapter continues by considering Lo's 
9 lra E. Kasoff, The Thoughts of Chang Tsai(1020-1077) 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 11. The four 
questions are ones proposed by Kasoff. 
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understanding of the phrase "principle is one: its 
particularizations diverse," and ends with a discussion of 
the Great Ultimate and yin and yang. 
Upon this basic foundation of Lo's philosophy, chapter 
Three deals with the second question: of what does human 
nature consist? The answer involves central implications of 
Lo's philosophy, specifically his monism of ch' i. This 
chapter concerns his conception of the physical nature 
(ch'i-chih chih hsing) as being the same as heavenly nature 
( t 'ien-li) , not separate as was previously held. This 
position led to his view that feelings and emotions were 
natural and not inherently detrimental. The chapter also 
includes a brief discussion of Lo's view of equilibrium, and 
a discussion of his stance on the relationship of mind and 
the one nature. 
Chapter Four deals with the last two questions. 
Kasoff 's third question--how is it that Mencius said that 
human nature is good and yet there is evil in the world?--is 
examined first. Here I deal with Lo's conception of why 
evil exists in the world, and his view of the ultimate goal 
one seeks in overcoming evil, humanity ( jen) . The last 
question is what is the mind (hsin), and how does a man 
cultivate it to enable him to become a sage? The answer to 
this question lies in Lo's view of self-cultivation, his 
interpretation of the 11 investigation of things" ( ko-wu) , and 
the significance of sense knowledge. 
8 
The final chapter discusses the issue of La's 
orthodoxy. His reputation of being orthodox came not so 
much from his desire to "return to unity," but from a 
vigilant fight against heterodox thought, specifically that 
of Wang Yang-ming and Buddhism. Lo clearly saw himself as 
orthodox, but not all scholars have agreed. The chapter 
thus concludes with some of La's views of himself and his 
notions in regard to orthodoxy, as well as some opinions of 
twentieth century scholars. 
CHAPTER 1 
Lo Ch'in-shun and Ming Society 
Lo Ch'in-shun was born in T'ai-ho county in Kiangsi 
province on December 25, 1465, 1 during the Ch' eng-hua 
(r.1465-1487) reign period. 2 He was the eldest of three 
sons born to Lo Yung-chiln (d.1523). 3 In his earlier years 
he was drawn to Ch'an Buddhism, and had a meditative 
experience consistent with those written about and called 
"enlightenment." He described it as a "vision" 
(kuang-ching). 4 After this experience, though, he later 
returned to the Ch' eng-Chu tradition and developed his 
philosophy much along the same intellectual vein as Chu 
Hsi. 5 
1 Irene Bloom, "On the 'Abstraction' of Ming Thought: 
Some Concrete Evidence from the Philosophy of Lo 
Ch'in-shun." In Wm. Theodore deBary and Irene Bloom, eds., 
Principle and Practicality: Essays in Nee-Confucianism and 
Practical Learning, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1979), 72. 
2 James B. Parsons, 






3 Ibid., 3. La's brothers were Lo Ch'in-te (1472-1550) 
and Lo Ch'in-chung (1476-1529). 
4Bloom, 'Abstraction,' 74. 
5 Ibid., 75. 
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To enter into service as a government official in the 
Ming, most participated in the civil service examinations. 
There were three steps or exams to the process: the 
provincial exam (hsiang-shih), the metropolitan exam 
(hui-shih), and the palace exam (t'ing-chih). 6 Upon 
successfully completing the palace exam one received the 
chin-shih degree, and was guaranteed a position in service 
of the government. The extremely competitive conditions of 
the exams in the Ming can be seen from the statistic that 
only the an average of 276 passed the metropolitan exam each 
time it was administered, which occurred once every three 
years. 7 This is quite a small number when compared to the 
1393 population of 60,545,812. 8 The number reflects those 
who passed the metropolitan exam and not the palace exam, 
which increases the significance of the statistic. 
In 1492, Lo placed first in his provincial exam. Then 
after passing the metropolitan exam, he went on to pass the 
palace exam in 1493. Not only did he pass, but he placed 
6Charles o. Rucker, A Dictionary of Official Titles in 
Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), 
81. 
7 Ibid. 
8Ping-ti Ho, Studies on the Population of China, 1368-
1953 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 10. Ho 
argues that the population was much likely higher than the 
reported numbers since the taxes for a given area were 
figured according to the reported population for that area. 
Kang Chao estimates that the population of 1592 was around 
200 million. Kang Chao, Man and Land in Chinese History 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), 41. 
11 
third, a rank formally honored with the title t 'an-hua. 9 
The scholars that placed in the top three were automatically 
given positions in the Hanlin Academy, a scholarly 
institution closely tied to the highest levels of the 
central government. Placement within the top three also 
helped many to secure a position in either the Grand 
Secretariat or the offices of the Ministry of Rites, 10 one 
of the six ministries at the highest level of the central 
government accessible to scholar-officials. 
Lo's success in the palace exam led to an automatic 
appointment to the Hanlin Academy. The Hanlin Academy was 
responsible for drafting and editing work in the preparation 
of the more ceremonial imperial pronouncements, and for the 
compilation of imperially sponsored historical and other 
works. 11 Lo was initially granted the rank of Hanlin 
compiler, but his duties surely varied in the nine years 
from his initial appointment to the Hanlin Academy until he 
was promoted to a position outside of the Academy in 1502. 
Lo was promoted in 1502 to the position of Director of 
Studies at the Imperial University in Nanking. While acting 
as the Director of Studies, Lo concurrently filled the 
9 James B. Parsons, "The Ming Dynasty Bureaucracy: A 
Supplementary Analysis," Monumenta Serica, vol.XXIX 
(1970-1): 470. The titles for the first and second place 
ranking in the palace exam are chuang-yuan and pang-yen, 
respectively. 
10Ibid. 
11Hucker, Dictionary, 223, #2154. 
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position of Chancellor of the university for a time until 
the appointed Chancellor finished observing his period of 
mourning . 12 
The position of Director of studies was the second 
executive official of the central government's Directorate 
of Education and carried the rank of 6a. 13 This office 
generally supervised the directorate's instructional 
programs, and dictated educational policy for all state 
supported local schools. 14 
It was during his time at the Imperial University in 
Nanking that Lo began an extensive program of readings of 
the classical texts, which gradually led him to his 
conclusions about the nature of reality and of knowledge. 15 
Although Lo only remained at this position until 1504, it 
was said of him and the Chancellor Chang Mou (1437-1522) 
12Bloom, Knowledge, 2. 
13Hucker, Dictionary, 459, #5821. The ranking system, 
known as the nine ranks, were categories into which all 
officials and the posts they occupied were divided for 
puposes of determining prestige, compensation, priority in 
court audience, etc. The lowerer the number used to 
designate the rank, the higher the position. Ranks from 4 
to 9 were considered lesser ranks. Ranks were commonly 
subdivided into 2 classes (teng, chi, chieh), first class 
(cheng) and 2nd class (ts'ung); and the lesser ranks from 4 
through 9 were often further subdivided into upper grades 
(shang) and lower grades (hsia), p.177, #1315. The 
subdivision of each rank into upper (first class, cheng) and 
lower (2nd class, ts'ung) is seen in the designation of a 
and b, respectively. For example the rank of 6 would be 
subdivided into 6a and 6b, p.4-5. 
14Ibid. I 74. 
15Bloom, 'Abstraction, ' 7 4. 
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that, "Through personal uprightness they established their 
leadership, and the university flourished during this 
period. "16 
Lo left his position at the university in 1504 to 
return home and care for his father, who had become ill. Lo 
sent a memorial to the throne in 1505 to request an extended 
leave to care for his father until his death. 17 The 
memorial was officially denied in 1507, but Lo elected to 
remain with his father anyway and submitted another 
petition . 18 The memorial and Lo's disregard for the 
denial, angered Liu Chin, the eunuch in power at court at 
the time, and in 1508 Liu stripped Lo of his rank and 
office. 19 This relegated Lo to the status of a commoner. 
Liu Chin was executed in 1510, and Lo was restored to 
his post. In the next year, Lo was appointed Vice Minister 
of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices in Nanking. 20 The 
Court of Imperial Sacrifices was supervised by the Ministry 
of Rites, and was foremost in prestige among the courts of 
16Julia Ching, ed., The Records of Ming Scholars by 
Huang Tsung-hsi, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
1987), 213-4. 
17Bloom, Knowledge, 2. 
18Ibid., 3. 
19Bloom, 'Abstraction,' 71. The eunuch Liu Chin also 




the central government. 21 The role of vice minister had a 
rank 3a. 22 
In 1515, Lo received another promotion to the position 
of Junior Vice Minister of Personnel in Nanking. After 
arriving at this position in 1515, Lo remained in the 
Ministry of Personnel until he left government service in 
1523. From 1515-1523, he received three more promotions, 
but all were within the Ministry of Personnel. In 1519, he 
became Senior Vice Minister of Personnel in Nanking, then in 
1521 succeeded to Senior Vice Minister of Personnel in 
Peking, and finally was elevated to Minster of Personnel in 
Nanking. 23 
The head of the Ministry of Personnel was considered 
the senior minister of all the ministers of the six 
ministries, and had ritual precedence over his 
counterparts. 24 The position of minister had a rank of 
2a. 25 The duties of the Ministry of Personnel included: 
promotions, demotions, titles, and honors of civil officials 
and subofficial functionaries. 26 As a minister, Lo was one 
of the most eminent members of the general administrative 
21Hucker, Dictionary, 476, #6145. 
22Ibid. I 427 I #5278. 
23Bloom, 'Abstraction, ' 71. 
24Hucker, Dictionary, 318-9, #3805. 
25Ibid. I 306 I #3630. 
26Ibid. 
15 
hierarchy and directly responsible to the emperor, although 
ministers in general were subordinate to the Grand 
Secretaries . 27 
Lo left office in 1523 to mourn the death of his 
father. Upon the completion of the mourning period, he was 
called to fill the position of Minister of Rites, which he 
refused. He then received the appointment to his former 
position of Minister of Personnel, but again he refused to 
return to service. According to the History of the Ming 
Dynasty (Ming shih), Lo declined these positions because he 
did not want to be associated with the men who were 
influential at that time. 28 After these refusals, Lo was 
granted his request for retirement in 1527. 29 
It was not until after Lo's political career was over 
that he became a productive scholar. 30 Since this was the 
case, there is little evidence to show how Lo's thought 
progressed and developed over the years. 31 After being 
granted his request for retirement, Lo spent the last twenty 
years of his life at home in quiet study and reflection. 
These studies concentrated on the classical Confucian canon, 
the works of Sung Neo-Confucians, the writings of earlier 
27Ibid. I 410-1, #5042. 
28Bloom, Knowledge, 4. 
29Ibid. 
30Ibid. I 10. 
31Ibid. I 9. 
16 
Ming Confucians, and Buddhist texts. 32 
Lo contributed various works to the Confucian 
tradition, but his major work, first published in 1528, was 
the K'un-chih chi (Knowledge Painfully Acquired). This work 
was a collection of reading notes and reflections on 
philosophy and history. 33 Since Lo was sixty-three when 
the work was first published Bloom describes it as a mature 
work; one that clearly displays the years of study and 
contemplation of a man of intense seriousness and incisive 
intelligence. 34 
Lo wrote of, and primarily for, his contemporaries and 
the Confucian tradition, 35 as evidenced by the final note 
in a letter he wrote to Wang Yang-ming, which read, 
When I first wrote this letter I had intended 
to reply to an invitation extended by Yang-ming in 
the past year for me to give a public lecture. 
Before the letter was sent out Yang-ming had died. 
Alas! My humble views are all stated here, and, 
feeling that our exchange was not a private matter 
only, I record this. 36 
After the original publication of the K'un-chih chi in 
32Bloom, 'Abstraction,' 71. Some of the writings of 
earlier Ming Confucians include those of Wu Yil-pi 
(1392-1469), Hu Chu-jen (1434-1484), and Ch'en Hsien-chang 
(1428-1500). 
33Bloom, Knowledge, 1. 
34Ibid. 
35Ibid. I 13. 
36Ibid. I 188. 
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1528, Lo made additions to it in 1531, 1533, 1538, and 
1546. 37 In the additions and supplements to his work, Lo 
did not make any substantial changes nor shifts in 
emphasis. 38 Bloom notes, though, that this continual study 
up until the time of his death strongly suggests his belief 
that intellectual and spiritual growth were achieved at the 
cost of diligence and painstaking effort. 39 
Although the K'un-chih chi was La's major work, it was 
not the only scholarly work produced by Lo. Other of his 
writings were combined with the K'un-chih chi in 1622 to 
form the Lo Cheng-an ts'un-kao (Literary Remains of Lo 
Ch'in-shun). These remains were a collection of essays, 
poetry and occasional writings, which formed the Lo 
Wen-chuang ho-chi (Collected Works of Lo Ch'in-shun). 40 
Shortly after his death on May 13, 1547, Lo was given 
the title Grand Guardian of the Heir Apparent (T'ai-tzu 
t 'ai-pao) , and the posthumous name Wen-chuang. 41 Then in 
1724, Le's tablet was place in the Confucian temple. 42 
Bloom writes that all accounts of his life reflect his 
intense seriousness and scrupulous sense of personal 
37Ibid. I 4. 
38Ibid., 7. 
39Bloom, 'Abstraction, ' 7 2. 
40Bloom, Knowledge, 11. 
41Ibid., 4. 
42Ibid. 
integrity, qualities that 




to have guided both his 
official career. 43 A 
confirmation of this can be found in a brief account of Lo's 
life and philosophy in the Ming-ju hsueh-an (The Records of 
Ming Scholars). This work, written and compiled by Huang 
Tsung-hsi (1610-1695), also contains some thoughts written 
by Liu Tsung-chou ( 1578-1645). 44 
Lo strove to return Confucian thought to unity as he 
himself sought to recover the ultimate unity, but according 
to the Ming-ju hsueh-an he was not specifically affiliated 
with any other Confucians. Both Huang and Liu followed the 
thought of Lo's philosophical adversary, Wang Yang-ming. In 
the Ming- ju hsii.eh-an, scholars were grouped with their 
teachers and disciples, and yet twenty percent of those in 
the work, including Lo, were classified under the heading 
miscellaneous. 45 Julia Ching, the translator of the work, 
feels this displays the vitality of Ming thought and the 
independence of mind of many philosophers and scholars. 46 
The miscellaneous category was constructed of those who 
learned from the classics but had no known teachers, those 
who relied upon friends for support but could not be 
classified with their friends, or those who flourished for 
43Ibid. 
44Ching, 4. 
45Ibid. , 26. 
46Ibid. 
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a time but had no disciples to carry on. 47 Despite Lo' s 
view of himself as an orthodox Confucian, he does not seem 
to have had a single influential teacher, nor did he leave 
any significant disciple to carry on his thought. This was 
an interesting situation for one who attained positions of 
considerable political power, had a high reputation for his 
virtue, and strove to return Confucian thought to unity. 
Though Lo's actions, his orthodoxy, and his philosophical 
strivings were admirable, they apparently did not provide a 
style of life that appealed to others living in the Ming. 
He chose a difficult and demanding path to follow, one which 
was in step with the Confucian teachings, but out of step 
with the lifestyle and goals that were current in the Ming. 
Ming Society and Culture 
The founder of the Ming dynasty, Emperor 
Hung-wu(r .1368-1398), 48 came from a peasant background. 
From his origins, he grew in power through a Buddhist 
organization, and ascended the throne of the Chinese empire. 
In his rule, he accentuated the rustic simplicity of an 
47Ibid. I 207. 
48Charles o. Hucker, ed., Chinese Government in Ming 
Times: Seven Studies, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1969) , 1. The emperor's temple name was T' ai-tsu and 
his personal name was Chu Yilan-chang. Irene Bloom gives the 
reign dates for Hung-wu as 1368-1399, Knowledge, 219. 
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agrarian society, 49 set the tone for the dynasty. After 
acquiring the title of emperor, he also conducted a series 
of purges that affected the entire social elite from the 
imperial court to rural communities, with casualties that 
have been estimated to be over 100,000. 50 
Largely because of these purges and the confiscations 
of the lands of the victims, the empire became a nation of 
small independent farmers. 51 The emperor's peasant origins 
and his desire for a social levelling also can be seen in 
his desire to provide education available to all. He wanted 
no one to monopolize the benefits of education, and 
therefore he established community schools in every 
county. 52 These schools provided functional literacy. 
By 1465, attendance was voluntary for those who were 
impoverished, 53 but publishers and authors tried to 
attract semi-literate readers by lavishly illustrating their 
books, writing in an informal vernacular style, and adding 
explanations and keys to pronunciations for difficult 
49Ray Huang, 1587, A Year of No Significance: The Ming 




52Joanna F. Handlin, Action in Late Ming Thought: The 
Reorientation of Lu K'un and other Scholar Officials, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 25. 
53Ibid. , 25 n. 55. 
21 
characters. 54 
In an analysis of the Ming bureaucracy, James Parsons, 
notes that Ming society was so thoroughly peasant dominated 
so as to be described as "uni-class. 1155 He further notes, 
though, that it was also the most socially mobile society in 
the pre-modern world. 56 It was a society which, because 
of the mobility, experienced extensive corruption. Those 
who succeeded in getting official positions in the 
government often acted corruptly because they knew that they 
might be the only members of their clan to ever attain an 
official position. 57 Wm. Theodore deBary points to the 
sixteenth century as the apogee of upward mobility for 
merchant families ascending into the bureaucracy. 58 Social 
mobility not only meant the possibility of ascending, but 
also descending. There were opportunities, but also 
insecurities, anxieties, and uncertainties.M There were 
constant changes in the political and economic fortunes of 
54Ibid. I 26. 
55Parsons, 'Supplementary, ' 4 7 2. 
56 Ibid . I 4 7 6 • 
57Ibid., 477. 
58Wm. Theodore deBary I "Individualism and 
Humanitarianism in Late Ming Thought." In Wm. Theodore 
deBary, ed., Self and Society in Ming Thought, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1970), 172. 
~Kristin YU Greenblatt, "Chu-hung and Lay Buddhism in 
the Late Ming." In deBary, Unfolding, 121. 
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people and their families. 60 
Social mobility and educational developments gave rise 
to two popular forms of literature: encyclopedias and 
morality books. 61 Encyclopedias were intended for those 
interested in taking the civil service examinations and 
consisted mainly of model essays, but many types of 
encyclopedias existed. 62 They had existed in the Sung and 
Yuan dynasties but gained popularity in the Ming. 63 
Morality books, however, were concerned with the daily lives 
of common people, and display the popular syncretism of the 
day. 64 
By the late Ming, widespread literacy gave rise to 
associations engaged in literature, poetry, and drinking. 
There was a spread of high culture through the literary 
societies which sponsored the writing and printing of poetry 
in the classical shih form by merchants and artisans. 65 
Another literary medium which helped to spread culture were 
plays, the heroes of which tended to be sentimental and 
60Ibid. 
61Tadao Sakai, "Confucianism and Popular Educational 
Works." In deBary, Self, 331. 
62Ibid., 332-3. 
63Ibid., 338. 
64Ibid., 344-5. The syncretism attempted to combine the 
thought of Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism. 
65deBary, "Individualism," 172. 
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firmly attached to Confucian and romantic values. 66 
The spread of literacy also meant competition for the 
attention of readers, which gave rise to simplified versions 
of the Confucian classics, practical.household handbooks, 
and vernacular fiction. 67 The fiction dealt with the 
popular topics of religious salvation, and supernatural 
fantasies, tales of crime and passion, heroic adventures and 
erotic love stories. 68 Not only did competition for the 
attention of readers result in a variety of things to read, 
but it also meant more possible alternatives to choose from 
in how one lived one's life. 
The spread of literacy and social mobility can be seen 
in a positive light, but the rise of popular literature and 
culture also reduced the impact of the traditional values of 
high culture. Lo's notion of achieving sagehood and the 
process that one must go through was a life-long one that 
took determination and serious effort. One of his common 
criticisms was of those that he thought were intimidated by 
the difficulties and sought shortcuts. Lo's approach could 
not have attracted many if things were as Joanna Handlin 
notes. She writes, whereas the traditional assumption that 
the goal of achieving sagehood or moral perfection was 
66C. T. Hsia, "Time and the Human Condition in the Plays 




difficult, as literacy spread this assumption gave way to 
the belief that learning should be widespread, pleasurable, 
and easy. 69 
With the increased number of reading choices and the 
attractive lives found in fiction, it seems natural that few 
would follow the arduous path that Lo had chosen to travel. 
For Lo, the path to sagehood included numerous problems and 
hardships. For Wang Yang-ming and his followers who 
accepted the concept of liang-chih (innate knowledge), the 
streets were theoretically filled with sages. Handlin notes 
a general feeling of the times in the late Ming that in 
former times sages appeared only every few centuries, but 
now filled the streets. Students who were loathe to make 
sacrifices for their education were reassured that the road 
to enlightenment or sagehood was not blocked by wine, women, 
weal th, and passion. 70 These were ideas that had become 
popular by late Ming, but ones that Lo had feared and warned 
against. 
Ming Politics 
Despite the development of commerce, urban life, and 
popular culture, Ming China was predominantly an agrarian 
society whose government was structured to be simple, 
strict, and realistic. Ray Huang notes that Emperor 
69Ibid. , 27. 
70Ibid • 
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Hung-wu 's rigid commitment to simplicity severely restricted 
its competence in dealing with a wide range of problems. 71 
Previous to his ascending to the throne, Emperor 
Hung-wu had been a Buddhist monk. When he first began to 
solidify his power, he appointed Buddhist monks who were 
well-versed in Confucianism to official posts until he 
earned more widespread support among the 
scholar-officials. 72 Although he rose in power through a 
Buddhist group, his association with this group may have 
been more for the power it provided than because of 
religious devotion. He tried to limit the economic power 
and influence of both Buddhist and Taoist establishments, 
because he saw them as potentially subversive. He used ideas 
from each, but only the aspects that he thought supported 
the central government in maintaining social unity and 
order. 73 His suspicions led to constant scrutiny and 
control of Buddhist and Taoist groups. 
Emperor Hung-wu not only tried to control religious 
groups, but also began to create an empire that was the 
exclusive domain of the emperor and his family, with little 
71Bloom, Knowledge, 143. 
72Judith A. Berling, The Syncretic Religion of Lin 
Chao-en, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 47. 
73Ibid. I 48. 
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emphasis on the people. 74 His position was strengthened by 
the elimination of the old generals and officials who had 
helped him rise to power. 75 The growth of authoritarianism 
in the Ming led to what Robert Crawford considered to be the 
peak of imperial autocracy in Chinese history. 76 
James Parsons divides the Ming into six periods. 77 Lo 
happened to live in the two periods described as the 
beginning of decline and decided decline, a fertile time for 
religious growth but not necessarily for a hard-driving 
advocate of Confucianism and the painstaking work it 
demanded. Derk Bodde describes the political situation of 
the period Parsons called the period of decided decline as 
an age of growing maladministration, corruption, internal 
oppression, and external weakness. 78 This situation 
gradually led to an abundance of cases of official 
corruption, legal injustice, and gentry oppression of the 
74Robert B. Crawford, Harry M. Lanley, and Albert B. 
Mann. "Fang Hsiao-ju in the Light of Early Ming Society," 
Monumenta Serica, vol.XV(1956): 318. 
75Ibid., 324. 
76Ibid., 318. 
77Parsons, "Aspects," 347. The periods are as follows: 
1368-1402, the period of initial instability; 1403-1449, 
the period of greatest stability; 1450-1505, the beginning 
of the decline of the Ming; 1506-1566, the period of decided 
decline; 1567-1620, a time of moderate recovery; and 
1621-1644, the final decline. 
78Sung-peng Hsu, A Buddhist Leader in Ming China: The 
Life and Thought of Han-shan Te-Ch'ing, 1546-1623, 
(University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1979), vii. 
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common people. 79 
Lo praised the first emperor because of his 
understandings of Buddhism and Taoism, and the establishment 
of a Confucian based government. 8 ° Confucianism received 
a boost in 1415 when the government compiled an official 
anthology of orthodox Ch'eng-Chu writings. 81 Not all 
emperors, though, favored Confucianism, nor trusted the 
scholar-officials. 
The Emperor Cheng-te (r.1505-1521), who ascended the 
throne in 1505, when Lo was beginning his official career, 
played down Confucianism. Although he reigned until 1521, 
the peace and welfare of the state did not seem to be his 
primary concern. Instead of following the Confucian 
guidelines for a ruler, he surrounded himself with eunuchs, 
courtesans, lamaist monks, and magicians from other 
lands. 82 
One of the biggest changes of the Ming government, one 
that shifted more power into the emperor's hands occurred in 
1380. In that year, a failed attempt to usurp the throne 
drastically changed the ruler-minister relationship. 83 
79Greenblatt, 119. 
80Bloom, Knowledge, 111. 
81Berling, 106. 
82Huang , 7 6 . 
83Frederic Wakeman 
Intellectuals in Ming 
lOl(Spring 1972): 39. 







In the early Ming and before, the Secretariat had been 
a primary part of the central government. In 1380, the 
Secretariat was abolished, and the powers were divided and 
given to the Six Ministries, which became the highest 
administrative body. 84 Instead of the ministers being in 
a role of moral equality to the emperor, the traditional 
understanding of their relationship, they were reduced to a 
role of servility, and further humiliated when the emperor 
revived the practice of public flogging of ministers in 
court. 85 
The destruction of the Secretariat also gave rise to 
the positions of Grand Secretaries, who filled an 
administrative and policy-making function. 86 Their power, 
though, was severely limited because the eunuchs remained 
between them and the emperor, and the scholar-officials did 
not trust them because of the close working proximity to the 
eunuchs. 87 Although eunuchs could wield considerable 
power, they were susceptible to manipulation by the imperial 
family, palace women, and eunuchs. 88 
Within the ranks of officials there were strong 
84Hanie Vanderstappen, "Painters at the Early Ming 
Court{l368-1435) and the Problem of a Ming Painting 
Academy," Monumenta Serica, vol.XV{1956): 317. 
85Wakeman, 3 9. 
86Ibid. 
87Ibid. , 40. 
88Hsu, 53. 
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elements of factionalism and regionalism, heightened by the 
move of the capital in 1403 from Nanking to Peking. 89 Much 
of the hostility was between officials from the north and 
those from the south. The south had become dominant both 
culturally and economically, but had been discriminated 
against by the north90 despite a concentration of power in 
the south. 91 
One of the largest problems for the scholar-officials 
in exerting any political influence came not from 
factionalism, but from the power of the eunuchs. The first 
emperor had decreed that no more than one hundred eunuchs 
could hold positions in the palace. 92 They were used to 
balance the power of the officials, were not allowed to 
become literate, and were not allowed to correspond with 
officials. Emperor Hung-wu gave them considerable power, 
but he did not depend on them. 93 
Emperor Hung-wu had not been dependent on them, but 
that changed with the ascension of the third emperor, 
Yung-lo (r.1402-25). 94 Emperor Yung-lo usurped the throne, 
and because of this the scholars did not recognize him, 
89Ibid., 57. 
90Ibid. 
91Parsons, "Supplementary," 459. 
92Wakeman, 40. 
93Crawf ord, 3 2 3. 
94Wakeman, 3 9 . 
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which forced him to rely more heavily on eunuchs. 95 It was 
at this point that the power of the eunuchs began to grow. 
Their power grew with the establishment of the Eastern 
Depot (tung-ch' ang) in 1420. 96 The Eastern Depot was 
charged to survey the regular secret police. In addition to 
this, the eunuchs maintained their own strategic garrisons 
separate from the military, and controlled important fiscal 
powers. They were, however, forbidden documentary 
literacy. 97 That, too, changed in 1432, with the 
establishment of their own clerical school within the 
palace. 98 
Wing-tsit Chan describes the political situation of the 
fifteenth century to be a time of incompetent rulers who 
allowed eunuchs to usurp power and suppress scholars. 99 
The power of the eunuchs can also be seen in the Ming-shih 
(History of the Ming), 
The eunuchs in the Ming period were sent out 
in charge of military expeditions, to supervise the 
army and the Guards. They spied on officials and 
people and secretly controlled all great authority. 
All this began in Yung-la's time.w0 









In the years from 1471-1497, the eunuchs, who routinely 
shielded the emperor from external contact, did not allow 
one ministerial audience with the throne. 101 Their power 
continued to grow. The initial limit of one hundred eunuchs 
set by Hung-wu grew until, by 1600, there were more than 
70, 000 eunuchs within the Forbidden City. 102 
Scholar-officials 
Previous to the Ming dynasty and in the early years of 
the Ming, scholar-officials held positions of status and 
power. The events of 1380 and the resulting political 
changes began to erode significantly the power of officials. 
The Emperor Hung-wu, despite his own previous Buddhist 
associations, embraced Confucian doctrine for the state. 
His doing so, though, was motivated by the hope of a 
political consolidation of power. He adopted the Ch' eng-Chu 
commentaries on the classics for the civil service exams and 
declared them orthodoxy, but used them in a confining, 
neatly packaged, simplified, and digestible form. 103 The 
spiritual feeling of earlier Nee-Confucian thought, the idea 
of broad learning, 104 and other ideas of the Ch' eng-Chu 
101Wakeman, 40. 
102Ibid. 





tradition which encouraged an expansion of thought were 
discouraged. The significance and the problems of this were 
well-stated by Robert Crawford, 
By making Nee-Confucian thought the state 
philosophy, and basis for examinations, T' ai-tsu 
drove the foundations of his autocracy deep into 
the very matter which gave the gentry its basic 
identity and its social posi tion--ideology. He 
thus presented to the scholars individually and 
collectively, a conundrum which endured as long as 
the dynasty; that being orthodox and loyal entailed 
the loss of all their political effectiveness and 
of any ability to function as a class either 
positively in making administrative policy or 
negatively in resisting the growth of that 
centralism which was their undoing . 105 
Despite the fact that Confucianism was state orthodoxy, 
the court officials and scholars lived a precarious 
existence.w6 With the ascension or usurpation of Yung-lo 
the hostility between the government and the officials grew, 
and the imperial government tried to divide the scholars and 
set them against one another to further limit their 
power .107 
The reduction of the power of the scholar-officials 
began in 1380, with the reinstitution of literary 
persecution, court-flogging, and a severe applications of 
laws . 108 Only a few years later they were looked upon not 
105Crawford, "Fang Hsiao-ju," 321. 
106Ibid. , 304. 




as equals deserving of respect, but as slaves. 109 
Scholars tended to become mere functionaries who were 
prevented from trying to find solutions to problems . 110 
Wang Yang-ming, who later became the dominant philosopher of 
the Ming, received forty lashes and banishment to the remote 
province of Kueichow for protesting the imprisonment of a 
scholar-official by a powerful eunuch. 111 
Instead of the Ch' eng-Chu orthodoxy being used to 
encourage the discovery of new insights and personal 
cultivation to achieve social harmony, it had generally 
become a mechanism of the government to instill a conformity 
to the details of the Neo-Confucian teachings. 112 The goal 
of social progress and personal cultivation, for many, 
though not all scholar-officials, was abandoned for the 
goals of worldly success in officialdom. 113 
Not all submitted to the limitations being imposed upon 
scholar-officials and chose instead not to participate in 
government but seek independence and freedom in moral 
cultivation outside of government. 114 This situation 
109Ibid. , 3 25. 
11°Chan, Source Book, 6 5 7 . 
111Ibid. 
112Wing-tsit Chan, "The Ch'eng-Chu School of Early 




presented a fundamental conflict for many. 
34 
Could one 
maintain one's own individuality and intellectual integrity 
and still fulfill their family responsibilities, or was it 
necessary to do whatever necessary in order to succeed in 
the world?115 
There developed a tangible tension between the harsh 
realities of politics and the moral ideals of Confucianism. 
Many left official service because of corruption and 
political pressures. 116 In this light it is easier to 
understand how some view this time as a period when learning 
had become pedantic and sterile, and how Wang Yang-ming 
generally criticized the pursuits of the Ch'eng-Chu school 
as fragmentary and trivial scholarship which neglected the 
fundamental moral values of mind and nature. 
Not all members of the Ch'eng-Chu school submitted to 
such conditions. One example can be seen in Wu YU-pi 
(1392-1469), a man seen as a model member of the Ch'eng-Chu 
tradition. 117 He was viewed as an example of authentic 
"orthodoxy" because of his moral earnestness, serious 
attention to personal cultivation, his high standards of 
conduct, and purism. 118 Instead of serving the usurper 
Yung-lo, he chose to pursue a life of scholarship and 
115deBary, "Individualism," 189. 
116Berling, 237. 




philosophical speculation with the intention of attaining 
sagehood. 119 He became an example for many, including Lo. 
Though the power of the scholar-official was declining, 
this status remained a desirable one and competition for 
official positions was increasing. By the third decade of 
the fifteenth century, the chin-shih degree had become 
essential for a significant political career. 1~ The role 
of these officials, nonetheless, was changing from one of 
moral leaders to one of tending to the details of practical 
matters . 121 
Fed up with the political situation, some 
scholar-officials left government service, and contributed 
to the spread of literacy. Others remained in government 
and at least paid lip service to the idea in the Great 
Learning that one should strive both to cultivate the self 
and serve society . 122 And still others, Lo included, 
believed that successful government and moral 
self-improvement were interdependent. One needed to be both 
a practical administrator and a moral teacher. 
Lo's Views on Government 
For Lo, serving in a correct manner was the only proper 
119Ibid. I 20. 
120Parsons, "Aspects," 402. 
121Handlin, 103-5. 
122Ibid. I 13. 
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thing to do. One should not serve only for the benefit of 
riches, nor should one leave service rashly either. Lo 
believed and tried to live the following: 
"The gentleman takes off ice and performs the 
righteous duties belonging to it."(a) It is 
through carrying out my duty that I fulfill my 
humanity. One who abandons himself to wealth and 
status and forgets all restraints is certainly not 
worth talking to, but one who rigidly adheres to a 
particular form of propriety and considers this to 
be noble, is also not worthy to be engaged in 
discussion of the Way of humaneness and 
rightness . 123 
The goal of the scholar-official, for Lo, was working 
toward sagehood and thus helping to bring the emperor to a 
humane way of governing and thus, the state to harmony. In 
this way, Lo stuck tenaciously to the traditional Confucian 
values as put forth in the ·Great Learning. By leaving 
service it was hard to bring about the gradual changes to 
right government. 
Although he chose not to return to government service 
after he finished mourning his father, his publishing of the 
K'un-chih chi and his thoughts on government reflected in it 
all came five years after retiring from service. In this 
sense they show his continued faith in the ability of the 
Confucian Way to transform government, even in the worst of 
times. Times in which even he did not want to serve. 
The transformation of government lay ultimately in the 
hands of the sovereign, but it had to begin with the 
123Bloom, Knowledge, 84. (a) Analects, 18:7:5. 
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scholar-officials. For the scholar-officials this meant 
personal cultivation, but even more immediate and urgent, Lo 
felt, was the government's need to cultivate talent. 124 In 
order to correct the mind of the sovereign, and thus attain 
the Way of governing, the government must cultivate talent. 
For Lo, the cultivation of talent began in schools. He 
acknowledged that the schools were devoted to classical 
studies and generally said to be good, but because of the 
examination system, talent was lost. 125 Because of the 
exams, many scholars emphasized elegant language and form in 
their studies and not the cultivation of his own person and 
mind. One of the most restrictive and highly criticized 
portions of the test was the eight-legged essay. This essay 
form, established in the 1500s, was to be written by the 
examinee in a prescribed form of a sequence of rhetorical 
steps and a specified total number of words. 126 Putting 
the emphasis on the wrong aspects of one's studies, Lo 
thought, was the reason for the common complaints of a lack 
of talent. 127 
The cry of a lack of talent and the consequent problems 
124Ibid. , 85. 
125Ibid. 
126Hucker, Dictionary, 359, #4370. "Commonly considered 
a rhetorical straitjacket that led to overly disciplined, 
too uncreative writing and thinking among all educated 
Chinese." 
127Bloom, Knowledge, 85. 
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in the government, led Lo to say the following of the 
government, 
When the ancients established government it 
was in order to enable the people to have 
plenty.(a) Now when the governments are 
established, it is only to enable the state to have 
plenty. As the government was run in former times, 
it served to transform people. As it is run now, 
there are some among the common people who 
criticize it. How can the people be 
transformed?1 u 
The only way to correct this situation was to put talented 
men into government positions. 
In order to know men of talent, one had to study and 
understand men's words, and those responsible for putting 
men into off ice needed to be serious about their efforts to 
correct their own minds . 129 In choosing men, one had to 
know whether their outward appearances corresponded to what 
was in their minds, and that their humane and righteous acts 
did not conceal treachery. 130 
The selection of the right men for officials would 
allow excellent discussion of laws and correct changes in 
them, which Lo thought were necessary for good 
government . 131 Talented men were essential to this, 
because they could put the correct laws in place and then 
128Ibid., 85-6. (a) Alludes to Analects, 12: 9. 
129Ibid. I 86. 
130Ibid. 
131Ibid. 
uphold them firmly. 
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In this way putting the right men in 
off ice would naturally lead to gradual changes in society 
and produce more men of genuine talent. 132 Lo thought, 
"Discussion of the Way and deliberation concerning the laws 
are not mutually contradictory but are, in fact, mutually 
complementary. " 133 
With the wrong man in power, there would be nothing he 
could do to make people cooperate. 134 On the other hand, 
under a worthy man the people would be conscientious and 
united, for Lo thought, "The Way of governing is in no sense 
separate from the Way of virtue. 11135 Only if the ruler 
himself practiced personal cultivation could his domain be 
at peace, and this meant surrounding himself with worthy 
men. 
The process needed to start with finding worthy men. 
Lo felt that the talent was available, if only it was sought 
in the right way. One way, Lo pointed out, was Confucius' 
suggestion of recommending those that one knew for off ice as 
a way of finding talent. 136 
Lo used the ancient ruler Shun as an example for 






employed the upright and dismissed the crooked. 
40 
Lo felt 
that if others could only abide by this example, there would 
be good government in spite of any contingency. 137 
The current government had abandoned the traditional 
institutions, which led to increasing strains upon the 
resources of the empire and the continued degeneration of 
customs . 138 Lo noted that the law was being defined in 
high places, and as a result he wrote, "Everything depends 
on the court, that is all. 11139 In good times, Lo most 
likely would have said the same thing, but in this way his 
criticism was directed pointedly toward the court and the 
emperor. 
Changes in the system needed to be made to ease the 
burden on the people so they would not need to resort to 
banditry. Lo suggested a redistribution of land to increase 
production, 140 and a better approach to managing 
resources . 141 Lo specifically noted those in positions of 
power and influence who interferred with the distribution of 
rice, the frequent extortion of taxes, and the breakdowns in 
communication of financial dealings •142 At the end of 
137Ibid. I 119. 
138Ibid. , 88. 
139Ibid., 89. 




these criticisms, Lo again pointed his finger at the 
emperor, and asked, "What difficulty could there be for a 
heroic and perceptive sovereign?"143 
The problem was not entirely the sovereign's, for it 
was the duty of the Confucians to work on themselves and on 
the sovereign. Lo lamented the current state not only 
within the empire, but also those who thought of themselves 
as Confucian. He wrote, 
In my experience, however, the term 
tao-hsueh[learning of the Way] finds little favor 
in the world. Those who have pursued the study of 
it have not necessarily done so in such a way that 
the name and the reality have corresponded. Then 
too there have been those who have not managed to 
avoid arrogance and intolerance, which in turn 
gives rise to antipathy and invective. Now to 
study with the objective of seeking the Way is 
naturally our responsibility. It is certainly 
unacceptable to shun others on this account and 
worse yet to be arrogant toward them. 
Therefore one who would be a scholar-official ought 
to put primary emphasis on cultivating real 
accomplishments, and one who seeks to employ 
scholar-officials must elicit their various 
strengths. In this way the talent of both great 
and small men will develop in due course. There 
will be no antipathy among them and mutual benefit 
will result. The good government of the empire 
will be virtually ensured. 144 
The Confucian scholars, in Lo's eyes should continue 
their learning by all means, but they should serve in the 
143Ibid. 
144Ibid., 92-3. [] mine. Tao-hsiieh here refers 
generally to the learning of the Way, but it has also been 
used to refer more specifically to a fellowship of thinkers 
of the Sung closely related to the Ch'eng-Chu school. See, 
Hoyt Tillman, Confucian Discourse and Chu Hsi's Ascendancy, 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992). 
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government, too, and not pursue scholarly pursuits 
exclusively. 145 Of this priority of service Lo stated, 
"This is an obvious benefit, having nothing to do with the 
empty talk that comes of plying the brush or the 
tongue . "146 
Lo urged involvement in the government and daily 
affairs. Although scholars and military officers were not 
allowed to mix, 147 Lo felt that military matters, too, were 
the Confucians responsibility. This was an important 
statement to make in that military episodes could be found 
in most Ming plays, 148 the importance of the cult of 
Chen-wu (the god of War) in the Ming , 149 and the Ming's 
almost 2.5 million military men. 1 M Lo wrote, 
At present few Confucians will discuss 
military matters, but, essentially, grain and 
military equipment are both our responsibility. 
How can we fail to discuss these matters?1~ 
The social and cultural situation of the Ming, and 
145Ibid. , 93-5. 
146Ibid. , 95. 
147Romeyn Taylor, "Social Origins of the Ming Dynasty," 
Monument Serica, vol.XXII(1963): 57. 
148Hsia, 268. 
149Anna Seidel, "A Taoist Immortal of the Ming Dynasty: 
Chang San-feng." In deBary, Self, 493. 
150Taylor, 1 . Taylor points out that on paper the 
numbers are close to 2.5 million, but that the number was 
probably closer to 1.5 million, where military officers 
roughly equaled the number of civil officials. 
151Bloom, Knowledge, 95-6. 
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especially the political situation were important to Lo and 
affected him, but within the overall picture one of his 
largest concerns was with the influence of Buddhism and 
Taoism. 
Buddhism and Taoism in the Ming 
One of the biggest concerns of the Nee-Confucians in 
the Sung had been the prevalence and impact of Buddhism and 
Buddhist thought. When the Mongols ruled China in the Yuan 
dynasty, Tibetan tantrism had been the state religion. It 
was still popular in the early Ming, 152 with many Tibetan 
temples and monasteries built in Peking in the Ming. 153 
The first emperor of the Ming, Hung-wu, too, had come 
from a Buddhist background which gave Buddhism some status. 
The elevated status, however, led some monks to become 
arrogant at court, which provoked bitter criticisms from the 
Confucians. 154 After 1382, the state control over Buddhism 
and Taoism was increased, with government agencies developed 
and assigned for that specific purpose. 
In the article "Taoist Self-Cultivation in Ming 
Thought," Liu Ts'un-yan deals at length with the influence 
of Taoism in the Ming. According to Liu, Taoism left an 
indelible tinge on Ming thought which was more significant 
152Hsu, 50. 
153Ibid. I 45. 
154Ibid. I 49. 
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than its inf 1 uence on the thought of the sung. 155 One of 
the main elements in which the tinge could be seen was upon 
the practice of self-cultivation. Instead of the 
cultivation of Confucianism oriented towards sagehood, the 
goal of Taoist cultivation was to become an immortal. 156 
Liu pointed to Wang Yang-ming as one of the most heavily 
influenced by Taoism. 157 Anna Seidel's assessment of the 
Taoist influence on the Ming is in agreement with Liu's. 
She notes that Ming thought was strongly, though 
unconsciously, influenced by popular Taoist beliefs . 158 
Despite this influence, Lo did not worry about Taoism, and 
concentrated his criticism more on Buddhism. 
By the Ming, Buddhism, instead of being divided into 
individual schools with specific teachings as was more 
common previously, became divided into groups identified 
with contemplation (ch'an), textual study (chiang), and a 
strict adherence to the monastic code ( lii) • 159 Though 
deBary notes that there was no large challenge posed by 
Buddhism and Taoism to Confucianism in the Ming, 160 Huang 
155Ts'un-yan Liu, "Taoist Self-Cultivation in Ming 
Thought." In deBary, Self, 292. 
156Ibid. 
157Ibid. I 307. 
158Seidel, 483. 
159Leon Hurvi tz, "Chu-hung' s One Mind of Pure Land and 
Ch'an Buddhism." In deBary, Self, 452. 
16°Chan, "Ch' eng-Chu, " 4 4 . 
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Tsung-hsi stated in the Ming-ju hsueh-an that the decline of 
Buddhism during the· Ming was accompanied by an increased 
religiosity of Confucianism itself. 161 It was precisely 
this point that worried Lo. Buddhism may have been in 
decline, but Lo felt many so-called Confucians had, in fact, 
adopted Buddhist methods. This would account for what Huang 
saw as a rise of religiosity in Confucianism. 
The Confucian interaction with Buddhism and Taoism was 
more open and better informed in the Ming than ever 
before . 162 Many Neo-Confucians, including Lo, also studied 
Buddhism and Taoism and a general tolerance of their ideas 
and practices allowed for their wide influence . 163 Lo' s 
orthodox position did not mesh well with such a mixture of 
practices, or the overall situation, which Liu Ts'un-yan 
referred to as a general, prevailing heterodox trend of Ming 
thought as a whole. 164 
Although it was not the case with Lo, many were of the 
opinion that if an idea, attitude, or practice helped one's 
personal cultivation it should not matter which tradition it 
came from.u5 The importance should be placed upon 
personal experience and practical accomplishment brought 
161Ching , 15 . 
162Berling, 55. 
163Liu, 308. 
164Ibid. I 309. 
165deBary, "Introduction," 24. 
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about through the ideas, attitude, or practice, not the 
tradition in which it originated . 166 
Syncretism 
These attitudes were common and point to a general 
openness to a syncretism of Confucianism, Taoism, and 
Buddhism, especially in the early and mid Ming . 167 The 
impact of syncretism, according to Judith Berling, was more 
pervasive in the Ming than in any other period of Chinese 
history . 168 She writes specifically of Lin Chao-en 
(1517-1598). Professor Hsu Sung-peng points to Lin Chao-en 
as one of three important syncretic thinkers of the Ming, 
all three of which happen to be general contemporaries of 
Lo .169 
Not only did Buddhism influence Confucianism as Lo 
feared, but Confucianism also impacted the Buddhism of the 
Ming .170 Lay Buddhism became more activist than 
contemplative, more moralistic than theological, it also 
166Ibid. 
167Berling, 236. 
168Ibid. I 3. 
169Hsu, 48. The other two syncretic thinkers pointed 
out by Hsu were Lu Hsi-hsing (1520-1607) and Li Chih 




became more world-affirming than world-rejecting. 171 
The impact of syncretism and its popularity can also be 
seen in the morality books of the Ming. They represented a 
shift in emphasis from religious salvation in another world 
to man's conduct in this world. 172 The books generally 
combined the social morality of Confucianism, the Buddhist 
reverence for life, and the Taoist moderation of desires in 
the effort to preserve one's health and vitality. 173 They 
were to simply and practically define exemplary behavior and 
warn against the common moral failings of the various roles 
and occupations of Chinese so~iety. 174 Their popularity 
may be attested to by the participation of the imperial 
family in the writing and distribution of a number of 
morality books . 175 
Many of the Confucian scholars were influenced by the 
general openness of the times to other kinds of thought, 
even if they did not openly embrace Buddhism or syncretism. 
Although it is doubtful that there was ever a point where 
all Confucians agreed completely on the teachings and ideas 
of their tradition, the Ming saw a significant shift away 




174Ibid. , 56. 
175Ibid. 
on the Ch'eng-Chu tradition, to the thought of Wang 
Yang-ming and others who concentrated on the mind. 
Confucian Scholars of the Ming 
48 
The Ch'eng-Chu tradition, which was established in the 
Sung, had a tremendous impact in the Ming. It provided the 
spiritual and intellectual orientation which produced the 
leading thinkers of the Ming, even though many chose to 
leave it. 176 
From the philosophical basis of the Ch'eng-Chu 
tradition, the social and intellectual climate of the time 
led Neo-Confucians to experiment, question, and seek new 
styles. 177 For Lo, this meant an attempt to return 
Confucian thought to unity. Since the thought of Ch'eng I 
and Chu Hsi had not been completed there may be some new 
aspects added, but the return to unity was the end goal. 
For others, the experimenting, questioning, and seeking new 
styles led them in different directions, often away from 
Confucianism. 
Previously, the Ming has been seen by scholars as a 
time of decay and confusion in thought, but that view has 
changed. It is now more frequently seen as a time of 
vitality and diversity. 178 William Atwell states that, 




despite the government intimidation of scholars and its 
autocracy, the Ming as a whole must be regarded as a 
remarkable time of intellectual and social emancipation . 179 
Intellectually, the period was marked by some trying to 
break free of Nee-Confucian "orthodoxy. 11180 
In the introduction to The Unfolding of 
Neo-Confucianism, deBary provides a description of a 
stereotypical orthodox scholar-official. The image he 
portrays is of a stern patriarchal figure, the embodiment 
and enforcer of a puritanical morality, who rigidly demanded 
conformity to a traditional pattern of conduct which did not 
allow the individual freedom or enjoyment in life. His role 
was to be the guardian of the established political order, 
to def end the interests of the dynastic system and resist 
change. 181 
Many have used such an image to denounce the 
effectiveness and relevancy of the orthodox Confucian, but 
deBary later notes that the changes of Ming Nee-Confucianism 
were due specifically to its vitality, strength and ability 
to engage in self-criticisms and withstand stresses and 
strains. He also notes that, in his opinion, it was not the 
inflexibility of the orthodox Ch' eng-Chu tradition that 
179William s. Atwell, "From Education to Politics: The 
Fu She." In deBary, Unfolding, 337. 
180Hsu, vii. 
181deBary, "Introduction, " 1. 
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drove scholars away, but the rigors of pursuing and 
attaining sagehood that they found too demanding, 182 a 
position Lo took. 
The general shift of early Ming Nee-Confucian scholars 
was away from metaphysical speculation to an interest more 
in the mind, its cultivation and preservation and 
seriousness ( ching) as the means of achieving that goal . 183 
In the Ming-ju hsueh-an, Huang Tsung-hsi made a distinction 
between Sung Confucianism and Ming Confucianism. Those of 
the Sung, he thought, started at the external universe, 
especially with questions of cosmology, and from there 
proceeded to the personal universe of the mind and nature. 
Those of the Ming, though, were more inner-oriented and thus 
began with questions of mind and human nature and moved from 
there to an understanding of the wider world. 184 Some of 
the characteristics that emerged from this were an emphasis 
on personal experience, inwardness, and practicality. 185 
The shift basically was from metaphysical speculation to man 
himself. 
This resulted in a growth of a new humanitarianism and 
182Ibid., 18. deBary points specifically to Wang Yang-
ming and Ch'en Hsien-chang(1428-1500) as two Confucians who 
redefined sagehood so they could find it achievable. 
183Chan , "Ch' eng-Chu, " 4 2 • 
184Ching, 12. 
185deBary, "Introduction," 30. 
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individualism, 186 and what might be called a preoccupation 
with the self. 187 One of the results of this has been the 
accusation that those in the Ming who emphasized the mind 
and self did so at the expense of neglecting classical 
studies. 188 It was not necessarily a disrespect for books, 
but an effort to bring about a balance with moral 
cultivation and correct a one-sidedness of cultural activity 
and the accumulation of learning as ends in themselves . 189 
For others, the shift was driven by the constantly 
increasing number of students and the limited number of 
official posts. The competition led many to study only for 
the purpose of attaining a position and thus it was not 
relevant to true learning. 190 In other cases students 
became frustrated with the discrepancy between the promise 
of personal enlightenment and the actual grind of 
philosophical study. 191 
Lo did not agree with the approach many took towards 
learning, aiming only for a government position without 
regard for cultivation, nor did he think that any could 
186deBary, "Individualism," 147. 
187Ibid. , 150. 
188Edward T. Ch' ien, "Chiao Hung and the Revolt against 





succeed in cultivation by taking shortcuts. For him, it was 
only through long-term determined study that one could 
achieve sagehood. Yet the emphasis of the School of the 
Mind in Ming Confucianism led to a decline in the study of 
the classics. 192 
Unlike the intellectual approach to knowledge that 
believed knowledge was found in books and could be 
accumulated, those who searched for knowledge within the 
mind sought moral or spiritual knowledge . 193 This 
knowledge of the mind could not be transmitted, and had to 
be experienced individually for oneself. It did not totally 
exclude scrutiny and study of the sages' teachings, because 
it was good to check one's experiences against them, but 
personal experience took priority over submission to the 
authority of books and sages. 194 
This emphasis on personally realized knowledge had a 
pronounced spiritual slant. Huang Tsung-hsi wrote, "The 
persistent concern with cultivation or spiritual ascesis 
reveals a dimension of spirituality as a principal 
occupation of the Ming thinkers and scholars. " 195 
192Araki Kengo, "Confucianism and Buddhism in the Late 
Ming." 
In deBary, Unfolding, 53. 
"
3Yu-wen Jen, "Ch'en Hsien-chang's Philosophy of the 
Natural." In deBary, Self, 81. 
194Ibid. I 72. 
195Ching, 20. 
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The stress on the individuality of experience, 
spiritual transcendence, and intellectual detachment 
revealed a tension in Neo-Confucianism between seriousness 
and openness. 196 The searching and contemplation of the 
mind had the potential to provide a detachment from things 
and affairs which would free the mind from conventional 
views. 197 Whereas the orthodox thinkers were attached to 
social conventions, those who sought transcendence through 
knowledge of the mind and a detached point of view removed 
themselves from pre-conceived theories. 198 As the mind was 
seen as the master of everything for these Confucians, a 
teacher tried to inspire students to evoke and guide their 
own thinking toward their own self-acquired convictions, as 
opposed to a method of indoctrination of a set of ideas. 199 
One of the methods that was used in cultivation in the 
Ming was quiet-sitting (ching-tso). It acquired a 
considerable emphasis in the Ming, and was almost considered 
a criterion for orthodoxy, but it was carefully and clearly 
distinguished from the Buddhist practice of meditation. 200 
Quiet-sitting was not a way to enlightenment, but a way to 
calm the mind to prepare for a breakthrough in which one's 
196deBary, "Cultivation," 188. 





relation to the principle of things would become clear. It 
had no regulations and was not a means of transcending 
rational and ethical thought, but an aid to it and to 
study.~1 Many considered quiet-sitting a necessary part 
of cultivation. Lo was cautious about the value of it, and 
Wang Yang-ming and many of his followers abandon it as too 
passive, quietistic, and basically unrelated to life. 202 
Another aspect of Ming thought was a vital concern with 
action. 203 One of the main proponents of this was Wang 
Yang-ming, who formulated the concept of a unity of 
knowledge and action. He held that knowledge was the 
beginning of practice and that practice was the end of 
knowledge. One could only be said to know something if he 
practiced it. 204 Unless one practiced it, the knowledge 
would be purely intellectual and not complete. This unity 
and the necessity of practice did not allow for a realm of 
abstract knowledge apart from factual knowledge or practical 
action. 205 
The ideas of quiet-sitting, practical knowledge, and a 
few others were commonly found in Confucianism in the Ming. 
201Ibid. I 107. 
202deBary, "Introduction, " 1 7. 
203Berling, 236. 
~4Ch'u Chai, "Neo-Confucianism 




205Robert Crawford, "Chang Chu-cheng's Confucian 
Legalism." In deBary, Self, 367-8. 
55 
Other ideas were found in the orthodox Ch'eng-Chu school of 
Confucianism but not outside of it. Still other ideas could 
be found in those Confucians outside of the orthodoxy, but 
not among those within it. Despite those who struck out to 
pursue their own path outside of the established orthodoxy, 
Ch'eng-Chu thought remained the basis for the civil service 
exams and claimed the outward loyalty of almost all Ming 
Neo-Confucians. 2~ 
The orthodoxy of Ming Confucianism did not represent or 
create a sterile, obsolete but immovable fixture of the old 
order, though the government may have desired such an 
effect. Instead it allowed for a continuing dynamic and 
constructive process of thought. 207 The early Ming 
Confucians of the Ch'eng-Chu tradition continued the legacy 
of Sung thought, 208 and concentrated on the moral 
development of the individual nature. 209 As the Ming 
progressed, those of the Ch'eng-Chu line began to favor 
education as a vocation and did not place as much emphasis 
on public service. 210 
Lo strove to uphold orthodoxy despite his disagreement 
206Chan, "Ch' eng-Chu, " 4 3 • 
207deBary, "Introduction," 5. 
208Ching, 12 • 
209Ian McMorran, "Wang Fu-chih and the Nee-Confucian 
Tradition." In deBary, Unfolding, 429. 
210Hellmut Wilhelm, "On Ming orthodoxy," 
Serica, vol.XXIX(1970-1): 6. 
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with some of the ideas of his time associated with it. He 
sought to uphold the truth of the orthodox teaching, while 
uncovering the errors of heterodox thought, especially that 
of Ch' an Buddhism and Wang Yang-ming. Later Confucians 
recognized his efforts as a defender of the Ch' eng-Chu 
tradition. 
A seventeenth century scholar described Lo's K'un-chih 
chi as an immovable rock of integrity in the face of the 
on-rushing current of the day, a reference to Wang 
Yang-ming' s inf 1 uence. 211 In the Huang-Ming shi (History 
of the August Ming), Lo was grouped with a few Ch'eng-Chu 
scholars, among who were Hsileh Hsilan (1389-1464) 212 , Wu 
YU-pi and Wu Yti-pi's student Hu Chil-jen. The thought of 
Hsueh Hsuan and Wu Yu-pi both influenced Lo. 
Hellmut Wilhelm refers to Lo as a disciple of Wu Yu-pi, 
the great old master of Ming Neo-Confucianism, 213 though Wu 
died four years after Lo's birth. In the Ming-ju hsueh-an, 
Huang Tsung-hsi commented that Wu was the purest of the 
pure. 21 ' Lo thought that few could compare to Wu's love of 
learning or his dedication to moral principles, and praised 
211William Theodore deBary, The Message of the Mind in 
Neo-Confucianism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1989), 103. 
212Bloom, Knowledge, 220. 
213Wilhelm, 19. 
214Ching, 54 · 
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him for once declining an appointment by the emperor. 215 
Lo also praised Hsueh Hsuan for his thoroughness in 
examining every subject. 216 Hsueh believed that li 
(principle) could only be found in ch'i (ether or material 
force), ideas that will be dealt with in detail below. Lo 
agreed with this idea of them being together, and also 
agreed with Hsueh's idea that all reality was embodied in 
ch'i.n7 Although their thought contained some 
similarities, Lo felt that Hsueh's thought had dualistic 
tendencies. Lo praised his heart of loyalty and 
faithfulness to the state, his genuine and earnest practice, 
his diligence,ns but Lo could not accept Hsiieh's idea that 
ch'i could be characterized by disintegration and that li 
could not. 219 Al though Lo appreciated his orthodoxy and 
his emphasis on ch' i, his thought had still never gone 
beyond the duality of their predecessors. 
There were Confucians Lo honored and respected, but 
even those whom he honored and respected had not been able 
to recover the ultimate unity of Confucian thought. Lo felt 
it was important for Confucianism and society that the unity 
be recovered, especially in light of the thought of Wang 
215Bloom, Knowledge, 146-7. 
216Ibid. I 14 7. 
217deBary, "Cultivation," 202. 
218Bloom, Knowledge, 148. 
219Ibid. I 14 7. 
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Yang-ming and Buddhism. He felt it was his responsibility 
as a Confucian to attempt to return to unity. This was to 
be accomplished primarily through his philosophy. 
CHAPTER 2 
The Foundation of Lo's Philosophy 
Lo Ch' in-shun' s years of active service in various 
positions of the Ming government allowed him little time to 
produce any scholarly works. After leaving the political 
life of government service, he began more academic pursuits. 
His most prominent work, the K'un-chih chi, reveals the 
fundamentals of his philosophy. Irene Bloom writes the 
following of Lo and the K'un-chih chi, 
The tone is reflective; the choice of language is 
precise; issues are sharply defined. Lo is 
revealed here as a scholar of formidable erudition, 
given to meticulous accuracy in his textual 
research and rigorous development of his 
philosophical views. Yet, as the text also 
reveals, Lo was not merely rehearsing or recasting 
the views of his predecessors. For all of his 
immersion in the Nee-Confucian tradition, his 
concern with precision and consistency, and his 
attention to nuances of language and 
interpretation, Lo emerges in this work as a 
creative thinker who sets forth certain 
metaphysical, epistemological, and psychological 
positions which are both new and recognizably 
modern. 1 
In this paragraph, Bloom captures many of the significant 
points of Le's thought. Possibly the single word in Bloom's 
description that completely defines Lo is consistency. 
1 Bloom, Knowledge, 7. 
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Scholars typically divide Nee-Confucian thought into 
the two main schools of Ch' eng-Chu and Lu-Wang, with 
Ch'eng-Chu thought considered the orthodox thought of the 
Chinese empire since the early fourteenth century. 2 
Although Lo's self-descriptions are characterized by candor 
and humility, 3 Bloom describes him as the most prominent 
adherent of the Ch'eng-Chu school in the mid-Ming. 4 John 
Meskill views Lo as a prominent critic of Wang Yang-ming and 
as an interpreter of the Ch'eng-Chu school. 5 
In Bloom's comments on Lo quoted above, she gives him 
an air of creativity and innovation, but also a strong 
grounding or immersion within the Nee-Confucian tradition. 
Meskill's view of Lo as an interpreter of the school echoes 
his basis in earlier Confucian thought but with the 
inclusion of a few additional new elements. Professor Abe 
Yoshio goes further and says Lo's philosophy is 
revolutionary. 6 Bloom thinks this is a little strong and 
2 Chan, Source Book, 589. The Four Books and Chu Hsi's 
commentaries on them, one of the primary sources of 
Ch'eng-Chu thought, were the basis of the civil service 
examinations from 1313 until the end of the examination 
system in 1905. The Four Books include the Analects, the 
Book of Mencius, the Great Learning, and the Doctrine of the 
Mean. 
3 Bloom, 'Abstraction,' 72. 
4Bloom, Knowledge, 1. 
5John Meskill, Academies in Ming China: A Historical 
Essay, (Tuscon: The University of Arizona Press, 1982), 
108. 
6 Bloom, 'Abstraction,' 77. 
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instead of using "revolutionary" offers the term 
"reformist. '17 She feels that his orthodox spirit is 
revealed in his appreciation of those in the Sung, but that 
Lo saw their thought as unfinished. 8 For Lo, the thought 
of his Sung predecessors was not sufficiently consistent 
with that of Confucius and Mencius. He retained certain 
intellectual and spiritual values which had their origin in 
the Sung, while other aspects of his views were closer to 
those of classical Confucianism. 9 Bloom also notes, though, 
that Lo introduced elements which had little apparent 
precedent in the earlier tradition. 10 
The cornerstone for the consistency of La's thought 
and, for him, Confucian thought, was the relationship of 
principle (li) and material force (ch'i). These two terms 
li and ch'i, had become the basis for Neo-Confucian 
metaphysics in the eleventh century. The concepts of li and 
ch'i will be defined and clarified in the discussion that 
follows. Although there are definite exceptions, 
Neo-confucian scholars in both the sung and Ming identify li 
as the prime force in the uni verse . 11 In his search for 
recovering the unity of thought in the Confucian school, Lo 
7 Ibid. 
8 Bloom, Knowledge, 1. 




stressed that ch'i was the prime force of the universe. 
This shift appears to be radical, a fundamental shift. Yet 
it provides unity in that li was encompassed by ch'i and no 
longer separate at any point. It had repercussions 
throughout his philosophy, and it is because of this shift 
that some see him as revolutionary and not merely as a 
reformer. Professor Benjamin Elman refers to the research 
of Yamanoi Yu. Yamanoi, Elman writes, demonstated that the 
Ming-Ch'ing transition saw a shift in emphasis to a 
philosophy of ch'i, which replaced the Chu Hsi philosophy of 
li as the dominant framework for analysis in Confucian 
scholarship. Yamanoi traced this development back to the 
thought of Lo Ch'in-shun, and he saw this development to be 
a turn from abstract, conceptual thought toward an emphasis 
on concrete verifiable ideas (k' ao-cheng). This shift 
further meant a return to a concentration on mundane human 
conditions instead of the transcendental philosophy of 
1 . 12 .I.. 
The purpose of Lo's shift was to reconcile problems in 
the thought of Chu Hsi, Ch' eng I, and other Confucian 
scholars. He would not have considered himself to be an 
innovator in the creative sense of a desire to produce 
something altogether new. He may have been appreciative of 
the description of being a transmitter, a self-description 
12Benjamin A. Elman, From Philosophy to Philology: 
Intellectual and Social Aspects of Change in Late Imperial 
China, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 44. 
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used by Confucius, but he truly was more a def ender of 
tradition whose ultimate goal was to once again unite 
Confucian thought, to make Confucian thought from ancient 
times until his time consistent. 
He may have been offended, on the other hand, at the 
idea of being thought a revolutionary, unless it meant 
throwing out concepts that did not allow unity in order to 
construct a comprehensive, unified thought based on ancient 
Confucian ideas. Lo would have been pleased with the return 
to mundane considerations in thinking mentioned above, for 
Confucius himself was much more interested in the things of 
this world, and disliked discussing the things beyond this 
world. 
Given that there is only one Way, what is the Way that 
runs through the realms of heaven-and-earth and of man? In 
order to understand Lo's view of the Way, the foundation of 
his philosophy, li and ch'i, must be understood first. 
Following the discussion of li and ch'i, an understanding of 
Lo's conception of Ch'eng I's idea of "principle is one; its 
particularizations diverse"13 will help to provide 
consistency to Lo's overall thought, as well as his view of 
the Way. 
Li and Ch'i 
The concepts of li and ch'i are fundamental to all 
13Bloom, Knowledge, 17-8. 
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Nee-Confucian metaphysics. The concept of ch'i, commonly 
translated as material force, usually refers to matter. 
Ch'i is similar to atoms in that it is the building block 
for physical forms, but in Chinese thought the idea of ch'i 
goes beyond physical forms. Ch'i can refer to the air that 
we breathe, or to energy in one's body or the earth. For 
Lo, everything was composed of ch'i. All reality was ch'i. 
Practically all schools of Chinese thought share the basic 
concept of ch'i, although it may be argued that the 
Nee-Confucian use of it was inspired by Taoism. 14 
The concept of li (principle) became prominent in 
Nee-Confucian thought in the sung with Ch'eng I and Ch'eng 
Hao. Although it has been suggested by Wing-tsit Chan and 
others that the concept of li originated in Hua-yen 
Buddhism. 15 The construction of the Neo-Confucian 
metaphysics in the Sung is often considered a response to 
the challenge posed by Buddhism. The use of the Buddhist 
concept, given a Confucian twist, may in fact have been an 
effective tool. 
The thought of the Ch' eng brothers and Chu Hsi was 
based on the idea that li were immutable principles or norms 
that govern the process of change and growth. They were 
above the physical world, often referred to as "above form," 
14Wing-tsit Chan, "Synthesis in Chinese Metaphysics," 
The Chinese Mind: Essentials of Chinese Philosophy and 
Culture, (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967), 137. 
15Ibid. 
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and thus were universal and not susceptible to change. Li 
formed a moral pattern or framework that was inherent in all 
things. 
Since li was inherent in all things it provided an 
order in the world that was discoverable in the regularity 
of things. The order that li provided was a moral one, so 
it was man's duty to "investigate principle." By 
investigating li in things and regulating oneself, it was 
the goal to understand li completely and thus be able to 
spontaneously act and react morally and humanely at all 
times. To accomplish this meant one had attained sagehood. 
This approach to life reaffirmed the physical reality of 
things and provided a rational and moral order, two things 
that were opposed to the Buddhist view of the world as 
insubstantial and illusory . 16 
Chu Hsi, whose thought and interpretations became 
orthodoxy in the fourteenth century, held the view that li 
and ch'i could not be separate, but that li was "above form" 
and ch'i was within form. This separation of li as "above 
form" and ch'i within it resulted in the notion that since 
li was "above form" it was necessarily prior to ch'i. Li 
was not subject to change and therefore perfect, while ch'i 
was full of impurities. It also followed that li was 
permanent and enduring and that ch'i was finite. Despite 
the fact that Chu Hsi claimed that li and ch'i could not 
16deBary, "Introduction, " 12. 
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exist without one another, the structure of "above form" and 
"below form" made for a dualistic view of li and ch' i. 
Since li was perfect and permanent, the polar opposite of 
Buddhist thought, it was the original focus in the 
Ch'eng-Chu school. 
Lo rejected these dualistic ideas of Ch' eng !17 and 
Chu Hsi, along with many of their other ideas that were 
based on this conception of li. Lo shifted the primary 
focus away from li to ch' i . 18 Despite this shift, li 
maintained a significant, if not central role, in La's 
thought. La's conception of li differed from his Sung 
predecessors. Neo-Confucian metaphysics was constructed in 
the Sung partly as a response to the Buddhist idea of 
impermanence. Lo, living in the Ming, viewed things 
differently. 
In his own life time, Lo considered Buddhism to be a 
significant threat, but the threat was seen to be different 
from the one it presented in the Sung. For Lo, change did 
not mean the impermanence of Buddhism. Change meant 
dynamism, vitality, and the constant process of renewal of 
the natural order. 19 Li had neither priority nor 
17Ch'eng I thought it was wrong to regard li and ch'i 
as two, but could not see them as one. See Bloom, 
Knowledge, 17. Wing-tsi t Chan regards any dualism in Ch' eng 
I's thought as superficial. See Chan, Source Book, 544. 
18Bloom, 'Abstraction, ' 77. 
19Ibid. , 88. 
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permanence, "It was itself the immutably mutable, the 
phenomenon of regularity within process, the inevitability 
and reliability of change as it affects and conditions 
concrete things. 1120 Lo could not comprehend li as separate 
from ch'i. Li was within form and constantly involved in 
the flux of concrete things. This placement of li within 
form and completely inseparable from ch'i has led many to 
describe his thought as monistic or leaning towards monism. 
For Lo, ch'i alone was the single substance of matter that 
formed everything. 
Although he disagreed with Chu Hsi, he thought Chu had 
a balance in his views regarding dualism. Lo believed that, 
those who followed Chu, had lost any kind of resemblance of 
balance. 21 Lo, in reference to Chu Hsi' s idea that li 
produced ch' i and was obviously prior to it, suggested 
looking at the "Great Appendix" of the Book of Changes 
(I-ching) to varify whether or not this idea was supported 
there. 22 
Lo sought to re-establish current Confucian thought in 
the context of the ancient Confucian tradition. In this 
sense, his shift in emphasis away from li to ch'i was a step 
towards recovering the unity of Confucian thought and was 
not revolutionary. 
20Ibid. 
21Ibid. I 85. 
22Ibid. 
Bloom notes that La's ideas are more 
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similar to classical ideas than those of Chu Hsi. 23 Lo 
found problems with inconsistencies in the thought of Ch'eng 
I and Chu Hsi, but felt that Ch'eng Hao's conception of li 
and ch'i had been handled satisfactorily. Ch'eng Hao made 
no distinction between what exists before physical form and 
what exists after, and wrote, "'Concrete things are the Way, 
and Way is concrete things.' 1124 
Since Lo could not find a classical precedent for Chu 
Hsi's dualism, he put forth his conception of ch'i as the 
fundamental reality of the universe with li as its order. 25 
Lo went to the "Discussion of the Trigrams" ( "shuo-kun") and 
the "Appended Remarks" ( "Hsi-tzu chuan") of the Book of 
Changes to formulate a view of li and ch' i that was in 
conformity with the ideas of Confucius, which would give him 
a foundation of classical authority and a philosophical 
cogency or consistency as well. 26 Ch' i, he felt, was 
reality, both physical and phenomenal. Ch'i was forever in 
a process of change and li provided the regularity, 
reliability, the spontaneous order for it. 27 Lo moved from 
Chu Hsi's view that li was perfect and the original cause of 
23Ibid., 84. 
24Wing-tsi t Chan, Neo-Confuncianism, Etc. : 
(Hong Kong: Oriental Society, 1969), 204. 
25Bloom, 'Abstraction, ' 84. 




the natural process to the idea that li was simply the 
pattern to be observed within that natural process. 28 
Bloom emphasizes that Lo did not refer to the Book of 
Changes to refute the Sung conception, but instead that 
" ... La's understanding of principle was essentially 
naturalistic and that his discussions of li and 
ch' i in the K'un-chih chi reflect an impulse to 
reduce, simplify, and clarify the notion of 
principle so that it would be more in keeping with 
his own understanding of a more naturalistic 
concept of principle found in the Book of 
Changes. " 29 
Lo discarded most of what Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi's said about 
li and ch'i, but retained the terms as valid philosophical 
concepts • 30 
Lo's shift away from the emphasis on li, to an emphasis 
on ch'i as the basis of reality, corresponded with a 
heightened interest in the complexity of concrete facts that 
occurred in the mid-Ming. Others, not necessarily in 
connection with Lo, began changing their emphasis to ch'i 
and away from Chu Hsi' s stress on li. 31 Joseph Levenson 
believed that the philosophy of ch'i did not emerge until 
the seventeenth century, and was the production of 
subjective-idealistic thinkers of the Lu-Wang school. Bloom 
disagrees completely, arguing that the philosophy of ch'i 
28Ibid. 
29Bloom, 'Abstraction, ' 86. 
30Ibid. I 86. 
31Ibid. 
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truly emerged in the early sixteenth century and out of the 
Ch' eng-Chu tradition itself. 32 
Lo removed li from the "above form" realm of Chu Hsi, 
which shifted the focus from what was timeless and beyond 
change to the process of change itself . 33 Li was no longer 
prior to ch'i, nor superior to it. In the K'un-chih chi, 
part II, section 35, Lo writes, "Li must be identified as an 
aspect of ch'i, and yet to identify ch'i with li would be 
incorrect. 1134 As if trying to inspire a would-be student 
more, he continues, 
The distinction between the two is very 
slight, and hence it is extremely difficult to 
explain. Rather we must perceive it within 
ourselves and comprehend it in silence. It is one 
thing to speak of "identifying li as an aspect of 
ch'i" and another to speak of "identifying li with 
ch'i." There is a clear difference between them. 
If this is not apparent there is no point in 
explaining further. 35 
Ch' i as the basis of reality was the material that gave 
shape or form to physical things. Li, on the other hand, 
was not a "thing" ( wu) , but a "term" or "designation" (ming) 
for the ways things are in actual fact, for the working of 
nature. 36 In this sense li was an aspect of ch' i, but 
could not be identified with it. 
32Ibid. I 82-3. 
33Ibid. I 91. 
34Bloom, Knowledge, 134. 
35Ibid. 
36Bloom, 'Abstraction, ' 8 3 . 
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Although li, as it was seen in the thought of Ch'eng I 
and Chu Hsi, was abstract, it had specific characteristics 
that could be discussed. One could speak specifically of li 
at length and describe it as perfect, a priori, or as 
permanent. As a result of Lo's shift from emphasizing li to 
emphasizing ch'i, it became difficult to discuss li without 
also mentioning ch'i. In part III, section 3 of the 
K'un-chih chi, Lo writes, "Li is only the li of ch'i. It 
must be observed in the phenomenon of revolving and turning 
ch' i. 1137 Li no longer was as separate, and as such could 
not easily be spoken of out of the context of ch'i. Bloom 
says part II, section 11 of the K'un-chih chi was Lo's 
answer to the critical Neo-Confucian question "what is 
principle?" Note, though, that his answer begins with 
defining ch'i. Lo writes, 
That which penetrates Heaven and earth, 
enduring from past to present, is nothing other 
than material force, which is unitary. Material 
force is originally one but follows an endless 
cycle of movement and tranquility, going and 
coming, opening and closing, rising and falling. 
Having become increasingly obscure, it then becomes 
manifest; through being manifest, it reverts to 
obscurity. It is the warmth and coolness and the 
cold and heat of the four seasons, and the birth, 
growth, gathering in and preservation of all living 
things. It is the people's daily life and social 
relations and the success and failure, gain and 
loss in human affairs. That which for all the 
multitudinousness and complexity cannot be 
disturbed, and which is so even without our knowing 
why it is so, is called principle. From the 
beginning principle is not a separate entity which 
depends on material force for its existence, nor is 
37Bloom, Knowledge, 173. 
it something which "attaches to material force 
and thus operates. 1138 
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The last sentence is a denial of two of the views Chu Hsi 
held of li. Lo thought that li could not be "above form" 
and thus not attached to ch'i. Lo stated, "There is nowhere 
that principle (li) is not fixed. 1139 
In contrast to the earlier conceptions of li, Lo saw li 
as vital and animated, and always right before us. 
Immediately, though, he followed this idea of vitality with 
the fact that it could not be augmented nor diminished in 
the slightest bit, nor could one raise or lower it by the 
slightest fraction. 40 This notion of not being able to 
alter li retained a bit of earlier notions. In Lo's 
interpretation, however, this small similarity ends quickly. 
Earlier Neo-Confucian thought approached ch'i as the cause 
of evil in the world, an issue that will be dealt with more 
fully below. Li, in this earlier view, provided the order 
of reality, but as it connected to ch'i in the formation of 
physical forms its order was obstructed by the impurities of 
the ch'i. Lo argued that li was not something that ensured 
the order of ch'i, as in earlier thought, but that li was 
the order of ch'i. 41 Bloom describes Lo's interpretation 
38Bloom, 'Abstraction, ' 8 3 . 




of li as follows, "As the spontaneous order, the unregulated 
regularity to be perceived in natural and human events, li 
is the reliability, coherence, and unity that characterizes 
those events. 1142 Lo saw the operation of the principle of 
nature as all-pervasive, a regular, orderly process that 
does not permit confusion. It was the reason people were 
humane. 43 
The fixed nature of li in ch'i, solved another problem 
that Lo had with the Neo-Confucian thinkers of the Sung. 
They, he thought, emphasized the accidental differences in 
ch'i in the phenomenon of individuation too much. 44 Within 
their conception of ch'i as impure, they thought that the 
degrees of impurity varied and were controlled by other 
natural factors (the sun, moon, seasons, weather, etc.). 
These varying degrees of impurity were the cause for why 
different people had different characteristics and 
personalities. Lo felt they emphasized this too much and 
did not show enough interest in ch'i in and of itself . 45 
In the view of Sung Nee-Confucians, it was li that was 
important, but as li was "above form" it needed to be added 
to ch'i. In this sense, it was not part of one's intrinsic 
42Ibid. 
43Ibid. I 74. 
44Bloom, 'Abstraction, ' 94. 
45Ibid. 
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nature. 46 Lo, on the other hand, felt that the qualities 
that serve to define a thing must be intrinsic to its 
nature, not external to it. 47 
To differentiate between li and ch'i, Lo thought, was 
arbitrary and unnatural. The differentiation existed, in 
Lo's view, primarily to account for a person's ethical 
potential in terms of the varying quality of ch' i . 48 In 
making this distinction between li and ch' i, the Ming 
Confucian Hsueh Hsilan stated that li and ch'i were 
inseparable, but ch'i was characterized by disintegration 
and integration while li was not. 49 Hsueh was putting 
forth the traditional idea that ch'i was constantly 
changing, but that principle was permanent and unchanging. 
Lo did not agree with this dualism, although he would have 
concurred that ch' i was constantly changing and that li 
could not be changed, as it existed in ch'i. In part II, 
section 23 of the K'un-chih chi, Lo discussed the idea that 
the formation of matter gave rise to the manifold diversity. 
Previously li had been responsible for the existence of 
different things. Man had its own specific li, as did each 
other thing. This idea of earlier Nee-Confucians is often 
compared to Plato's concept of forms, in which things as 
46Ibid. 
47Ibid. 
48Ibid. I 95. 
49Bloom, Knowledge, 147. 
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they exist in our reality are all imperfect copies of their 
ideal or perfect form. Lo, on the contrary, said that 
manifold diversity was produced in the formation of matter. 
He wrote, 
Through the integration of ch' i, there is 
life, and when there is physical form, there is 
existence. When there is this thing, there is 
1 i (principle) . Upon the dis integration of ch' i , 
there is death, and ultimately the thing returns to 
nothingness. When there is no longer this thing, 
there is no longer this li.~ 
This idea of li disappearing with the disintegration of ch'i 
was directly opposed to the traditional idea maintained by 
Hsueh. By stating that li was not permanent, perfect, or 
"above form," Lo essentially removed li from the moral 
sphere, which had more implications throughout La's 
philosophy. 
As Benjamin Elman pointed out, the Japanese scholar 
Yamanoi Yu traced the development of the emphasis on ch'i in 
the Ch'ing back to Lo, yet Wing-tsit Chan states that ch'i 
was primary for the thought of both Chou Tun-i and Chang 
Tsai. Lo would probably argue that ch'i had been thought of 
as primary since the Book of Changes, but that that had 
changed in the sung. 
Chung-ying Cheng describes Chang Tsai's thought as a 
philosophy with implicit, if not explicit, undertones of 
50Ibid., 126-7. 
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pragmatism, naturalism, and monism. 51 Bloom notes, 
however, that Lo did not consider himself a follower of 
Chang and may have disagreed more with him than with Chu 
Hsi.~ Chang distinguished between types of ch'i, unlike 
Lo. For Lo, ch'i was unitary, the same everywhere. Chang 
thought that pure ch'i did not have form. Ch'i only had 
form if it was impure. 53 Chang took the diagram of Chou 
Tun-i and spoke of the Great Ultimate as divided into the 
Great Void and the Great Harmony. He stated that the Great 
Void was identical with pure ch'i. Ch'i went from the Great 
Void into form and upon disintegration back to the Great 
Void. 54 Lo did not agree with this distinction. He wrote, 
The ch'i involved in human breathing is the 
ch'i of the universe. Viewed from the standpoint 
of physical form, it is as if there were the 
distinction of interior and exterior, but this is 
actually only the coming and going of this unitary 
ch' i. 55 
Lo was more in agreement with Chang's idea that ch'i 
was the basic matter of the universe. Chang believed that 
ch'i was the one substance that provided the basis for the 
multiplicity of all things, and stated, "The ch' i of man 
51Chung-ying Cheng I "Reason I Substance I and Human 
Desires in Seventeenth-Century Nee-Confucianism." In deBary, 
Unfolding, 472. 
52Bloom, 'Abstraction, ' 89. 
53Kasoff, 63. 
54Chan, Source Book, 5o1 and 5 O 3 . 
55Bloom, Knowledge, 161. 
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unites him with all things in the universe as if they were 
his family. ""'6 Lo would have agreed that ch' i was indeed 
the basic matter of the universe, but would have made sure 
that one understood that it did not just underlie the 
multiplicity of all things, but caused the multiplicity of 
all things. 
From this basis Chang went on to say that li was a 
property of ch' i. 57 Chung-ying Cheng agrees with Ira 
Kasoff's assessment and writes, "Such is the ch'i monism of 
Chang Tsai (1020-1077) in which li becomes the pattern of 
organization inherent in the substance of ch' i. 1158 Lo's 
thought also resembled this aspect of Chang's thought. In 
the K'un-chih chi, nowhere did Lo attribute aspects of one's 
life to li or ch'i in the sense Chang did. Chang felt that 
life, death, and the longevity and brevity of life were due 
to one's ch'i and could not be changed, but that wealth and 
honor depended on li. 59 
For both Ch'eng I and Ch'eng Hao, the Way could not be 
found outside of ch'i, and for this reason Wing-tsit Chan 
writes, "It should be apparent that while the Ch'eng 
brothers resemble Chang Tsai (Chang Heng-ch'u, 1020-1077) in 
56Berling, 104. 
57Kasoff, 52. 
58Chung-ying Cheng, New Dimensions of Confucian and 
Neo-Confucian Philosophy, (Albany: State University New 
York Press, 1991), 209-10. 
59Chan, Source Book, 512 • 
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emphasizing material force, with them it is no longer the 
basis of existence as with Chang but only the corporeal 
aspect. 116° Ch'eng I also differed from Chang in that he 
thought since the uni verse was a perpetual process of 
production and reproduction that ch' i was not reused. 61 
Ch'i did not disintegrate to be used again, but was a new 
fresh production each time matter was formed. Lo's thought 
came right down the middle on both these differences. Lo 
did not like Chang's term "Great Void," a term many thought 
too Taoist, and did not believe that dispersed ch'i would 
return to to the Great Void, as Chang believed. Ch'i was 
the basis of the universe, but just because ch'i may not 
have a current form it did not go somewhere else, as seen in 
the earlier quote of La's on breathing ch'i. So it did not 
return to the Great Void, nor did Lo see ch'i as impure when 
it was involved in the corporeal aspect, as Chang and the 
Ch'eng brothers did. Lo simply saw ch'i as the product of 
the constant alterations of yin and yang, which will be 
dealt with shortly. Lo also fell in between Chang and 
Ch'eng I in the integration and disintegration of ch'i. Lo 
believed, unlike Ch'eng I, that ch'i continually recycled 
through the process of integration and disintegration, but 
because of Chang's concept of the Great Void did not agree 




In his work Ming-ju Hsueh-an, Huang Tsung-hsi was in 
agreement with Lo and stressed the fact that Lo had stated 
that throughout Heaven and earth and throughout ancient and 
present times there had been and was nothing but ch' i. 62 
Huang, who was also a monist but whose thought was more 
similar to that of Wang Yang-ming, thought La's discussion 
of li and ch'i was precise and accurate. It sufficiently 
clarified Chu Hsi's statements on the separation between li 
and ch'i so that no further argument was necessary. 63 Here 
the word "clarified" is important. In the discussion of 
La's views of li and ch'i above, there were a few 
considerable shifts in emphasis, all of which have further 
implications throughout his philosophy. Despite these 
apparent differences, it was La's intent not to react 
against the thought of Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi, but instead to 
clarify their ideas to re-establish a unity in their 
tradition of orthodox Confucian thought. 
"Principle is one; its particularizations diverse" 
As ch'i provided the foundation for La's thought, the 
idea of "principle is one; its particularizations diverse" 
(li-i fen-shu) cemented his thought together. This idea 
also gave it a coherency and consistency. 
Al though this idea was prominent in the Confucian 
62Cheng, "Reason," 496. 
63Ching, 215. 
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thought of the Sung and became a fundamental tenet of 
Neo-Confucianism, Wing-tsit Chan suggests that it had its 
beginnings in Buddhism. Chan traces the origins to the 
Buddhist Tao-sheng (d.434), and writes, 
Few realize it actually originated with 
Tao-sheng. To Neo-Confucianists, of course, the 
one principle and the many manifestations are 
equally real whereas to Tao-sheng the multiplicity 
is to be transcended by li. 64 
To transcend the multiplicity and obtain li was the 
attainment of Buddhahood. 
Despite its putative origins in Buddhism, this idea was 
incorporated into Nee-Confucian thought from its outset. 
Chou Tun-i, one of the thinkers responsible for the initial 
construction of Nee-Confucian thought in the Sung, developed 
the concept that "'Many are [ultimately] one, and the one is 
actually differentiated into the many.'"~ Lo liked this 
idea as put forth by Chou and commented, "Here he illumines 
the wonder of creation in all its aspects. " 66 
The Ch'eng brothers, especially Ch'eng I, emphasized 
this idea of one, yet many. Ch'eng Hao commented on li, "It 
is many but it is essentially one, for all specific 
principles are but principle. 1167 Al though this was not the 
main point of emphasis in his thought, it was a significant 
64Chan, Etc., 65. 
65Chan, Source Book, 460. 
66Bloom, Knowledge, 125. 
67Chan, Source Book, 519 . 
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determinant in why he saw the world as a unity. Ch'eng I 
specifically stressed the doctrine that principle is one, 
but its manifestations many. 68 
Chang Tsai does not seem to have used this idea in 
connection with his concept of li, but his thought contained 
a similar, if not parallel, idea. This parallel, though, 
was rooted in his conception of ch'i. He made the 
distinction between the pure ch'i, or undifferentiated ch'i, 
and impure ch'i, or condensed ch'i. The undifferentiated 
ch'i was perfectly good and the same in everything and 
everyone. The condensed ch'i, on the other hand, with its 
impurities was individual to each thing and person. These 
ideas of Chang were in no way compatible with the idea of 
"principle is one; its particularizations di verse," 
especially since condensed ch'i was impure, but some of the 
ideas to maintain unity were similar. 
Lo disliked Chang's conception of ch'i, but was 
ecstatic upon realizing the importance of this idea of 
"principle is one; its particularizations diverse." Bloom 
comments on the idea, "This pregnant formula, generally 
thought to have originated with Ch'eng I, is reinterpreted 
by Lo to account for the fact of unity within phenomenal 
diversity, which had been and remained a central problem in 
Neo-Confucian ontology. 1169 The reinterpretation went back 
68Ibid., 521. 
69Bloom, Knowledge, 18. 
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to the differences in the conception of li as discussed 
above. Ch'eng I viewed li as "above form," perfect, and the 
cause of the manifold diversity. Lo did not view things in 
the same way. He saw li as entirely coming from the same 
source, but since li was inherent in all things it was 
divided into many "particularizations." Ch' eng I and Lo 
both used the idea in similar ways, and Lo discovered the 
significance of the idea while trying to understand another 
of Ch'eng I's ideas, but still the philosophy behind the two 
thinkers' uses of the idea were considerably different. 
Lo struggled over a long period of time trying to 
understand Ch'eng I's idea "nature is principle." It was 
through the concept "principle is one; its 
particularizations diverse" that Lo found he could maintain 
a consistency in his philosophy and accept the idea "nature 
is principle. 1170 In part I, section 74 of the K'un-chih 
chi, he wrote, "The principle which is endowed [in all 
living things] is one ... The principle of nature is one. 1171 
In this same section he stated that the particularizations 
were introduced through alternations of yin and yang. Bloom 
notes that for Lo, li was universally expressed in all 
things and was therefore one, and not in the sense of many 
of his predecessors that li was one because it was identical 
70 Ibid • I 1 71 • 
71Ibid. I 107. 
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everywhere in everything. 72 Li, as manifested in 
particularizations, differed in that they assumed discrete 
forms and followed particular patterns of life. 73 Lo 
writes, 
At the inception of life when they are first 
endowed with ch'i, the principle of human beings 
and things is just one. After having attained 
physical form, their particularizations are 
diverse. That their particularizations are diverse 
is nothing but natural principle, for the oneness 
of their principle always exists within diverse 
particularizations. 74 
In another spot, he writes more specifically, 
At the time they are first endowed with ch'i, 
the nature of a dog or an ox is always one with 
that of man, while after having taken on physical 
form, the nature of a dog or an ox is naturally not 
the same as the nature of man. 75 
Bloom notes that Lo primarily used the idea of 
"principle is one; its particularizations di verse" in an 
ontological sense, while others used it other ways and 
contexts. 76 One of the other principle contexts would be 
the "investigation of principle" (ko-wu) which was a 
fundamental doctrine in Neo-Confucianism and will be treated 
in more depth later. To highlight the significance of the 





76Bloom, 'Abstraction,' 95. 
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Neo-Confucianism, as li was generally seen as "above form," 
one was to investigate the li in things, most often in texts 
and human affairs, to understand the li in that thing. The 
investigation was driven by a search for the moral truth. 
Over time, one would theoretically investigate li in many 
things and ultimately understand that li was one and thus 
become a sage. This approach, though, did not tend to 
increase the awareness of concrete objects. Since Lo took 
li out of the moral sphere and emphasized ch'i, his view of 
"principle is one; its particularizations di verse" was 
different. Bloom notes, "The reason that Lo's 
interpretation of the formula li-i fen-shu is so important 
is that his monism does not seek to erase the awareness of 
phenomenal diversity but actually to heighten it. 1177 
In response to Chu Hsi's dualism, Lo felt, "Only in 
'principle is one; its particularizations are diverse' is 
everything encompassed, nothing left uncomprehended. 1178 In 
this phrase he found consistency. Lo's wonder of the idea 
is evident in the following quote: 
I submit that the wondrous truth of the nature 
and endowment is summarized in the expression, 
"Principle is one; its particularizations diverse 
(li-i fen-shu)." This is simple and yet complete, 
concise and yet utterly penetrating. [The 
operation of principle] owes nothing to artificial 
constraint or compulsion, and by its nature it 
77Bloom, Know 1 edge, 2 2. 
78Ibid. I 67. 
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surely cannot be changed.~ 
All of La's thought hinged on the idea of an ultimate 
unity of all things, but he did not de-emphasize the 
diversity because of his desire for unity. Each individual 
thing as part of its physical form had its own li which 
impelled it to complete its own life cycle or destiny. 80 
Bloom writes, "In simplest terms, it is the propensity of 
all living things to conform to an orderly process of change 
and development. 1181 The diversity was important to Lo, but 
the most significant point in this idea was the ultimate 
unity. In part I, section 6 of the K'un-chih chi Lo gave 
his view of "principle is one; its particularizations 
diverse" and ended by quoting Mencius. 
Man is like other living things, and I am like 
other men. Could there be any difference in 
respect to our principle? But after physical form 
is complete, the particularizations of principle 
are necessarily diverse. Because of the diversity 
of particularizations, each has his own body. 
Because of the unity of principle "everything is 
complete in me. ns2 
The phrase "everything is complete in me" epitomizes 
the consistency and unity that drove Lo's thought. The 
source of this principle and of everything was yin and yang, 
and ultimately the Great Ultimate. 
79Bloom, 'Abstraction,' 95. 
80Ibid., 95-6. 
81Ibid., 95. 
82Bloom, Knowledge, 53. 
The source of ultimate principle is simply 
the two phases of activity and tranquility. As 
there is tranquility, there is unity; as there is 
activity, there is manifold diversity. This is 
the same in Heaven (or nature) and in man. 83 
The Great Ultimate, Yin and Yang, and the Way 
Lo's conception of "principle is one; 
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its 
particularizations diverse" provided consistency to his 
thought, but it was only an aspect of the larger picture. 
One can see this to be a truth in the reality of the 
uni verse, but it was not the uni verse itself. Lo stuck with 
many of the conceptual basics of the understanding of the 
uni verse as they were set up by his predecessors in the 
Sung. He saw the universe as a constant process of change 
and transformation, and that "sending forth and nourishing 
all things" was the function and accomplishment of the 
creative transformations of the universe. 
If one carefully reflects on this and grasps 
it, heaven and man, things and self, inner and 
outer, beginning and end, darkness and light, the 
lessons of birth and death, and the conditions of 
positive and negative spiritual forces (a) should 
perform and all pervading unity(b) with nothing 
left behind. Thus, when we speak of the myriad 
things, is there any that is after all external to 
our own nature? ( c )84 
83Ibid. I 67. 
84Ibid., 55. (a) "The circumstances of dark and light," 
"the lessons of birth and death," and "the conditions of 
positive and negative spiritual forces," are allusions to 
the "Appended Remarks" in the Book of Changes, 7:5b-6a. (b) 
Analects, 4:15:1. (c) In Chu Tzu yu-1ei(Classified 
Conversations of Master Chu Hsi), 4:5b, Chu states that, "In 
the universe there is no single thing that is external to 
87 
The idea of the Great Ultimate in Nee-Confucian thought 
began with Chou Tun-i, although because of its similarities 
to Taoist diagrams it was and is often considered to be 
Taoist in origin. Wing-tsit Chan notes that though its 
origins may be debatable the diagram put forth by Chou 
discarded the fantasy and mysticism of Taoism and provided 
a basis for rational philosophy. 85 In Diagram of the Great 
Ultimate Explained (T'ai-chi T'u-shuo), Chou wrote, "The 
five phases are the one yin and yang; the yin and yang are 
the one Great Ultimate; and the Great Ultimate is 
fundamentally the Ultimate of Nonbeing."u Many Confucians 
disliked Chou's use of the phrase "Ultimate of Nonbeing" 
because of its Taoist undertones, but the basics of seeing 
the five phases as a product of yin and yang, and yin and 
yang being the Great Ultimate was generally accepted among 
the Confucians of his time. This conception of the Great 
Ultimate, despite discrepancies and disagreements over 
details, gives Neo-Confucianism an holistic philosophy. 
Chou held the belief that the Way of Heaven was to change 
and transform, in that way everything would obtain its 
correct nature and destiny. 
our nature." Conrad Schirokauer notes also Hu Hung's 
sttement in Hu Tzu chih-yen(Master Hu's Understanding 
Words), 1:6b: "There is no thing outside the nature and no 
nature outside things." 
85Chan, Source Book, 4 6 o . 
86Berling, 186-7. 
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Chang Tsai, like Chou, began with the conception of the 
Great Ultimate, but unlike other Confucians, split it into 
two parts. Most Confucians believed the Great Ultimate 
produced yin and yang and did not include anything else. 
Chang, though, divided the Great Ultimate into the Great 
Void and the Great Harmony. The Great Void held the perfect 
undifferentiated ch'i, while the Great Harmony was an 
agglomeration of ch'i in the harmony of yin and yang. 87 
Chang did not see yin and yang and the five agents 
(same as Chou's "five phases" above) as the generative 
forces of the universe. 88 He thought things were generated 
in the process of ch' i moving from its undifferentiated 
state into form, and thus saw existence as a perpetual 
integration and disintegration. 89 As pure ch'i and impure 
ch' i came together, they united and gave rise to the 
concrete, producing everything. 90 
Chang considered the Great Harmony and the Great Void 
as "above form." At first glance this may not be a problem, 
in that many considered the Great Ultimate to be "above 
form," including Lo. For some, the problem came from Chang 
saying the Great Void was full of ch'i, placing ch'i "above 
form." This was a problem for Lo, but another problem for 
87McMorran , 4 3 6 . 
88Chan I Source Book I 4 9 5 . 
89Ibid. 
90Ibid. , 505. 
89 
Lo in this idea was that it divided ch'i. An additional 
problem was that Chang conceived the Great Harmony to be the 
coexistence of the two polar forces (yin and yang) in a 
harmonious unity, which placed yin and yang "above form." 
In Chang's conception of the diagram of the Great Ultimate, 
he viewed the Way as the constant integration and 
disintegration of ch' i, which happened "above form." In his 
work Cheng-meng (Correcting the Unenlightened) , 91 Chang 
wrote, 
All that is above form is called the Way. It 
is just that the place where being and non-being 
come together, the place of form and no-form, is 
difficult to understand. You must understand that 
ch'i originates here. 92 
The Ch' eng brothers and Chu Hsi did not think ch' i 
existed in the "above form" realm. Ch' eng I criticized 
Chang, 
Ch' i is below form. If the Great Void is 
ch'i, then it is below form. Being below form it 
cannot be used to describe the Way, which is above 
form. 93 
Lo did not consider himself a follower of Chang, and may 
have disagreed with Chang more than Chu Hsi, 94 but he did 
not agree with Ch'eng I's idea either. Lo thought the Way 
was to be found in yin and yang, which was below form. 
91Ibid. , 496. 
92Kasoff, 40-1. 
93Ibid. , 41. 
94Bloom, 'Abstraction,' 89. 
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Ch'eng Hao did not agree totally with his brother either, 
and saw more of a unity, one that Lo thought satisfactory. 
Ch'eng Hao wrote the following, 
What exists before physical form [and is 
therefore without it] constitutes the Way. What 
exists after physical form [and is therefore with 
it] constitutes concrete things. Nevertheless, 
though we speak in this way, concrete things are 
the Way and the Way is concrete things. 95 
Another term that was found in the discussion of the 
Great Ultimate and yin and yang was shen. In discussing 
Chang Tsai' s philosophy, Ira Kasoff translates shen as 
"marvelous." In her work on Lo, Bloom translates it as 
"spirit." 
Chang notes that in ancient texts, shen was used to 
emphasize the inscrutable, wondrous aspect of Change, or the 
Way. 96 Chang thought the interaction of yin and yang was 
shen. He saw yin and yang as "above form," and everything 
invisible and "above form" was shen. 97 
Ch'eng Hao, on the other hand, saw shen as immanent in 
all things and could not understand how Chang could place 
such a limit on it. Ch'eng Hao wrote, 
outside of qi there is no such thing as the 
marvelous and outside of the marvelous there is no 
qi. Someone [i.e., Chang] said the pure is 
marvelous. Does this mean that the impure is not 
95Chan, Source Book, 5 2 7 . 
96Kasoff, 61. 
97Ibid. , 62. 
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marvelous?98 
Chang saw ch'i as one thing with two substances, 
because it was one it was shen, because it was two it was 
transformed. Lo used similar language, but the one, for Lo, 
was the Great Ultimate, and the two yin and yang. 
The two translations of shen as marvelous and spirit 
show the difficulty in conceptualizing what was meant by it. 
Chang used shen as a name for the force behind the visible 
processes of heaven-and-earth, and to describe the fact that 
everything was one. 99 Lo's and Chang's philosophies differ 
greatly in parts, even in the context of what shen referred 
to, but these uses of shen were remarkably similar in their 
usage. Kasoff writes of shen, " ... precisely because it was 
the term he used to describe the indescribable ... Chang had 
difficulty conveying its meaning. 11100 
In the I-shu (Written Legacy of the Ch'eng 
Brothers), 101 Ch'eng Hao wrote the following of shen, 
The cold of winter and heat of summer are yin 
and yang. That by which they are moved and 
98Ibid., 63. Kasoff uses qi to make a distinction in 
his translation of Chang's thought. Because Chang saw 
undifferentiated Ch' i as different from condensed ch' i, 
Kasoff translates the former with a capitalized "C" and the 
latter with a lower case "c" and uses qi when both are 
included. As other thinkers do not make this distinction 
among ch'i as Chang did Kasoff uses qi to describe the more 
typical unitary view of ch'i. 
99Ibid. I 63-4. 
100Ibid., 63. 
101Bloom, Know 1 edge, 2 21. 
transformed is the marvelous force . 102 
He also wrote, 
The marvelous is a word to express the 
wondrousness of the myriad things . 103 
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As with "principle is one; its particularizations 
diverse," Lo used the concept of shen in connection with the 
Great Ultimate and yin and yang to show the unity of 
everything. In part I, section 37 of the K'un-chih chi, Lo 
made the following comment in regard to the idea "principle 
is one; its particularizations diverse," but the language 
closely resembles his discussion of shen. He wrote, 
"Principle (li) is one. Only in response to action will 
there be form. 11104 In applying this quote to the idea of 
shen, the "one" could refer to the Great Ultimate, and 
action to the alternations of yin and yang which produce the 
concrete things. He continued, "Once there is action there 
is duality. 11105 The duality ref erred to a di vision into 
particularizations, but could also, in regards to shen, 
refer to yin and yang. He finished, "Without duality, there 
would not be unity. Within heaven-and-earth, action and 
response are everywhere and therefore principle is 
102Kasof f, 6 3 . 
103Ibid. 
104Bloom, Knowledge, 82. The quoted sentences in the 




everywhere. " 106 Again the duality here mirrors the idea of 
yin and yang, which produced everything, but in that the 
duality still contained the unity of the Great Ultimate, 
therfore the Great Ultimate was everywhere. 
The stretch from principle to the Great Ultimate and 
the duality to yin and yang in the previous quote may seem 
to be big, but in the next section Lo wrote, 
Spirit (shen) and transformation (hua) are the 
mysterious functioning of heaven and earth. Were 
it not for yin and yang, there would be no 
transformation in the world, and were it not for 
the Great Ultimate, there would be no spirit. 
However to conclude from this that the Great 
Ultimate is spirit and that yin and yang are 
transformation would be invalid. For 
transformations result from the action of yin and 
yang, but yin and yang are not transformation. 
Spirit results from the action of the Great 
Ultimate, and yet the Great Ultimate is not spirit. 
The word "action" (wei) expresses what [Mencius] 
called, "that which in enacted without an agent" 
(mo chih wei erh wei che).(a) 
Master Chang said, "Unity is the condition for 
spirit. Duality is the condition for 
transformation."(b) The word "transformation" here 
refers to movement and action, whereas the word 
"spirit" refers to permanence and abiding. 
Although transformation involves duality, its 
action is always unitary. Spirit is originally 
unitary, and yet is always present within duality. 
United we call it spirit; divided we call it 
transformation. Thus when one speaks of 
transformation spirit is included, and when one 
speaks of spirit, transformation is included. Yin 
and yang include the Great Ultimate, the Great 
Ultimate includes yin and yang. Unity implies 
duality and duality implies unity (i erh erh; erh 
erh i). The student must realize this so as to 
distinguish clearly between substance and function, 
for those who make the least error in this regard 
io6Ibid. 
" 
seldom avoid drifting in the direction of 
Buddhism. 107 
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In the idea "principle is one; its particularizations 
diverse," people and things were all united as one, since 
everything contains principle. It is the same with the 
Great Ultimate. Lo stated above that yin and yang include 
the Great Ultimate, and in the process of production through 
the continual succession of yin and yang, the Great Ultimate 
was included in everything. So not only are all things 
connected in the concept of li, but also in the concept of 
the Great Ultimate. Lo quoted a passage from the Book of 
Changes-- "'There is in the changes the Great Ultimate'"--
which he believed meant that the Great Ultimate was 
everywhere and it was identical with "equilibrium, 11108 an 
important idea that will be dealt with below in more detail. 
Others interpreted this idea that the Great Ultimate 
was present in the changes, to mean that there was a single 
controlling power amid the transformations of yin and yang. 
Lo did not think this was the case. He thought "change" 
referred to the two primary forces, four secondary forms, 
and eight trigrams, 109 and that "Great Ultimate" was a 
107Ibid., (a) Mencius 5A:6:2. (b) Chang Tsai in 
Cheng-meng, "Ts'an-liang" sec., no. 2, in Chang Tzu 
ch'uan-shu, 2:5b. 
108Ibid., 134. 
109The two primary forces refer to yin and yang, which 
interact to produce the four secondary forms. "Yin and yang 
interact and generate the four secondary forms of Heaven; 
the element of weakness and the element of strength interact 
<€ 
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collective name for all principles taken together . 110 He 
thought that the Great Ultimate was the single source that 
through dispersal produced the manifold diversity. 111 
The Great Ultimate assumed an important role in Lo's 
thought because it provided unity for all things as their 
source, but Lo wrote much more on yin and yang and change. 
Yin and yang were important because they were the Way. Lo 
wrote, 
The transformations of heaven and earth, the 
life of human beings and other living things, the 
beauty of ritual, the mysteries of positive and 
negative spiritual forces, the passage of time, the 
metamorphoses of life and death, the circumstances 
of good and ill fortune, remorse and humiliation--
the theories about them are endless. Yet they may 
be summarized in a single phrase: "Yin and yang 
succeeding one another is called the Way."(a) 112 
Lo felt that Ch'eng Hao had a correct understanding of yin 
and yang and the Way, but felt his younger brother Ch'eng I 
had made a distinction between yin and yang and the Way. 113 
Lo believed Chu Hsi's dualism of li and ch'i was 
and generate the four secondary forms of earth; and 
consequently the eight trigrams are completed." From Wm. 
Theodore deBary, ed., Sources of Chinese Tradition, vol.1, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 462. The 
eight trigrams are ch' ien = , tui :.: , li ::= , chen:..:: , 
sun=., k'an ==, ken:=, and k'un ==. From Fung, Yu-lan. 
A History of Chinese Philosophy, vol.II. trans. Derk Bodde, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 456. 
110Bloom, Knowledge, 59. 
111Ibid. 
112Ibid. I 76. 
7:7A. 
113Ibid. I 59. 
(a)Book of Changes, "Appended Remarks," 
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problematic, but quoted a line that he agreed with from a 
letter of Chu's to K'o Kuo-ts'ai. Chu wrote, "'Yin and yang 
succeeding one another in ceaseless alternation is the 
complete substance of the way. ' "114 
As yin and yang constituted the Way, they deserved 
close attention. Shao Yung, the last of the prominent Sung 
Confucians to be mentioned, used the phrase "consummate 
mystery" to describe the alternation of activity and 
tranquility. Lo wrote, "In this single phrase--consummate 
mystery--the principle of the nature and endowment is fully 
expressed. 11115 In this, the principle of the nature ( li) 
and the endowment (ch'i) were expressed through the 
continued succession of yin and yang as the producer of the 
myriad things. As things were formed in this process they 
received the li and ch'i together and were thus expressed. 
Lo saw the activity of yin and yang as causing man to be 
influenced by things, which resulted in men being 
active. 116 
Yin and yang were in constant succession and therefore 
continually in a state of production. Because of this, yin 
and yang were synonymous with change, and change was the key 
to understanding. In the second section of part I of the 
K'un-chih chi, Lo quoted a passage from the Book of Changes, 
114Ibid., 60. 
115Ibid. , 80. 
116Ibid. , 100. 
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"Appended Remarks," that read, "'The changes are the means 
by which the sage reaches the depths and studies the subtle 
activating forces (of all things].' 11117 In emphasizing the 
importance of change, Lo later quoted the ch'ien hexagram of 
the Book of Changes, "'The Way of heaven works through 
change and transformation so that each thing receives its 
proper nature and destiny.' 11118 Although a sage could not 
alter the transformations, he needed to understand the 
principles involved so that he could follow them, live in 
accordance with them and by doing so further human 
interests. 119 
By viewing li and ch' i as inseparable, Lo began to 
build a foundation for a coherent, consistent system of 
Confucian thought. Through the concept of "principle is 
one; its particularizations diverse," he found a cohesive 
element to bring substance to his thought. And with his 
conception of the Great Ultimate and yin and yang he defined 
the Way, which ran through the realms of heaven-and-earth 
and of man. Lo found much in Ch'eng Hao's thought that he 
agreed with, but he thought the following was utterly 
incisive, 
"The workings of high heaven have neither 
sound nor smell." (a) As substance it is called 
change; as principle it is called the Way; in its 
117Ibid. I 50. 
118Ibid. I 53. 
119Ibid. I 115. 
functioning, it is called spirit; as an endowment 
in human beings it is called the nature. 1 w 
98 
What is that endowment in human beings that is called 
the nature? What does it have to do with the Great 
Ultimate, yin and yang, the Way, and li and ch'i? With the 
fundamental metaphysical views of Lo laid out, the 
implications that resulted from his changes may be seen more 
clearly. 
120Ibid., 126. (a )Mean, 33: 6, quoting Ode 235. 
CHAPTER 3 
The Implications of La's Monism 
Having discussed the fundamentals of li and ch'i, the 
idea "principle is one; its particularizations di verse, 11 and 
the Great Ultimate in response to the first question posed 
by Kasoff, we can move to address the second question: Of 
what does human nature consist? To answer this question it 
is necessary to first understand Lo's conception of human 
nature and how it relates to the rest of the universe. From 
there the discussion can move to Lo's views on feelings and 
desires and how they fit into his conception of the 
existence of only one nature, and finally to what the 
relationship of the nature is to the mind. We begin with 
Lo's conception of human nature as it developed from his 
notions of li and ch'i and the Way. 
One Nature, Not Two 
As seen earlier, Lo did not agree with some of his 
predecessors' dualistic views of li and ch' i. Their dualism 
caused him great consternation as he struggled to reconcile 
his views of li and ch' i and human nature. The Sung 
Confucians that Lo followed and others after them used 
100 
different terms to describe the nature of heaven (t'ien-li) 
and what was the physical nature (ch' i-chi chi hsing). They 
associated the nature of heaven with li, which meant that 
the nature of heaven, or the original nature, was perfect 
and unchanging. Human nature (hsing) was associated with 
the nature of Heaven and thus originally good, but the 
physical nature, associated with ch' i, was impure and 
subject to error, evil, and hopefully, cultivation. 
Lo thought this dichotomy of essential li and 
accidental ch'i (accidental because everyone received wide 
ranging variations of impurities that were restricted to 
one's own self alone) was unconvincing and unnatural. 1 So 
to maintain consistency with his view of li and ch'i as one, 
Lo discarded the distinction between an idealistic and a 
physical nature to make a single, more monistic and 
naturalistic, nature. Lo considered the nature of Heaven, 
human nature, and physical nature to be identical, though 
these specific terms may be used to refer to different 
manifestations of it. 
Chang Tsai, who some have described as a monist, said 
the following of the nature of man, 
Whether integrated or disintegrated, it is my 
body just the same. One is qualified to discuss 
the nature of man when he realizes that death is 
not annihilation. 2 
1 Bloom, 'Abstraction,' 94. 
2 Chan, Source Book, 501. 
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This gives the impression of a single nature, but Wing-tsit 
Chan notes that Chang never made his idea of the nature 
clear, nor did he explain why some ch'i was more impure 
relative to other ch' i . 3 Chang, however, did see human 
nature as having two aspects: the universal nature or 
nature of heaven and the physical nature. The nature of 
man, in Chang's thought, consistent with the ideas of 
Mencius, was invariably good. 4 The physical nature 
naturally developed problems because only impure ch'i was 
used to give things physical form. 
So, though his terms differ slightly from those of 
Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi, their views were similar in that it 
was ch'i that gave rise to physical form, and determined 
one's abilities, qualities, and personal weaknesses. These 
ideas also provided the opportunity for retaining one's 
goodness through being able to return and thus preserve the 
universal nature. 5 
It is, in light of the potential to return to the 
universal nature through cultivation, that Chang's following 
comment becomes understandable, "Nature permeates beyond the 
material force and destiny operates within the material 
force. 116 
3Ibid. I 504. 
4McMorran, 442. 
5 Ibid. 
6Chan, Source Book, 508. 
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Lo rejected the distinction between the nature of 
heaven and the physical nature. Bloom writes of Lo, 
Here it must be observed that underlying his 
rejection of this distinction was his refusal to 
accept the notion that there was any such 
transcendent reality as the supreme Vacuity, out 
which finite reality emerged and into which it 
would ultimately be subsumed. 7 
Lo thought Chang's distinction between the universal nature 
and physical nature clearly demonstrated that Chang, too, 
had a dualistic tendency.a 
The distinction between two natures in the thought of 
Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi was a primary point on which Lo felt 
their philosophies had not been able to "recover the 
ultimate unity. 119 This was one of the points which Lo felt 
must be reconciled so that there would be more consistency 
in Confucian thought. 
Like Chang Tsai, Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi both spoke of an 
original nature and a physical nature. For Ch'eng and Chu, 
the original nature was associated with li and was therefore 
perfectly good. Physical nature was bound up with one's 
endowment of ch'i, and was consequently tainted. Original 
nature was universal among things, but physical nature was 
particular10 to each thing due to the endowment of ch' i, 
7 Bloom, 'Abstraction,' 89. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Bloom, Knowledge, 17. 
10Ibid. 
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which varied due to the circumstances under which the thing 
received its endowment, or form. For Ch'eng and Chu it was 
possible through personal cultivation, an idea that will be 
discussed under Kasoff's fourth question below, that one 
could clear away the impurities of one's ch'i to allow 
original nature to be more fully expressed. Bloom comments, 
In line with his monism of ch'i, Lo Ch'in-shun 
reflects the notion of two natures, insisting once 
again that it is without either classical precedent 
or philosophical justification. The nature is 
one. 11 
Bloom also notes that the idea of a distinction between two 
natures does not depend on dualism, but that they do however 
fit well •12 
Although Lo denied Ch'eng I's dualism and his 
conception of two natures, Lo did accept his idea "nature is 
1 . " 1. Lo did not accept this idea readily, and only did so 
after agonizing over the idea for a lengthy period of time. 
He finally concluded that the subtle truth of nature and 
endowment were contained in the idea of "principle is one; 
its particularizations diverse."13 
Lo noted, that although, Ch'eng I wrote in the I-shu 
that it was wrong to regard the nature and ch'i as two, he 




14Ibid. I 64. 
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of the K'un-chih chi, Lo commented on Chang's, Ch'eng I's, 
and Chu Hsi's application of two names to a single nature. 
Lo quoted the Doctrine of the Mean to argue that there were 
not two natures, "'What heaven has endowed is called the 
nature. Following one's nature is called the Way.'"15 Lo 
argued that there should not be a distinction between 
original nature and physical nature. What was given by 
heaven should be followed. One should not have to forsake 
a so-called physical nature, or endowment of ch'i, to return 
to the original nature. Following this quote of the 
Doctrine of the Mean, Lo wrote, 
But when we speak of the nature endowed by 
Heaven, this already entails the physical being. 
And when we speak of the physical nature, isn't 
this the nature endowed by Heaven? To a single 
nature they applied two names, and, moreover, spoke 
of the physical being and the endowment of Heaven 
as if they were opposed, so that in the final 
analysis their argument turned out to be unclear. 16 
Lo did not agree with Chang Tsai's, Ch'eng I's, and Chu 
Hsi's views on nature, but Lo did approve of Ch'eng Hao's 
monistic tendencies and his complex view of human nature, 
which Lo felt avoided some of the problems found in the 
thought of the others. 17 Ch'eng Hao thought that nature, 
what is inborn, was the same as ch'i and that ch'i was the 
15Ibid. 
16Ibid. I 66. 
17Bloom, 'Abstraction,' 75. 
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same as nature. 18 Lo accepted the idea, as noted above, 
that nature is li. In La's thought, however, since li was 
an aspect of ch'i, his idea and Ch'eng Hao's were 
comparable, but not identical. Ch'eng Hao's assertion was 
quite contradictory to his brother Ch'eng I's idea, who drew 
a clearer distinction between li and ch'i. 
Lo's conception of a monism of ch'i and his search for 
ultimate unity and consistency led him to reject the notion 
of two natures in favor of a single nature. His fundamental 
shift in emphasis from li to ch'i, led to this important 
shift to a single nature, and also another fundamental move 
away from the conception of human nature commonly held in 
the Sung. The view of a single nature created a shift in 
the role and place of feelings and desires within human 
nature. This move away from Sung Confucian thought, Lo 
felt, shifted the emphasis back towards the more classical 
Confucian views and thus towards recovering the ultimate 
unity. 
Feelings and Desires 
The most significant result of Lo's denial of the idea 
of two natures, was the corresponding breakdown of the 
tension between the Principle of Nature (t'ien-li, nature of 
Heaven) and human desires (jen-yu). 19 Within the framework 
18Chan, Source Book, 5 2 7 . 
19Bloom, Knowledge, 20. 
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of two natures, human desires were an impediment to 
returning to and preserving of the original nature. So 
those who held the position that there were two natures also 
believed that one must rid oneself of desires. 
Lo disagreed completely, and believed that desires and 
emotions were signs and expressions of human nature. They 
were natural and in conformity with li. 20 They needed to 
be regulated for the sake of oneself and others so they did 
not reach the extremity of selfishness, but they did not 
need to be repressed. Lo referred to the written work 
Mencius and the "Record of Music" in the Book of Rites to 
show that the ancients viewed the human emotional and 
appetitive nature as fundamental and worthy of 
cultivation. 21 
The negative view of the emotions began in 
Neo-Confucian thought as early as Chou Tun-i. Chou thought 
desires, emotions, and the distractions of external things 
harmed the unity and sincerity of mind. An idea similar to 
Buddhism and Taoism. They disrupted the quiescence of mind, 
which he considered fundamental to the basis of moral 
knowledge and thus to moral action. 22 For Chou, 




23Chan , Source Book, 4 6 3 . 
"Feelings are not genuine but obscure. 
thousand ways. 1124 
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They change in a 
Wing-tsit Chan points out that Chang's advocation of 
having no desires is not an idea found in earlier Confucian 
thought, and that Mencius had suggested having few 
desires. 25 Lo agreed completely. Chan is of the opinion 
that Chou's insistence on eliminating desires was a Taoist 
inf 1 uence . 26 Shao Yung felt similarly to Chou, and 
said, "Our nature is impartial and enlightened, but our 
feelings are partial and deceived. 1127 In agreement with 
Chou and Shao, Chang Tsai felt that our good nature was 
blocked by human desires and emotions. Chang said, "Those 
who understand the higher things return to the Principle of 
Nature (t'ien-li,Principle of Heaven) while those who 
understand lower things follow human desires. 1128 For 
Chang, the physical nature was the source of evil in man and 
the superior man necessarily denied parts of his physical 
nature, namely human desires, to be his original nature. 29 
Ch'eng I also felt desires to be troublesome. Ch'eng 
Hao did not make distinctions between internal and external, 
24Ibid. I 479. 
25Ibid. I 473. 
26Ibid. 
27Ibid. I 492. 
28Ibid. I 509. 
29Ibid. I 511. 
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but Ch'eng I did. He saw external things as problematic 
because they gave rise to desires. 30 Ch' eng I wrote , 
"Seriousness is unselfishness. As soon as one lacks 
seriousness, thousands of selfish desires arise to injure 
his humanity. 1131 It is important to note that selfish 
desires could injure his humanity, for humanity, the ability 
to constantly, spontaneously act humanely, were an integral, 
fundamental piece of sagehood. Thus injury to one's 
humanity was a considerable setback in the Confucian journey 
towards sagehood. 
Ch'eng I did not, however, necessarily advocate 
complete repression of feelings and desires. He felt the 
enlightened person controlled his feelings so that he did 
not deviate from the mean. 32 His fear of the potential 
damage of desires however, pushed his thought much more 
towards the repression of desires, and further from Lo's 
idea of embracing desires as natural. Ch'eng I wrote, 
In nourishing the mind there is nothing better 
than having few desires. Without desires, there 
will be no delusion. One does not need to be 
submerged in desires. Merely to have intention is 
already desire. 33 
In another part, though, when speaking of pleasure, anger, 
sorrow, and joy, he wrote, "As they are aroused and attain 
30Berling, 119. 
31Chan, Source Book, 556. 
32Ibid. I 548. 
33Ibid. I 553. 
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their due degree, they are good, no matter in what 
direction. 1134 
This idea of Ch'eng I's was much closer to La's view, 
apart from the fundamental difference between Ch' eng I 
seeing the desires as removing one further from his original 
nature and Lo seeing them as part of the nature and possibly 
taking one away from what was appropriate. Lo quoted a 
passage from the "Record of Music" in the Book of Rites to 
substantiate his view of desires, 
Man is tranquil at birth; this is 
heaven-endowed nature. When, influenced by things, 
he begins to be active, that is desire arising from 
his nature. 35 
Lo thought that some desires were necessary and could 
not be repressed and that some were appropriate and could 
not be changed . He wondered, if desires conform to the 
principle of what was appropriate, how could they not be 
good?36 Lo did not agree with previous Confucians who had 
tried to eliminate or severely restrain desires. He wrote, 
It is only heedlessly giving way to the 
passions, indulging desires, and not knowing how to 
turn back that is evil .... The desires, together 
with pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy, are 
qualities of the nature. 37 
Lo viewed the principles of the seven emotions as each 
34Ibid. I 66. 




rooted in the nature. 38 Even so, he also felt there was a 
need to regulate them. One could not follow one's desires 
to the extreme and justify such actions because the desires 
were rooted in the nature. Lo wrote, "The Way is 
everywhere, of course, but one must be in accord with moral 
principle and free of selfishness before it can be 
considered the Way. 1139 In another spot he wrote of the 
need to regulate the desires in the following way, 
Heaven (or nature) produces people with 
desires. By following their desires people find 
pleasure. From the flouting of them they feel 
anger. In fulfilling them they feel joy. And in 
finding them thwarted they know sorrow. Therefore 
the "Record of Music" only speaks of "The desires 
rising from the nature." The desires cannot be 
spoken of as evil. They may be good or evil 
depending solely upon whether or not they are 
regulated. ' 0 
Lo was conscious of the problems associated with 
selfish desires even if the origin of those same desires 
were rooted in the nature. In part III, section 3 of the 
K'un-chih chi, he spoke of this in a way that paralleled the 
concept "principle is one; its particularizations diverse," 
Because the Way of nature is what is common to 
all, action and reaction are constant and unerring. 
As the human emotions cannot be free of the 
encumbrance of selfish desires, action and reaction 
may be inconstant and liable to error.'1 
38Ibid. , 68. The seven emotions are desire, love, hate, 
pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy. 
39Ibid. I 153. 
'
0 Ibid. I 68. 
41Ibid. I 173. 
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Despite the intentions of many to eliminate desires, 
and the fundamental difference from those who held desires 
to be part of the physical nature, Lo's views of regulating 
the desires were similar not only to classical Confucian 
thought but to his Neo-Confucian predecessors as well. Lo 
quoted the following passage of Li T'ung (Yen-p'ing, 
1093-1163) because he was in agreement with it, and 
considered it to be a well-established idea, 
If at the time before the feelings have been 
aroused, the disposition is distinguished clearly, 
then in managing affairs and responding to things, 
one naturally regulates the feelings so that they 
attain due degree. 42 
In another section, Lo took a position similar to the 
one stated by Li T'ung and supported it with a quote from 
Analects and an allusion to the Book of History. He wrote, 
"'Sincerely following the golden mean' (a) is the same as 
'following the desires of one's mind without transgressing 
the bounds of decorum,'(b) and this is what the spirit of 
the sage is able to accomplish. 1143 
The idea of regulating one's desires so that one does 
not transgress the bounds of decorum, and the idea of 
sincerely following the golden mean, both begin at the point 
Li T'ung referred to in the passage quoted above by Lo, as 
the time before the feelings have been aroused. It was at 
42Ibid. I 70. 
43Ibid., 51. (a )Alludes to the Book of History, 
"Counsels of the Great Yu." (b)Analects, 2:4:6. 
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this point, often referred to as equilibrium, that 
regulation began. The sage was capable of continually 
maintaining this point of equilibrium, which resulted in the 
ability to perfectly regulate his feelings, always act in 
accord with the golden mean, and thus spontaneously act and 
react to everything in a perfectly moral fashion. 
Equilibrium 
Lo felt that all people have equilibrium before the 
feelings were aroused, and in fact stated that not only men 
but all things have equilibrium, too. 44 He cited the 
Doctrine of the Mean to state the idea that equilibrium was 
"the great foundation of the world," and felt that although 
all have equilibrium only the sage through maintaining 
equilibrium was capable of establishing this great 
foundation of the world. 45 Lo wrote of his view, 
Were there a distinction between those who had 
it and those who did not, how could it be that "all 
things are endowed with the entirety of the Great 
Ultimate?"(a) This idea is extremely refined and 
subtle and is definitely not subject to more than 
44Ibid. I 81. 
45Ibid., 80-1. The Doctrine of the Mean reads, "Before 
the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are aroused 
it is called the equilibrium (chung, centrality, mean). 
When these feelings are aroused and each and all attain due 
degree, it is called harmony. Equilibrium is the great 
foundation of the world, and harmony its universal path. 
When equilibrium and harmony are realized to the highest 
degree, heaven and earth will attain their proper order and 
all things will flourish." In Chan, Source Book, 98. 
113 
one interpretation. 46 
As if to show whether or not there was only one 
interpretation, Bloom suggests checking this idea against 
the thought of Wang Yang-ming as found in Wing-tsit's Chan 
translation of Instructions for Practical Living and Other 
Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-ming. Indeed Wang 
wrote, "The nature of all men is good. They all originally 
possess the qualities of equilibrium and harmony." 47 Wang 
and Lo disagreed on many things, yet they both held that all 
men have equilibrium. It seems, though, that more than 
anything this shows how fundamental the idea of equilibrium 
was to Confucian thought. 
Ordinary men may all have equilibrium, according to Lo, 
but these same men were generally confused and distracted 
because they got carried away by things. If men could 
respond to things according to their li, and not get carried 
away, then they would not be encumbered and be sages. 48 
Chou Tun-i spoke of sincerity, and sincerity seems 
closely related to equilibrium. Chou saw sincerity as the 
foundation of the sage, the foundation of the five constant 
46Bloom, Knowledge, 81. (a)Chu Hsi in Chu Tzu yu-lei, 
4:2a. 
47Wing-tsi t Chan, trans. , Instructions for Praci tal 
Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-ming, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 51. 
48Bloom, Knowledge, 105. 
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virtues and the source of all activities. 49 Wing-ts it 
Chan, in speaking of Chou, uses the word incipience. For 
Chou it was at the point of incipience that good or evil 
emerged. It was at this point of incipience where 
existence, primarily external things, met nonexistence 
causing activity to start, but where it had not yet 
manifested itself into physical form. 50 In other words, it 
was at the point of incipience when one had experienced the 
effect of an external thing upon oneself, that moral nature 
would naturally react in one way, and one chose whether to 
act in that moral way or according to what one desired. 
Chou said of this point, 
It is here and now that one must be absolutely 
sincere and true to his moral nature so he will not 
deviate from it either in going too far or not 
going far enough. 51 
For Chou, desires were negative in general since he thought 
they should be eliminated. For Lo, the idea of incipience 
was the point at which one had the opportunity to regulate 
whether or not one's desires were in accord with what was 
proper or not. 
Lo felt that equilibrium was difficult to discuss in a 
general way, and wrote, "One must observe it attentively and 
49Chan, Source Book, 465-6. 
50Ibid. I 467. 
51Ibid. 
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comprehend it in silence. 1152 In another section he quoted 
Ch'eng Hao, 
"Equilibrium is the great foundation of the 
world." (a) It is the correct principle of all 
under heaven which is central and straight. 53 
Lo equated the tranquility at birth with equilibrium. 
For Lo, equilibrium was the state before the feelings had 
been aroused and the reality of nature, which was 
unitary. 54 Equilibrium in Lo's thought maintained the 
general notion that was current in Nee-Confucianism, but not 
because it was the general notion nor because it was the 
currently accepted conception of it. It was because of its 
basis in the Doctrine of the Mean that Lo held the view he 
did. It was the state before the feelings had been aroused, 
the place to maintain the balance of the golden mean, and 
the exact point where one experienced the reality of the 
Great Ultimate and thus one's unity with all things. 
The Relationship of the Mind and Nature 
Lo rejected the dualism of li and ch'i, and as a result 
also rejected the notion of two natures. Why then does he 
maintain a distinction between the mind and nature? This 
point has been a virtual magnet for those arguing against 
52Bloom, Knowledge, 84. 
53Ibid., 83-4. The quote is one of Ch'eng Hao from the 
I-shu, ll:lla. (a)a reference to the Mean, 1:4. 
54Ibid. I 100. 
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the consistency of Lo's thought. 
Part of the problem arises from Lo's position that 
nature is li, and that the mind was not. Another point that 
was also problematic was the notion that nature was prior to 
the mind, a specific idea that Lo had attacked in the 
dualism of his predecessors when they viewed li as 
necessarily prior to ch'i. Bloom notes that the success or 
failure of Lo's position of nature as li without sacrificing 
the consistency of his monism of ch'i has been a matter of 
considerable controversy. 55 
One of the first prominent critics of Lo, in regard to 
his consistency of his view of mind and nature, was Huang 
Tsung-hsi, the author of the Ming- ju hsiieh-an. 56 Huang 
felt Lo was not theoretically consistent. Lo's view of li 
and ch'i did not agree with the views of Chu Hsi, but his 
views of mind and nature did. 57 Huang, who happened to be 
partial to the thought of Lo's main target of criticism 
among his contemporaries, Wang Yang-ming, said the following 
of Lo, 
Lo thought that man's Heaven-endowed nature 
originates when life is first engendered, but that 
consciousness arises only after one is born, and 
that consciousness is mind and not nature. 58 
55Ibid. I 18. 
56Ibid. I 221. 
57Ching, 217. 
58Ibid. I 216. 
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Huang broke down Lo's views on nature and mind. He 
noted that for Lo, nature originated before man was born, 
and was therefore tranquil. The mind, in comparison, was 
active, as it moved when aroused by external things. The 
nature was the principle of heaven-and-earth and the myriad 
things, and was common to all. The mind, though, was what 
one personally possessed, and was particular to oneself. 
Huang thought this analysis clearly showed that Lo's thought 
put the nature as prior to the mind and therefore was master 
to it, a problem reminiscent of li being prior to ch' i. 
Huang felt the two concepts as Lo held them were mutually 
contradictory, and wrote, 
That which in heaven is ch'i, in man is the 
mind. And that which in heaven is li, in man is 
nature. What is true of li and ch'i will also be 
true of the mind and nature, for there is 
definitely no question of difference between 
them.M 
Huang could not accept that nature was a separate entity 
that existed prior to the mind and that attached to it. 60 
Huang's basic arguments have appealed to others since 
they were put forth, but contrary to Huang's views, Lo's 
thought maintains a consistency within his own system, and 
also in its relationship to the thought of Confucius, 
Mencius, and traditional Confucianism. 
Mind was seen as ch'i and nature as li, but Huang made 
59Ibid. , 215. 
60Ibid., 216. 
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a direct correlation, saying, since li could not be prior to 
ch'i neither can nature be prior to mind. As nature was 
endowed at the beginning of life as li, it was necessarily 
in connection with ch'i. Therefore the physical basis for 
the mind was not endowed after the endowment of nature, it 
was simultaneous. The problem arose in the definition of 
mind. So, although the physical basis of ch'i was present 
for mind, mind was not seen to exist until consciousness, 
which occurred at birth. 
In Huang's analysis, he compared the mind and nature. 
At one point he stated that nature was common to all, but 
that the mind was particular to each. In Lo's thought, the 
mind would be particular to each, but precisely due to the 
fact that the nature endowed to each was different. Nature 
was li, and thus subject to the notion "principle is one; 
its particularizations diverse." As nature was endowed in 
each person, it represented a particularization unique to 
that individual, and consequently the mind was also 
particular to each. 
Huang also asserted that the nature was the master of 
the mind in Lo' s thought. It was not the master, but 
instead the pattern which provided the basis for the mind. 
Lo wrote, "The place where principle resides is called the 
mind. . . . That which the mind possesses is called the 
nature. 1161 Al though Lo perceived a distinction between 
61Bloom, Knowledge, 104. 
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mind and nature, he did not consider them to be separate 
either. La's position will become more clear as it is laid 
out in more detail. 
The first entry of Lo's work the K'un-chih chi, stated 
the following, 
The teaching of Confucius was entirely devoted 
to the matter of preserving the mind and nourishing 
the nature. Though he never clarified this, it was 
clarified by Mencius. Mind is the spiritual 
intelligence of man. The nature is his vital 
principle. The place where principle resides is 
called the mind. That which the mind possesses is 
called the nature. The two must not be confused 
and considered one. . . . The two are always 
inseparable, yet they should not be confused. 62 
The basis of thought for Lo had to be compatible with the 
comments of the sages. If one could conceptualize an 
enlightening concept, it was groundless, irrelevant, and 
most importantly not Confucian unless it coincided with the 
ideas of Confucius, Mencius, and those ideas found in the 
classic Confucian texts. Much later in the K'un-chih chi, 
Lo wondered, "When Mencius discussed the mind and the nature 
he distinguished them clearly, so why should it be that 
scholars often mistakenly identify them?"~ 
Lo saw the original substance of the nature as still 
both in activity and tranquility. The mind, though, in Lo's 
conception varied in accordance with the circumstances of 
62Ibid. I 49. 
63Ibid. I 104. 
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activity and tranquility. 64 Lo saw the two as separate, 
but inseparable as one's nature resided in the mind. If one 
could learn to maintain one's mind so that it did not vary 
in accordance with the circumstances, then one could 
spontaneously act and react in accordance with the mean, and 
become a sage. Lo was adamant that mind was not principle, 
but if one successfully brought one's mind into a constant 
state of equilibrium, then Lo thought, 
The sage turns mind into nature, so that his 
mind is principle, and principle is his mind. Its 
original substance is always naturally clear and 
without the slightest difference whether in 
activity or tranquility. 65 
In striving to recover the unity in Confucian thought, 
Lo tried to be faithful to the original ideas of 
Confucianism. As Huang Tsung-hsi stated, though, La's views 
of mind and nature were similar to those of Chu Hsi and 
Ch'eng I. Chu Hsi also thought nature was li, and thought 
that mind was the function of human nature. 66 Lo saw the 
key to perceiving the difference between mind and nature in 
Chu Hsi' s comment, "'The human mind possesses consciousness. 
The substance of the Way is inactive. ' 1167 Chu Hsi' s idea 
concurred with La's distinction between the mind's activity 
and the nature's stillness. Despite the distinctions made 
64Ibid. I 105. 
65Ibid. 
66Chan, "Ch' eng-Chu," 42. 
67Bloom, Knowledge, 108. 
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here, Ch'eng I argued that that distinction did not preclude 
an ultimate unity, 
What is inherent in things is called 
principle. What is endowed in man is called 
nature. And as the master of the body it is called 
the mind. In reality they are all one. 68 
In comparing Lo to Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi on this point, 
Bloom cites A.C. Graham's assessment that Ch'eng I and Chu 
Hsi, although to a lesser extent than Ch'eng I, saw nature 
as a substance. Bloom states that Lo saw nature less as a 
substance and more as a veridical, genuine object. 69 
Ch' eng I's conception of the idea nature is li had 
strong ethical implications. 70 Since li was perfect, in 
identifying nature as li, Ch'eng I stated that the goodness 
of nature existed as an ideal substance within individuals. 
Because men had this ideal substance within, they could 
recover it through striving to do so. 71 
Lo's different view of li also altered his conception 
of nature is li. Instead of li as a perfect unchanging 
substance within men, it was, for Lo, the dynamic aspect of 
ch' i. 72 Li as it was endowed into man became a 
particularization which caused a dynamic pattern 
68Chan , Source Book, 5 6 7 • 





characteristic of individual beings rather than as an ideal 
essence within them. 73 As the nature it meant the 
spontaneous tendency of all beings to follow the internal 
dictates of one's own individual nature. 74 The structure 
of Lo's views regarding the relationship of mind and nature 
thus derived much from the words and concepts of Ch'eng I 
and Chu Hsi, but the substance of his views carried 
different meanings and implications. 
Lo saw mind and nature as inseparable, yet it was 
important that one understood the distinction he repeatedly 
drew in the K'un-chih chi that the mind was an active 
subject and the nature as its veridical object. 75 He 
relied heavily on Mencius in making this distinction. In 
part II, section 41, Lo quoted Mencius to stress that the 
function of the mind was to think, and that Mencius clearly 
stated that the ability to think was the most important part 
of upholding the nature. 76 Upholding the nature in this 
context meant to recover the ultimate unity for oneself, or 
the ability not to stray from the equilibrium. 
In this same section Lo wrote, "That which is capable 
of thought is the mind. What we apprehend through thought 
73Ibid. 
74Ibid. 
75Ibid. , 104. 
76Bloom, Knowledge, 139. 
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is the principle of nature. 1177 Nature was not a 
disposition to moral goodness, it was a reality which could 
be known. 78 Moral goodness was not inherent because of li, 
it resulted from an objective awareness of li which united 
oneself and others. 79 This conception of li fueled the 
necessity and importance of the "investigating things" and 
probing principle to the utmost. 
This view of li, nature, as a veridical object and the 
mind as an active subject showed nature as substance and 
mind as function. The mind possessed nature. Nature 
resided in the mind, and nature as an objective reality was 
accessible to the mind but was not identical with the human 
mind.~ Nature was to be the object of the mind's 
reflection and investigation. They could not possibly be 
one. 
Lo associated mind with consciousness, and 
consciousness was the awareness of the nature and things in 
general. So nature was, besides being the object of the 
mind's reflection, necessarily prior to the mind as life 
itself precedes consciousness. 81 Though this distinction 






ultimately one. Lo wrote, 
They may be called two things, and yet they 
are not two things. They may be called one, and 
yet they are not one. If one does away with the 
mind, there is no nature, and if one does away with 
the nature, there is no mind. It is only when a 
distinction is made within a single thing, allowing 
two things to emerge, that one can speak of 
"knowing the nature. 1182 
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While trying to grasp the relationship of the mind and 
nature, another division may seem like an added distraction, 
yet Lo also divided the mind. The mind was one, but, as 
seen in a previous quote, he felt that only by making a 
distinction within a single thing and thus allowing two to 
emerge could one speak of "knowing the nature." Dividing 
the mind for explanation purposes, into mind of Tao and 
human mind will help one to understand the relationship of 
the mind and nature. 
Mind Divided into the Mind of Tao and the Human Mind 
In a few of the earliest sections of the K'un-chih chi, 
Lo spoke specifically of the mind of Tao and the human mind. 
In part I, section 3, the mind of Tao was described as 
quiet, still, perfect, and because it could not be seen, 
subtle. In the same section, the human mind when 
stimulated, penetrates, was most changing, could not be 
fathomed and was therefore insecure. 
In section 4, Lo continued by saying the mind of Tao 
82Ibid. I 153. 
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was the nature and the human mind was the feelings. At this 
point it is important to remember that the mind is one. For 
Lo the feelings were part of the nature. Feelings were 
inherent in the nature, but he divided them in speaking of 
the mind of Tao and the human mind by looking at the 
feelings after birth as they were active as a part of life. 
Lo wrote, "The mind is one, but one speaks of it as two 
because of the distinction of activity and tranquility and 
the difference of substance and function. 1183 Lo saw the 
mind of Tao as tranquil, whose substance was most perfect 
because it was the nature. The human mind was active and 
because of the feelings most changing. It is important not 
to equate changing and active with negative ideas such as 
imperfection. The nature was tranquil and most perfect, and 
the feelings were part of the nature but in functioning in 
life were changing. Changing, though, did not have any 
negative meaning for Lo. It was only a description of how 
feelings operate. 
The idea of stillness and activity and their importance 
was addressed in this same section by Lo. He wrote, "When 
tranquility controls activity, it is auspicious. 1184 It was 
auspicious, because if tranquility was controlling activity 
it meant that one was maintaining one's state of equilibrium 




mind without crossing the bounds of decorum, one was 
maintaining the golden mean, fulfilling one's nature, and 
this was naturally auspicious. 
Lo followed with, "When activity results in confusion 
about returning, it is inauspicious. 1185 It was not 
following one's feelings that was inauspicious, but getting 
carried away in the activity without thinking and without 
exerting an effort of returning to the mean. So if one was 
to heedlessly fallow the activity without regulating oneself 
as to avoid selfishness and avoid violating the bounds of 
decorum, Lo thought one was surely heading for trouble. 
Lo thought the human mind's substance was pure 
spirituality. Originally the human mind was 
all-encompassing, but could be blinded by selfishness and 
egotism. 86 Lo stated, "It perceives what is small but 
neglects what is great. 1187 The neglect came from not being 
sincere, which meant not maintaining the golden mean. By 
not being sincere one was headed for trouble and neglected 
what is great. Without continued effort one could tend to 
favor the human mind and neglect the mind of Tao, which was 
nature. 
Lo used this division to show the necessity of 
investigating li so one could know the mind of Tao and thus 
85Ibid. 
86Ibid. I 53. 
87Ibid. 
know the nature. Of this Lo stated, 
Seeking the lost mind is only the preliminary 
work; fully developing the mind is the culmination 
of the process. In between what is most important 
is to probe principle to the utmost. Probing 
principle to the utmost necessarily entails gradual 
stages. But fully developing the mind and knowing 
the nature takes place at once, and there is no 
longer a question of priorities. 88 
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For Lo, li was not perfect or morally relevant, as it 
had been with Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi. Li was to be 
investigated so one could increase one's knowledge in 
gradual stages, until one realized the unity of all things 
and thus knew the nature. Through the investigation of li 
one developed one's mind until one knew the nature and thus 
had also fully developed the mind. Therefore, the process 
of investigating li helped one to unite the division of the 
mind of Tao and human mind, fully develop the mind, know the 
nature, and thus, as the quote stated above, turn the mind 
into nature so the mind would become principle and one would 
become a sage. The distinctions and divisions spoke of help 
one to grasp the overall process of recovering unity and 
make it easier to discuss things, but ultimately one comes 
to understand that there has always been unity. 
Criticism of Lo's Division of Mind and Nature 
Liu Tsung-chou commented on various scholars in Huang 
Tsung-hsi's Ming-ju hsueh-an. In this work, Liu saw La's 
88Ibid. I 104. 
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strength as seeing the moral mind (mind of Tao) as nature, 
and his identification of this with the state of mind before 
the stirring of emotions. 89 The idea of the human mind as 
emotions after being stirred goes along with this. Liu, 
however, criticized Lo. He felt that since mind, nature,and 
emotions all ref erred to the same person that there should 
not be a distinction between that which was prone to error, 
the mind, and that which is subtle not being the mind.~ 
Liu, like Huang, was sympathetic to the thought of Wang 
Yang-ming, who held the position that mind was li. Liu 
wrote, 
The problem is that Lo firmly believed that to 
hold consciousness to be nature is Buddhistic, 
since, for him consciousness belongs to [the state 
of mind] after emotions are stirred and hence 
refers to emotions and not to nature; indeed, the 
mind that concerns the root of all things is only 
the mind that is prone to error, while there is no 
[such thing as the] mind that is subtle. 91 
Liu felt Lo had pushed the subtle outside the mind and 
thus had to be sought in the appearances of heaven-and-earth 
and the myriad things. Liu thought Lo had almost pushed 
nature outside of oneself, that it was something 
external. 92 As a result Liu thought that Lo did not really 
perceive the nature, and criticized Lo for distinguishing 
89Ching , 6 3 . 
90Ibid. 
91Ibid. 
92Ibid. , 64. 
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between the mind and nature. 
As Liu stated, Lo did believe that to hold 
consciousness as nature was Buddhistic. It was for this 
reason that he could not accept the idea that mind is li. 
Liu went astray, though, in his criticisms of Lo when he 
thought Lo had pushed the subtle outside. Lo had made the 
distinction between mind and nature, but considered them 
inseparable. 
By saying that nature resided in the mind, Lo 
maintained the subtle in the mind. Liu felt Lo used the 
mind, which was prone to error to pursue the root of all 
things. In Lo's thought, it was through the human mind, 
which could err, that one thought and investigated li, but 
the human mind was only part of the mind. Lo's discussion 
of the mind of Tao and the human mind, which were truly one 
mind, provides answers to Liu's criticisms. 
Since Liu sought the nature within the mind, Lo's 
thought relative to his own seemed to push the nature out of 
oneself into an external position. Lo did advocate that one 
investigate external things, but it was through the external 
investigation that one came to the realization that 
everything was ultimately one, so one knew the nature, which 
had been within oneself the entire time. 
Lo thought it was necessary to search externally to 
establish the entire context of reality that could lead to 
knowing the nature. Lo was critical of those who did not 
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search externally. Bloom writes of Lo, "Consciousness has 
many objects and modes, but the consciousness of principle 
involves awareness of what it is that is common or shared 
among all living things and consistently and reliably true 
in their life processes. 1193 This awareness of what was 
commonly shared by all was the ultimate object of knowledge. 
Teaching this unity was complex, and thus Lo considered it 
knowledge painfully acquired. 94 
The Problem of Emphasizing Mind 
Lo was critical of those within Confucianism who 
concentrated their efforts on the mind specifically, and 
often considered their approaches to be Buddhistic. Le's 
criticism of Lu Hsiang-shan provide an example of his 
fundamental problems with emphasizing the mind. In part II, 
section 41, Lo quoted Lu's view that as the mind exists 
principle will illuminate itself. In Lu's thought, since 
mind was li, one would naturally act compassionately, feel 
shame and dislike, be yielding, be capable of discriminating 
between right and wrong, be generous and compliant, and be 
bold and resolute all when it was proper to do so. 95 
Lo referred to Mencius' emphasis on thought and the 
mind's function of thinking in the apprehension of knowledge 
93Bloom, Knowledge, 22. 
94Ibid. 
95Ibid. I 139. 
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to show the error of Lu's view. Lo wondered, in Lu's 
statement, what was the need for thought?96 Lo found it 
conceivable within the spiritual consciousness of the mind 
to naturally act as Lu described, but thought when it came 
to a matter of discretion and judgement, one could not help 
but be either excessive or deficient. 97 Lo concluded that 
to concentrate on the mind and hold its spiritual 
consciousness as the ultimate Way could only be called Ch'an 
Buddhism. 98 
Lo admitted the difficulty of being clear about the 
mind and nature, but thought Lu, and by implication others 
who agreed with Lu that mind is li, outwardly eschewed the 
name of Ch'an, but inwardly employed its substance. 99 Lo 
felt that Lu, although he often had quoted the sages to 
support his views, had in fact used them out of context 
merely to promote his own theory of the mind, which was in 
conflict with the views of the sages. 100 Lo quoted Ch'eng 
I to show the point that Lu went astray. Ch'eng I stated, 
All the words of the sages and worthies are 
designed to lead man to get hold of his lost mind 
and cause it to return and reintegrate with his 
body. Having accomplished this, he will be able to 
direct his inquiries to a higher plane and "through 
96Ibid. 
97Ibid. , 140. 
98Ibid. 
99Ibid. 
100Ibid. , 141. 
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study of lower things advance to the higher. 11101 
In quoting Ch'eng I and his reference to Confucius, Lo tried 
to show that Lu got enchanted at the point of returning and 
reintegrating with one's body, but neglected the most 
important step of advancing to the higher plane through 
study of lower things. 102 
The following quote clearly shows Lo's positions on the 
relationship of mind and nature, and the necessity of his 
position being consistent with the Confucianism of the 
ancients. Lo wrote, 
When our Master(a) compiled the Book of 
Changes he spoke repeatedly about the nature. He 
said, "The Way of ch'ien works through change and 
transformation so that each thing receives its 
proper nature and endowment. " ( b) He said, "That 
which brings to completion is the nature."(c) He 
said, "The sages made the Book of Changes so that 
it would be in conformity with the principle 
underlying the nature and destiny." ( d) He said, 
"[The sages taught] probing principle to the utmost 
and fully developing one's nature until the destiny 
is fulfilled."(e) If only one dwells on these 
statements, it will be clear that the nature is 
principle. 
He also spoke repeatedly about the mind. He 
said, "The sages cleansed their minds by means of 
this."(f) He said, "[The gentleman] composes his 
mind before he speaks."(g) He said, "[The sages] 
were able to rejoice in their minds."(h) Thus he 
said of the mind that one cleanses it, one composes 
it, and one rejoices in it. With respect to 
cleansing the mind, he said that it is "by means of 
this(knowledge of the chahges]." If one dwells on 
these statements, is it valid to say that the mind 
is principle? Moreover, Mencius said, "Moral 
principles are as agreeable to my mind as the flesh 




This is extremely clear and easy to perceive.w3 
By examining the ideas of Confucius, Mencius, Ch' eng I, 
Chu Hsi, and other Confucians, Lo constructed his view of 
the nature. With the goal of maintaining ultimate 
consistency in Confucian thought, Lo denied the notion of a 
separation between an original nature and a physical nature, 
arguing that they formed one nature. He included feelings 
and desires within the nature, and showed the necessity of 
distinguishing the mind from the nature. For Lo, these were 
basic components of human nature. 
103Ibid., 144. (a) i.e., Confucius. (b) Book of 
Changes, ch' ien hexagram, 1: 4a. ( c) Book of Changes, 
"Appended Remarks," 7:7b. (d) Book of Changes, "Discussion 
of the Trigrams," 9: 2a. ( e) Ibid. ( f) Book of Changes, 
"Appended Remarks," 7: 16a. ( g) Ibid. , 8: Sb. ( h) Ibid. , 
8:13b. (i) Mencius, 7A:7:8. 
CHAPTER 4 
Acting and Reacting in the World 
Within Lo's conception of li and ch'i, "principle is 
one; its particularizations diverse," the Great Ultimate, 
the nature, etc., how does one account for the existence of 
good and evil in the world? Now that the basic foundation 
of Lo's thought has been established, Kasoff 's third 
question can be discussed: How is it that Mencius said that 
human nature is good but yet there is evil in the world? 
Due to La's shifts away from some of the philosophical 
positions held by his sung predecessors, Lo's answer to this 
question was also different from theirs. 
Evil in the World 
Amongst Sung Neo-Confucians, many of the theories of 
the existence of evil begin with the endowment of ch'i. 
Chou Tun-i, as discussed earlier, stressed the importance of 
sincerity, so as not to stray too far from equilibrium. 
Chou thought human nature was originally good, but that good 
and evil appear as one came in contact with external 
things. 1 This would not fit in well with Lo's thought, 
1 Chan, Source Book, 467. 
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which strongly advocated investigating external things, but 
Chou did not blame the things themselves. Evil arose from 
how man chose to deal with those external things, an idea 
that does not necessarily correspond with Lo's but has 
similarities. 
Chang Tsai' s view was much different. He did not blame 
evil on ch' i, but more on the process of it assuming 
physical form. Chang believed in undifferentiated ch'i, 
which was pure, and condensed ch'i, which was not. Evil 
arose from the meeting of the two, which produced physical 
form. These imbalances gave rise to positive and negative 
traits and evil. 2 
Chang, though, did not necessarily like the terms good 
and evil, and preferred to see the idea of good as the 
nature which completes the Way and evil as the imbalances 
that obstruct the natural pursuit of the Way and its 
resulting loss of Harmony. 3 As people naturally received 
different imbalances in life, these created opposition, 
discrimination, and conflict. 4 These conditions did not 
allow for harmony. Similar to Chou Tun-i, Chang did 
not see the physical nature as evil in itself, but the 
occasion for evil. The imbalances led man to deviate from 
the mean or equilibrium. The imbalances provided situations 
2McMorran, 442. 
3 Ibid. 
4Chan, Source Book, 511. 
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of potential opposition and conflict, and evil arose from 
how one reacted in these situations. The external things 
were not evil, but how one chose to react to them could be. 
Chang Tsai's idea for the basis of evil in the imbalance of 
ch'i in physical form differed from Chou Tun-i's, but the 
fact that evil arose from one's choice was similar to both 
of them. 
Ch'eng I's position was considerably different. He 
thought one's nature was naturally good, but the potential 
for evil arose from one's capacity. 5 Capacity for Ch'eng 
I meant one's endowment of ch'i, which varied in degrees of 
clarity. The variance in degree of one's capacity 
determined whether one was generally good or evil. Ch'eng 
I stressed the perfect goodness of li, and the imperfect 
ch'i which obstructed li. Chu Hsi's views on evil were 
basically those of Ch'eng I. For Chu also saw li as perfect 
and impure ch'i as the source of selfish human desires and 
potential evil. 
La's monism of ch'i rejected the dualism of Ch'eng I 
and Chu Hsi, and consequently their explanations for the 
existence of evil, which he considered to be the original 
reason for the construction of their dualistic system. La's 
view of evil did not agree with Chang Tsai's either because 
of Chang's view of two natures, but Lo's notion of evil did 
resemble both Chou Tun-i's and Chang's in that evil arose 
5 Ibid. I 567. 
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out of the choices of man. 
Yamanoi Yu thinks that those who advocate a philosophy 
of ch'i have a problem with the established Mencian idea of 
the nature as good. 6 Yamanoi sees Wang T' ing-hsiang, 
another monist of the Ming, as having advocated the idea 
that the nature contained both good and bad. Bloom thinks 
that Lo, in effect, leaned toward a view similar to that of 
Wang T'ing-hsiang, but cast the whole problem within the 
framework of "principle is one; its particularizations 
di verse . 117 
Lo saw the nature as good in its original unity, but 
through the division into particularizations the possibility 
for evil arose. Ch'eng Hao thought that some ch'i was good 
and some evil, and this was responsible for why some men 
were good and others evil . 8 As Ch'eng Hao saw this to 
originate with the endowment of ch'i at birth, Lo thought 
that Ch'eng was referring to the diversity of 
particularizations. 9 
Ch'eng Hao thought that human nature in its original 
tranquil state was neither good nor evil, and wrote, "The 
distinction arises when human nature is aroused and 
manifested in feelings and actions, and when these feelings 
6 Bloom, Knowledge, 20. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Chan, Source Book, 528. 
9 Bloom, Knowledge, 100. 
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and actions abide by or deviate from the mean. 1110 Lo 
agreed that evil arose from deviation from the mean, but not 
necessarily that the original, tranquil state was neither 
good nor evil. Lo wrote, "The equilibrium before the 
feelings have been aroused is 'the moral sense bestowed by 
the Lord.' 1111 
Moral goodness for Lo lay in the ultimate unity of li, 
and one's realization of this fact. It lay in knowing the 
true nature of things. As this unity existed only in 
equilibrium, until one recognized it, how could he have 
realistically held that this original, tranquil state was 
neither good nor evil? La's disagreement with Ch'eng Hao 
and his agreement on the other part can be seen in the 
following quote from Lo, 
It is only that the feelings of pleasure, 
anger, sorrow, and joy arise but are not 
necessarily regulated so as to attain their due 
degree, and this is why there is the distinction 
between good and evil. Regulation refers to the 
oneness of principle as it exists within diverse 
particularizations, while attaining due degree 
refers to not losing Heaven's endowment as it 
originally is . 12 
The existence of evil in the world and how to deal with 
it can be generally said to be a universal concern of 
thinkers and philosophers. Nao-Confucians had several 
10Chan, Source Book, 521. 
11Bloom, Knowledge, 67. 
12Ibid. 
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explanations for its existence and for how to return to the 
good, with some general trends. Despite the "duality" of 
some Confucian thinkers and the "monism" of others, 
Confucianism and specifically Neo-Confucianism can be said 
to be organic. Lo saw the Great Ultimate as the single 
source, and that all things were ultimately united in li. 
When one gathers enough knowledge to understand this unity 
and know the nature of things, one can be said to be a sage. 
In Confucian terms the sage was the embodiment of 
humanity (jen), or of the cardinal virtues in Confucianism. 
Another phrase that came to be used in Neo-Confucianism that 
encompassed this idea of unity and humanity was "forming one 
body with all things." Wing-tsit Chan comments that the 
extension of jen from living things to cover the whole 
universe resulted in the concept of forming one body with 
all things (the universe). 13 As one realized the unity of 
all things and as a result realized that one was not 
separate from things, then one naturally could overcome the 
potentials for evil and practice humanity towards all things 
like one would towards one's own self. 
Jen/Forming One Body With All Things 
Though Confucian thinkers varied greatly in their 
opinions and approaches, the significance of jen was common 
to all. Even for Lo, who took li from the moral sphere as 
13Chan, Source Book, 499. 
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seen in the thought of Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi, the ultimate 
unity was synonymous with moral goodness and humanity. 
One of the most famous expressions of the idea of jen 
can be seen in Chang Tsai's Western Inscription. Chang saw 
the universe as one and the manifestations many. In the 
Western Inscription, he wrote of heaven-and-earth as 
universal parents, and through this relationship there was 
the idea of love for all : 14 
Heaven is my father and earth is my mother, 
and even such a small creature as I find an 
intimate place in their midst. Therefore, that 
which extends throughout the universe I consider as 
my nature. All people are my brothers and sisters, 
and all things are my companions. 15 
In commenting on Chang's views and others who agreed with 
the general idea the Western Inscription, Lo said, "As to 
others who saw humaneness as impartiality(a) or love(b) and 
the like, everything can be understood if we infer from the 
idea of 'farming one body. ' 1116 
Most Confucians could agree with the general emphasis 
of the Western Inscription, but beneath it lay a philosophy 
that others had problems with. As discussed earlier, Chang 
14Ibid. , 495. 
15Berling, 104. 
16Bloom, Knowledge, 77. (a) Refers to Chou Tun-i, who 
in T'ung-shu, ch. 21 and 38 discussed humaneness in terms of 
impartiality (kung). (b) Hsieh Liang-tso, who himself 
discussed humaneness in terms of consciousness (chueh), was 
somewhat wary of a tendency to discuss jen in terms of love 
( ai) and asked (in Shang-ts' ai hsien-sheng yii-lu, A: 7a): 
"If one concentrates on love, how will one understand jen?" 
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split the Great Ultimate into the Great Void and the Great 
Harmony. Chang thought tranquility was the basis for 
goodness, an idea that fits well with the idea of 
equilibrium. Yet Chang went on to state that voidness, an 
idea many disagreed with, was the basis for tranquility. 
Thus, for Chang, it followed that voidness was the source of 
humaneness. 17 Chang saw heaven as nourishing all things 
equally because it was void and therefore impartial and 
disinterested . 18 
Though others may not have liked Chang's ideas of 
voidness, the general idea of unity was important. Ch'eng 
I thought, similarly to Chang, that the humane man regarded 
heaven-and-earth and the myriad things as one body. 19 So 
despite what many have seen as dualism in his thought, 
ultimately Ch'eng I thought there was nothing that was not 
part of the self. In a statement that shows Ch'eng I's view 
of things ultimately being one, he wrote, "'Things and self 
are governed by the same principle. If you understand one, 
you understand the other, for the truth within and the truth 
without are identical.'"m 
Ch'eng Hao's thought differed from that of his brother 
on some points, but Ch'eng Hao strongly emphasized the unity 
17Kasoff, 58-9. 
18Ibid. I 58. 
19Berling, 104. 
20Bloom, 'Abstraction,' 79. 
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of things. In describing the point when one realized the 
full knowledge of nature and the unity, Ch'eng Hao stated, 
"'When external and internal are both forgotten, then a 
state of non-differentiation and peace is attained. ' 1121 
Ch'eng Hao saw the universe chiefly characterized by 
the idea of production and reproduction, 22 an idea Lo 
agreed with fully. Because of this idea, Ch'eng Hao saw the 
spirit of life in all things, and equated this creative 
quality of the universe with jen. 23 Lo felt that only 
Ch'eng Hao truly understood the concept of jen. To show 
Ch' eng Hao' s understanding, Lo pointed to Ch' eng Hao' s 
phrase in the I-shu, "forming one body with all things 
without any differentiation. 1124 
Lo also agreed with Ch'eng Hao and Ch'eng I's 
conception of the five virtues. They felt that rightness, 
propriety, wisdom and faithfulness were all contained in 
humaneness. 25 Lo compared this conception of the virtues 
to the idea of "principle is one; its particularizations 
diverse." Lo wrote of the virtues, 
Thus all the distinct particularizations are 
brilliantly clear, and not one is omitted. It is 
precisely because not one is omitted that all in 
21Berling, 151. 
22Chan , Source Book, 5 21 . 
23Ibid. 
24Bloom, Knowledge, 77. 
25Ibid. 
their wholeness and entirety constitute this one 
thing. 26 
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In this same vein of thought, later in the K'un-chih 
chi, Lo stated that li was one, but that there were four 
designations that applied to its virtues. Lo spoke of its 
aspects. As li was integrated and whole, it was called 
humanity. Decorum was the name for its aspect of clear 
order. Its aspect of resolute forbearance was called 
rightness, and wisdom was its aspect of incisive 
discrimination. 27 Though these were described as four 
items, Lo thought in reality they were one, and wrote, "The 
aspects of clarity, resolution, and incisiveness all figure 
into the integration, and this is why humanity encompasses 
the four virtues and constitutes the complete substance of 
the nature. 1128 
In speaking of one's separation from the knowledge of 
reality that everything was one, Lo thought, 
Heaven and man do not represent a duality in 
any fundamental sense. It is only because man has 
this substantial form that he is on a different 
level from heaven. When this substantial form is 
discarded, he is entirely merged with heaven. How 
can this substantial form be discarded? It is only 
by overcoming my egoistic sense of personal 
identity that it can be discarded. 29 
The idea of discarding the "substantial form" to be 
26Ibid. 
27 Ibid. , 17 4. 
28Ibid. 
29Ibid. , 131. 
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able to realize the unity of all things and embody jen was 
the goal of investigating things and learning. These 
provide the answers to Kasoff 's fourth and last question. 
Ira Kasoff's last question was, what is the mind, and 
how does a man cultivate it to enable him to become a sage? 
The idea of what the mind was for Lo and its general role in 
apprehending li was discussed above, but what was important 
in the process of self-cultivation that led one to sagehood? 
Self-cultivation 
The purpose of the process of self-cultivation in 
Nee-Confucianism was to become a sage. By becoming a sage 
one would be able to bring harmony to society. As with 
other points in Nee-Confucian thought, approaches to 
self-cultivation varied, though the goal was always 
sagehood. 
Chang Tsai saw the process of self-cultivation as the 
process of restraining one's tendency to excess and the 
restoration of the balance of the ch' i of which one was 
formed. 3° Chang thought learning was a necessary part of 
removing the evil and completing the good. 31 Learning 
enabled one to transform one's own physical nature. 32 
Those who came after Chang Tsai had differing views, but 
30McMorran, 442. 
31Chan, Source Book, 513. 
32Ibid. I 515. 
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many similarities as well. Lo's ideas agreed with 
restraining oneself from excess and the importance of 
learning. Ch'eng I's and Chu Hsi's ideas were similar as 
far as the importance of learning and the ability to 
transform one's own physical nature. Learning was central 
to most of the approaches of self-cultivation, but what to 
learn and how to go about it often varied. 
For Lo the goal of cultivation was to study and 
investigate li so one eventually would know the nature and 
realize the unity of all things. His learning, though, 
began with a Buddhist experience of enlightenment, which he 
described in the K'un-chih chi. Following a written 
description of his experience he continued, 
Later when I held off ice at the Imperial 
University in Nanking, I never put the books of the 
sages and worthies out of my hands for even a day. 
I entered into the spirit of the books and savored 
them over a long period of time, gradually 
realizing their truth. Only then did I understand 
what I had perceived on that former occasion was 
the mysterious activity of the mind's pure 
spirituality and not the principle of nature. 33 
His realization of the differences between his two 
experiences led him to his distinction between mind and 
nature. He felt that one not only needed to learn, but 
needed to think during the process of learning or one would 
not be capable to apprehend li. Only through the 
apprehension of li in things could one know the nature and 
the Way, a position which led him to disparage those who 
33Bloom, Knowledge, 138. 
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concentrated on the mind. He said, "Thus getting a hold of 
the spiritual consciousness and considering this to be the 
ultimate Way can only be called Ch' an. 1134 
Despite his position against concentrating on the mind, 
the development of the mind to the fullest was the goal of 
self-cultivation. Since the substance of the human mind was 
the substance of heaven and originally one, the full 
development of the mind restored it to unity with heaven and 
all things. 35 
The process of cultivation, as Lo saw it, took a long 
period of time and much diligence. Lo said that he spent 
decades of earnest effort before he even had grounds for 
self-confidence. 36 The matter of cultivation lay not 
merely in the investigation of things, but also in the 
preservation of the mind. In preserving the mind one needed 
to "reach its depths" and "study its subtle activating 
forces," which one did so as not to neglect the rectitude of 
the nature and feelings. 37 One needed not only to 
investigate the li in things, but maintain a watch over 
one's inner-self and the mean. This combination, notes 
Wing-tsi t Chan, which sums up the whole of Ch' eng-Chu 
doctrine was stated by Ch' eng I, "'Self cultivation requires 
34Ibid. I 144. 
35Ibid. I 135. 
36Bloom, 'Abstraction, ' 7 4. 
37Bloom, Knowledge, 50. 
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seriousness, the pursuit of learning depends on the 
extension of knowledge.' 1138 Lo agreed that seriousness was 
necessary for learning. He stated, "One must 'reflect on 
oneself and be sincere'(a) if one is to create 'the learning 
of al I-pervading unity' ( b) of the school of the Sage. " 39 
Seriousness, for Lo, was central for one to pursue the 
true course of cultivation. Seriousness meant one needed to 
maintain one's thoughts and actions at all times in line 
with what was right. Lo commented, 
Confucius once explained seriousness as 
"straightening the inner life."(a) When this mind 
is always held fast and preserved, there is no 
longer any room for selfishness. With out expecting 
one's inner being to be straight, it is naturally 
straight of itself. 40 
Lo felt if one did not expect one's inner being to be 
straight, and assumed that it would not be, but earnestly 
tried to handle each situation correctly then one would 
gradually, naturally improve. Through earnest, serious 
practice at all times one's inner being would straighten 
itself. 
Seriousness was to be applied to everything, and only 
by constantly maintaining this seriousness could one hope to 
38Wing-tsit Chan, "The Hsing-li ching-i and the 
Ch'eng-Chu School of the Seventeenth Century." In deBary, 
Unfolding, 550. 
39Bloom, Knowledge, 130. (a) Alludes to Mencius, 
7A:4:2. (b) Alludes to Analects, 4:15:1. 
40Ibid., 77-8. (a) Book of Changes, k'un hexagram, 
1:16a. 
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find the Way and attain sagehood. As a practical example 
that scholars might encounter, Lo gave the following, 
One who is committed to the Way must bypass 
the two barriers of wealth and status, honor and 
glory, before he is able to enter. Failing this he 
will be here while the Way is over there, with a 
strong fence and a thick wall between them and the 
separation growing greater by the day. . . . The 
sages and worthies were not lacking in rewards and 
fame. But all that they did, being in accordance 
with the dictates of principle, had to be done and 
was not done for any ulterior motives. As to 
wealth and status that were not gained in 
accordance with the Way, they would not even accept 
them much less have sought them. 41 
La's emphasis on dedication and earnest effort can be 
seen in the writing of Huang Tsung-hsi in the Ming-ju 
hsiieh-an. Although Huang found what he considered to be 
flaws in Lo's philosophy, he was complimentary about Lo's 
character and his seriousness in the process of cultivation. 
Huang wrote, 
When he dwelled at home he arose at dawn 
everyday, dressed himself correctly, and went up to 
the Hall for study of Antiquity (Hsiieh-ku lou), 
followed by his disciples. After receiving their 
greetings and obeisances, he sat in a dignified 
posture and engaged in study. Even when he dwelled 
alone, he was not careless in his demeanor. He was 
frugal in his diet, had no pavilions or garden 
houses, and employed no music when he 
entertained. 42 
Seriousness (ching) and one's efforts were crucial in 
Lo's opinion. The only reason one might fail to comprehend 
41Ibid. I 78-9. 
42Bloom, 'Abstraction, ' 7 2. 
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was due to the deficiency in one's efforts. 43 When 
struggling to understand Ch'eng I's idea of nature is li, Lo 
quoted a passage of Mencius that provided him with 
inspiration. It read, "'Although one is dull, he will 
[through unremitting effort] surely become intelligent.'" 44 
The idea of seriousness applied not only in maintaining 
one's thoughts and actions in accord with what was right, 
but also to the process of learning, as evidenced by the 
previous quote and the title of his book Knowledge Painfully 
Acquired. Lo did not deny the spiritual aspect of learning, 
but tended towards the intellectual aspect as the spiritual 
aspect differed from those who considered li as perfect and 
prior to ch' i. Benjamin Elman points out that Bloom's 
assessment of the K'un-chih chi, as a compilation of reading 
notes and thoughts which displayed the meticulous accuracy 
in his textual research, is quite a contrast to the writings 
of the majority of Sung and Ming Neo-Confucians which had 
been records of spiritual quests. 45 
Lo's approach to learning followed what he found to be 
a scholarly rigor in the orthodox tradition and a conviction 
of the indiscerptible relation between intellectual and 
" 
spiritual concerns. 46 He thought these two ideas of 
43Bloom, Knowledge, 105. 
44Ibid., 171. 
45Elman, 17 4-5. 
46Bloom, 'Abstraction,' 75. 
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intellectual and spiritual were vital to the proper process 
of learning and cultivation. Lo found in Chu Hsi a 
wonderful example of scholarly rigor. 47 John Meskill 
points out the emphasis Lo put on hard work as the essence 
of learning in an inscription for the Pai-lu-chou Academy. 
In the inscription Lo stressed the notion that unless one 
was a sage, one must be diligent without relaxation both in 
learning and in one's behavior. 48 
For Lo, the relationship between the intellectual and 
spiritual in one's learning was that through intellectual 
endeavors one cultivates and perfects one's spiritual 
awareness. Previously, in the thought of Ch'eng I and Chu 
Hsi, since li was perfect, the investigation of li as a 
process was moral. For Lo, the investigation of li was not 
moral, but it led to a moral awareness that was perfected 
when one came to know the nature and one's unity with all 
things. In Lo's view, the intellectual achievement 
provided the basis for a necessary objectivity which should 
allow one to attain an accurate perspective on the self and 
the natural world as a whole. 49 For Chu Hsi, li as the 
primary object of knowledge had both ontological and ethical 
reality with an emphasis on goodness more than truth. 
47Ibid. 
48Meskill, 129. 
49Bloom, Knowledge, 9. 
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Seeking knowledge of li led to the key to moral judgements 
and actions. 50 With Lo's monism of ch'i, the ethical value 
was not in the nature itself, but in knowledge of the 
nature. 51 deBary comments on Lo' s view of learning as a 
basis for a thoroughgoing objectivity achieved through 
self-transcendence. He notes that La's approach was almost 
a "'value-free objectivity,'" but under another aspect its 
mirrorlike receptivity was understood to reflect perfectly 
the value-full nature of heaven-and-earth. 52 
Lo felt that one must first have knowledge and 
comprehension before one could comprehend humanity and 
become humane oneself. He noted, though, that in order to 
be successful one had to be wholehearted and careful or one 
would miss the truth if it was incomplete. 53 
Lo thought the way of the sage lay in the three hundred 
rules of ceremony and the three thousand rules of demeanor, 
since they all pertain to human affairs. 54 His belief that 
the way of sages lay in these was directly in opposition to 
those who concentrated on the mind. Lo wrote, "Thus if one 
carries on his studies without reference to the classics and 
is utterly arbitrary and opinionated, it is inevitable that 
50Bloom, 'Abstraction,' 79. 
51Ibid. , 96. 
52deBary, "Cultivation," 186. 
53Bloom, Knowledge, 103. 
54Ibid. , 54-5. 
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he will be misled. 1155 Lo followed this comment with the 
addition that it was wrong to be misled, but even worse to 
mislead others, a notion that represented his desire to stay 
within the orthodox tradition and the dangers of not doing 
so. 
In emphasizing the importance of the classics, Lo cited 
Ssu-ma Ch'ien's writing that Confucians read the Book of 
Changes so many times that the leather stays on the bindings 
broke three times. Lo commented on this and said, "If he 
had found that it was not suitable to expound learning that 
would serve the world, why would he have read it so 
much?"~ Lo referred to Confucius' use of the text in such 
a way as to def end the interpretation of the Book of Changes 
in light of li, as opposed to its use for divination. 57 
Other scholars stressed the purpose of the Book of Changes 
as a tool for divination, a use that Lo felt a gentleman 
would never depend on. 58 Lo depended heavily on the Book 
of Changes and read it numerous times. Lo felt that the 
classics in general were important, but in part II, section 
3 of the K'un-chih chi, he stated his belief that all 
principles in the world could be found in the "Appended 
55Ibid. , 144-5. 




Remarks" of the Book of Changes. 59 His fondness for the 
Book of Changes can be seen in his following comments, 
In recent years I deeply love to read the 
Changes, but my spirit is gradually becoming 
deficient, and it has become difficult to be 
thoroughly steeped in the text. All those who read 
the commentaries on the Book of Changes should 
certainly devote thought to the points on which 
they agree and those on which they differ. 60 
Lo did not feel such fondness for all of the classics. 
Regarding the Book of History, parts of which he thought 
were hard to understand, he wrote, 
One really does not need to waste his mental 
effort on these because if one forces oneself to 
achieve an understanding, it may not necessarily be 
right. If one can learn something from a thorough 
reading of those parts that are clear and readily 
understandable, the benefit will be 
inexhaustible.n 
It's interesting to note that Lo worried about forcing 
an understanding, which may be wrong, but felt that an 
understanding would develop naturally, an idea he repeated 
in speaking of how to read the Spring and Autumn Annals. He 
suggested that one should not make simplistic or superficial 
observations, yet excessive probing could cause one to miss 
the true idea. 62 He felt, 
If only one has an open mind and a relaxed 
disposition and tries again and again to enter 
fully into the spirit of the work and to avoid 
59Ibid. 
60Ibid. , 115. 
61Ibid. I 117. 
62Ibid. I 120. 
being confused by different theories, one should 
naturally be able to achieve some understanding. 63 
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He added that the commentaries in the Spring and Autumn 
Annals should not be dismissed, but that one should not 
consider them to be reliable either. 
Lo strongly emphasized learning, but also felt that 
learning and action should assist each other. 64 One could 
not wait until one's knowledge was perfect to act. In 
learning, the efforts to extend knowledge and earnestly 
practice had to be simultaneous. 65 Lo stated, "Everything 
depends on exerting oneself. What good is it to engage in 
consulting and deliberating which will merely result in idle 
talk?H66 
Lo generally warned against all extremes in learning 
whether one's learning led to complete quietism or the other 
extreme of neglecting the internal. Lo recognized that 
students were individuals and that their endowments and 
abilities naturally varied. Despite these differences it 
was necessary for all to maintain balance. Concerning this 
Lo wrote, 
But when it comes to the Confucian teaching of 
the Great Learning, the Way cannot be changed, and 
the requirement that the student should enter 
through this Way cannot be repudiated. In 
63Ibid. 
64Ibid. I 176. 
65Ibid. I 109. 
66Ibid. 
departing from this, some are caught up in 
boastfulness and carried away by ostentation, in 
which case they drown in the external and are 
neglectful of the internal. Some detest 
complexity and delight in shortcuts, in which 
case they confine themselves to the internal and 
neglect the external. To be confined to the 
internal and neglectful of the external is the 
learning of Ch' an. 67 
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This referred primarily to how one approached learning, 
but Lo thought that the balance one found by following the 
mean should be applied to all aspects of one's life. To 
abide in seriousness, one must be constantly careful and 
watchful. 
Lo strongly emphasized the intellectual aspects of 
cultivation, but cultivation meant one needed to devote 
oneself to the teaching of the mean. Only through devotion 
to this as it concerned the cultivation of the Way could one 
become a gentleman and fulfill one's nature. 68 As Lo noted 
the importance of balance, he favored cul ti vat ion that 
included appropriate attention to both quiet-sitting and 
textual study. 69 Lo worried, however, about how scholars 
used quiet-sitting and that some overemphasized it. He 
worried that an overemphasis of quiet-sitting would lead to 
concentrating on the internal and neglecting the external. 
In criticizing Ch'en Hsien-chang (1428-1500), 70 a Confucian 
67Ibid. I 178. 
68Ibid. I 70. 
69Bloom, 'Abstraction, ' 7 4. 
70Bloom, Knowledge, p. 218. 
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who Lo thought excessively emphasized quiet-sitting, Lo 
ref erred to the four beginnings of virtue and wondered how 
they could be developed through quiet-sitting and 
disengagement from events and things. 71 
As a result of his own first hand knowledge of 
enlightenment through a meditative experience, Lo worried 
that quiet-sitting would enchant many to follow this path to 
the exclusion of the external. He ref erred to his 
experience as a "vision" (kuang-ching), 72 which was elusive 
and unreliable. He worried that others would experience a 
similar "vision" of oneness of all being and not go on to 
realize a more sustained intellectual apprehension of an 
objective reality of oneness in nature itself •73 
Lo practiced quiet-sitting on occasion as a means of 
personal cultivation, 74 but his desire for balance and fear 
of scholars being distracted by quiet-sitting led him to 
stress intellectual cultivation. Lo used the following 
71Ibid., 159. Mencius stated that the "four beginnings" 
of virtue--namely, the sense of pity and commiseration, the 
sense of shame and dislike, athe sense of modesty and 
yielding, and the sense of right and wrong--were innate and 
could be developed into the four virtues of humaneness, 
rightness, decorum, and wisdom. Ch'en Hsien-chang left 
studying with his master Wu Yii-pi after he felt he had 
failed to achieve any results, and kept in seclusion and 
cast aside the complexities of Wu's method and exclusively 
practiced quiet-sitting. In Fung Yu-lan, History, 594. 
72Bloom, Knowledge, 8. 
73Ibid. , 9. 
74Bloom, 'Abstraction, ' 7 4. 
passage from Mencius to demonstrate his view, 
If one's learning is not extensive and one's 
discussion is not detailed, his vision will be 
limited by the confines of his own mind, and 
however he may wish to be free from error, it will 
be impossible. 75 
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Lo wanted to be free from the confines of one's mind, error, 
and to increase his knowledge. As was generally true with 
Neo-Confucians, Lo thought knowledge was to be acquired 
through the "investigation of things" ( ko-wu) and the 
probing of principle. The probing of principle was 
important but can generally be seen as a complementary part 
to the "investigation of things." 
Investigation of Things 
The idea of the investigation of things came from a 
passage in the Great Learning. 76 It was the first and most 
important step towards sagehood, and thus the ability to 
help others bring about social harmony. Though many 
Confucians would agree on the necessity of the investigation 
of things to become a sage, how one interpreted the phrase 
75Bloom, Knowledge, 106. 
76Chai, 386. The passage reads, "Those ancient princes 
who wished to enlighten complete virtue throughout the 
empire first ruled well their own states; in order to rule 
well their state, they first regulated their own families; 
in order to regulate their families, they first cultivated 
their own persons; in order to cultivate their persons, they 
first rectified their hearts; in order to rectify their 
hearts, they first made their purpose sincere; in order to 
make thier purpose sincere, they first extended their 
knowledge. Such extension of knowledge [ "chih chih"] 
depended on the study of things ["ko-wu"]." 
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varied widely. The two most dominant views were: one, to 
investigate external things, and two, to rectify the 
mind. 77 The "wu" in ko-wu has generally been translated as 
"things," but it typically referred to human affairs and not 
material things. The Ch'eng-Chu school, whose emphasis on 
intellectual cultivation Lo followed, advocated the 
investigation of external things. 
Of the numerous definitions of ko-wu, Wing-tsit Chan 
notes that the four most prominent ones all were ethical, 
and stressed the point that knowledge was to be achieved by 
the mind without the aid of external things, until Ch'eng I 
and Chu Hsi taught that one should investigate all things 
that one came in contact with. 78 
Liu Tsung-chou, who followed the view that the purpose 
of the investigation of things was to rectify the mind, 
criticized Lo for wasting several decades on investigating 
things when he should have concentrated his efforts on the 
mind and nature. 79 Lo, in a letter to Wang Yang-ming, who 
also thought the investigation of things meant to rectify 
the mind, once wrote, 
If one wanted to regard learning as a task 
that does not depend on searching outside of 
oneself, that requires only the effort of 
self-reflection and inner examination, then the 
words "sincerity of intention" and "rectitude of 
77Ibid. 
78Chan, Source Book, 562. 
79Ching, 17. 
mind" should contain everything, and there would 
be no more need of burdening[the student] with 
the effort of investigation of things at the 
beginning of his quest. 80 
159 
Liu thought Lo was burdened by the investigation of things 
not only at the beginning of his quest, but throughout his 
entire life. 81 
Lo thought that approaching the investigation of things 
as the rectification of one's mind was one-sided. To refute 
this imbalance Lo quoted Ch'eng I, who wrote, 
To seek in our own nature and feelings is 
indeed to be concerned with our own person. But 
every blade of grass and every tree possesses 
principle and should be examined. 82 
The Ch'eng brothers explained the concept of the 
investigation of things to combat the influence of Ch' an and 
to assist the students who were neglecting the principles of 
heaven-and-earth and the myriad things. Lo thought their 
efforts helped to save students from their errors and guide 
them into the great mean. 83 Lo wrote of them, "Their 
intention was that students should achieve corresponding 
illumination of things and the self, perfect interfusion of 
inner and outer, and complete integration of subject and 
object. 1184 
80Ibid. I 64-5. 
81Ibid. I 65. 
82Bloom, Knowledge, 55. 
83Ibid. I 56. 
84Ibid. I 55-6. 
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Lo thought that one could not complete this integration 
by concentrating on the mind. In order to achieve insight 
into the mystery of the unity of all being, one had to 
realize that since all things proceeded from unity without 
artificial contrivance then in returning to unity there was 
no room for selfish manipulation. 85 Lo wrote of the need 
to consider the external, 
Thus to "seek within oneself" one must begin 
with one's own nature and feelings. One then goes 
on to extend to other things what one has perceived 
in oneself, and if it is found to be inconsistent, 
it is not ultimate principle. 86 
In Lo's view, the perception that the investigation of 
things could mean rectification of the mind was directly 
contrary to the purpose of the process of the investigation 
of things. For Lo, the investigation of things and the 
extension of knowledge were the beginning of knowledge, 
which was completed when one subdued the self and returned 
to propriety. 87 It was only when one completely dispelled 
the self-conscious ego that the ultimate unity of li could 
be realized. 
Lo felt that the Way was inherent in man, but one could 
not realize this because things and self were contraposed, 
which resulted in people only realizing that there was the 
85Ibid. I 56. 
86Ibid. 
87Ibid. I 74. 
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self . 88 To increase the consciousness of oneself drew one 
further and further from the Way. Only in perceiving the li 
in things could one subdue the self and realize the unity of 
all things. It was through reading the Confucian classics 
while at the Imperial University in Nanking, that he came to 
new conclusions about the nature of reality and of 
knowledge, 89 and the dangers of concentrating on the mind. 
Lo's approach to the investigation of things was 
heavily influenced by Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi. The emphasis on 
the investigation of things was a cardinal concept in Ch' eng 
I's thought, a concept that Ch'eng I understood to mean the 
inductive and deductive study of things, events and handling 
of human affairs. 9 ° Ch'eng I wrote, 
To devote oneself to investigate principle to 
the utmost does not mean that it is necessary to 
investigate the principle of all things in the 
world to the utmost nor does it mean that principle 
can be understood merely by investigating one 
particular principle. It is necessary to 
accumulate much and then one will naturally come to 
understand principle. 91 
Lo referred to nine items of ko-wu put forth by Ch'eng 
I, and felt that if one could successfully investigate li in 
88Ibid. 
89Ibid., 8. 
9 °Chan , source Book, 5 4 5 • 
91Ibid. , 551. 
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only one of these areas that was enough. 92 In a sense, for 
Lo, one must pay attention to and be ready to investigate 
everything, because, "· .. there is nothing that is not a 
I thing• I 1193 
For Ch'eng I, everything contained li, and one needed 
to investigate things in order to comprehend this li. Chu 
Hsi, for the most part, followed Ch'eng I's approach. For 
Ch'eng and Chu, li was the basis for moral action, so the 
goal of comprehending li was to know what to do. 94 The 
investigation of things was a moral endeavor, and not an 
investigation of the natural world as an object of 
92Bloom, Knowledge, 53-4. Bloom, in regard to Ch'eng 
I's "nine items," refers to Wing-tsit Chan, who put them as 
follows: (1) to read books, discuss doctrines, and 
elucidate principles, to deliberate on people and events of 
teh apst and the present and distinguish their right and 
wrong, to handle affairs and to settle them in the proper 
way, and to investigate a thing one day and another the next 
day:(2) to investigate the principles in all things, from 
one's own person to the ten thousand things: ( 3 ) not to 
investigate extensively all the principles in the world nor 
to investigate intensively the principles of only one thing 
but to investigate more and more and thus to accumulate:(4) 
to investigate either the easy of the difficult according to 
one's capacity: ( 5) to realize that every thing has its 
principle and should be investigated:(6) to know that the 
investigation of the principle of filial piety means to 
practice it:(7) to realize that every blade of grass and 
every tree has its principle and should be investigated:(S) 
to know where the highest good is to be found: and {9) to 
examine principle in one's own person. 
93Ibid., 54. 
94Willard J. Peterson, "Fang I-chih: Western Learning 
and the 'Investigation of Things.'" In deBary, Unfolding, 
377. 
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interest. 95 Though one needed to be aware that li existed 
in all things, the investigation of things primarily took 
place in textual study. Yu-wen Jen points out that Chu Hsi 
thought all moral principles could be found in the 
classics. 96 As Lo did in his own thought later, Ch'eng I 
and Chu Hsi both emphasized not only the investigation of 
things in the external world, but the need for seriousness, 
reverence, and ethical self-reflection. 97 
Chang Tsai had emphasized the investigation of things 
as a purely internal process, while Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi 
sought a more objective basis for the relation of an inner 
and outer reality. 98 Lo pushed the shift in emphasis 
further by looking for the truth of oneness as a factual 
reality characteristic of nature itself and not limited only 
to consciousness. 99 The dangers of becoming absorbed in 
the mind led Lo to an almost exclusive emphasis on the 
investigation of things, which meant observation of the 
external world. 
Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi's approach to the investigation of 
things influenced Lo heavily, but it was another area 




98Bloom, 'Abstraction, ' 1o5. 
99Ibid. 
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Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi's goal was to apprehend li as a moral 
endeavor in and of itself. Le's apprehension of li was more 
a matter of accumulating knowledge until one realized the 
unity of all things due to this accumulation of knowledge, 
and only then could one understood moral goodness. 
Li became the object of the mind's inquiry and 
reflection more in a sense of empirical investigation than 
in an attempt to recover one's original nature or moral 
goodness. Unlike the Ch'eng-Chu notion of the gradual 
clarifying of ch'i that resulted in increasing moral 
goodness as one accumulated knowledge of li, Lo' s moral 
goodness or jen came when one realized the unity of all 
things. For Lo the probing of principle came in gradual 
stages, but the full development of the mind and knowing the 
nature both took place at once. 100 In a sense, one may 
become more moral as one gains knowledge and can maintain 
the equilibrium more consistently, but any increase in the 
morality of one's actions had nothing to do with clarifying 
one's ch'i. 
Although Lo felt one should act even though one's 
knowledge was not complete, it was not until one's knowledge 
was complete that one's thoughts could be sincere. Only 
when one's thoughts were sincere, at which point one did not 
distinguish between subject and object and was thus 
perfectly humane, could one correctly govern the state and 
100Bloom, Knowledge, 104. 
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consequently bring peace to the world. When one had finally 
brought peace to the world, only then could it be said that 
there was an all-pervading unity . 101 
Lo followed an approach to the investigation of things 
similar to those of Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi, and the end goal 
of ultimate world peace was the same, but there were 
differences. One difference was the conception of li and 
thus the perception of the progress of moral goodness. 
Another difference of Lo's monism of ch'i as it affected the 
investigation of things was in regards to sense knowledge. 
By declaring that the feelings were not negative, but in 
fact a part of one's nature, he increased the significance 
of sense knowledge. Previously, when li was the impercei ved 
truth within things, knowledge of li was necessarily above 
and beyond the senses. So in order to apprehend the highest 
knowledge, that of li, scholars were reluctant if not 
opposed to the use of sense knowledge. 102 
To employ the senses to pursue knowledge of the 
concrete things of the world, for Lo, was a legitimate 
pursuit in itself and an essential prerequisite to higher 
forms of integration . 103 As everything consisted of ch' i, 
li had to be identified within the context of ch' i. So 
instead of li being in the realm beyond the senses as for 
101Ibid. I 178. 
102Bloom, 'Abstraction,' 101-2. 
103Ibid. I 102. 
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Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi, it was necessary to use the senses to 
apprehend li in La's system. Like Ch'eng I and Chu 
Hsi, Lo felt one needed to investigate everything, from a 
blade of grass, an insect, a plant, etc., but the idea took 
on new implications. Bloom notes that Lo's process of 
confirming the li one has found in one's nature and feelings 
through observing the external reality and of confirming the 
realities of nature in one's own personal experience, 
suggests that Lo was more intellectually assured in 
confronting the phenomenal diversity of nature and had a 
more critical attitude toward the process of understanding 
li than had his predecessors of the Sung.w' Sense 
knowledge played an important role in this closer 
observation of the diversity of nature. 
Sense Knowledge 
Of the sung Neo-Confucians, each may have had a little 
something different to say about the senses and the 
knowledge one could get through them, but none gave that 
knowledge much positive emphasis. 
Chang Tsai ref erred to the Mencian idea of innate 
knowledge to state that knowledge gained through 
enlightenment, which was the result of sincerity was the 
innate knowledge of one's natural character. 105 Knowledge, 
10'Ibid. I 105. 
105Chan, Source Book, 507. 
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on the other hand, gained through what one heard or saw was 
small knowledge. Because this was knowledge obtained 
through contact with things, it was not knowledge obtained 
through one / s moral nature. Knowledge obtained through 
one / s moral nature could not originate from seeing or 
hearing. 106 
Other Sung Neo-Confucians felt similarly. Many felt 
that uncontrolled exposure to external influences and 
sensory knowledge was distracting and disturbing. 107 Chang 
Tsai stated, 
The mind of ordinary people is limited to the 
narrowness of what is seen and what is heard. The 
sage, however, fully develops his nature and does 
not allow what is seen or heard to fetter his 
mind . 108 
Chu Hsi agreed, in that, he felt one should not rely much on 
sense knowledge as a means of understanding "things in the 
world. 11109 
Lo thought that the distinction between the ideas of 
knowledge gained through the moral nature and that of sense 
knowledge was arbitrary. 110 When Lo denied the concept of 
two natures and thus included feelings as part of one's 
nature he also did away with the possibility of 
106Ibid. I 515. 
107deBary, "Cultivation," 167. 
108Chan, source Book, 515 . 
109Bloom, / Abstraction,' 80. 
110Bloom, Knowledge, 22. 
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distinguishing between these two types of knowledge. Lo 
could not dismiss sense knowledge or consider it distracting 
as those of the Sung had. Though this seems like another 
break from thought of the Sung Nee-Confucians, Lo saw 
himself as returning to an earlier tradition and not going 
in a new direction. 111 His view of one nature gave new 
validity and importance to sense knowledge and sense 
experience. He could not accept the idea that there were 
modes of thought independent of and qualitatively superior 
to sense knowledge, and that the only epistemological issue 
was the care and discernment with which one used their 
senses. 112 
As Lo's conception of li had changed from that of the 
Sung and earlier Ming, the change had implications 
throughout his thought as has been evident. One of the 
repercussions can be seen in his view of sense knowledge, 
and as a result the nature of knowledge in general. Bloom 
notes that his questions about the nature of knowledge and 
his monism of ch' i helped to lead him to develop a few 
preliminary steps towards a critical epistemology. 113 
Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi had looked at knowledge to see whether 
it was profound or superficial, morally edifying or 
111Ibid. I 40-1. 
112Ibid. , 21. 
113Bloom, 'Abstraction,' 77. 
stultifying. 114 
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In switching from a dualistic view to a 
monistic view Lo's view of knowledge differed from that of 
Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi. The criteria of knowledge for Lo was 
generality, consistency and verifiability. 115 
Bloom notes the lively skepticism of the K'un-chih chi, 
an example possibly of Ch'eng I's idea that a student must 
first of all learn to doubt. 116 Lo's skepticism, view of 
sense knowledge, and desire for consistency led him to a 
critical appreciation of things. A few examples of textual 
scholarship show his critical approach. In part II, section 
10 of the K'un-chih chi, Lo compared a passage of the Book 
of History and a passage of the Book of Changes which had 
similar meanings, but Lo pointed out a slight difference. 
One saw man and li as different and the other saw them as 
one . 117 In part II, section 13, Lo pointed to different 
editions of the Tso-chuan, in which a five character phrase 
was different in different editions. Only one character had 
been place differently, but Lo wrote, "One of the characters 
having been transposed, the nuance and meaning are 
completely different. Not infrequently mistakes pile up in 
this way. 11118 
114Ibid. I 99. 
115Ibid. 
116Chan , source Book, 5 7 O • 
117Bloom, Knowledge, 117-8. 
118Ibid. I 120-1. 
CHAPTER 5 
Lo's Orthodoxy 
The significance of Lo's contributions as a thinker can 
be highlighted by examining his disagreements with Wang 
Yang-ming. In particular, Lo's approaches to knowledge and 
to critical textual study differed from those of Wang 
Yang-ming. Wang challenged Chu Hsi's version of the Great 
Learning, and Lo felt that only on the basis of textual 
evidence could the problem be mediated and settled. 1 
This, though, was not the only problem Lo had with Wang 
Yang-ming and his thought. Lo saw Wang as a thinker whose 
ideas and teachings often ran contrary to Confucian thought 
as Lo perceived it. Wang posed a more significant threat to 
orthodoxy than did Buddhism. Both, Lo thought, needed to be 
discredited philosophically in order for Confucianism to 
continue to survive. 
Wang Yang-ming 
Lo's views of the investigation of things, sense 
knowledge, and critical methods helped to give him a 
reputation as a prominent critic of Wang Yang-ming. Wang 
1 deBary, "Cultivation," 198. 
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was the dominant thinker of the Ming, and left behind more 
writings from different periods of his life than Lo. Wang's 
dominance in the Ming and the fact that he and Lo were 
contemporaries have led some to view Lo' s thought as a 
reaction to Wang's thought. Bloom suggests that Lo's 
philosophy of ch'i was not in reaction to Wang at all, but 
an attempt to resolve the problems left to him by his 
Ch'eng-Chu forbears. 2 
Lo and Wang Yang-ming had met personally, and carried 
on friendly correspondence, but they disagreed on 
fundamental points. Wang Yang-ming's fundamental doctrines 
and ideas can be found, according to Wing-tsit Chan, in 
Wang's work, Inquiry on the Great Learning. Chan lists them 
as follows: the man of humanity forms one body with all 
things and extends his love to all, the mind is li, to 
investigate things is to rectify the mind, the highest good 
is inherent in the mind, the extension of innate knowledge 
is the way to discover the highest good and perfect the 
moral life, and, the idea (Chan felt was implied) of the 
unity of knowledge and action. 3 Lo and Wang agreed on the 
first idea listed, but after that their differing 
conceptions of the mind led to two different stances. 
Unlike Lo, Wang identified mind with li, which led Wang 
to emphasize the idea of innate knowledge (liang-chih), a 
2 Bloom, 'Abstraction,' 106-7. 
3Chan, Source Book, 666-7. 
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term used by Mencius. For Wang this meant that all things 
were in one's mind, and all that which was moral was also in 
one's mind. One just had to realize it. Like Lo, Wang 
wanted to remove the distinction between li and ch'i, but 
Wang did so by identifying li with the mind. 4 As with li 
and ch'i, Wang tried to unite inner and outer, theoretical 
and practical, and other things. 5 
Lo felt that Buddhists had some understanding of mind, 
but not of nature and thus considered nature as 
consciousness. Lo thought this was the same problem in 
Wang's thought. Liang-chih and the idea of mind as li 
forced Wang to regard consciousness as nature. 6 As a result 
of this view, Lo felt that there also was a distinction made 
between liang-chih (innate knowledge) and sense knowledge, 
a distinction that reminded Lo of a similar distinction made 
in the Lankavatara Sutra. 7 Ou-yang Te (1496-1554), a native 
of Lo's area but a student of Wang Yang-ming, argued that 
the two were not distinguished and that one could only 
realize liang-chih through the senses and reflection and 
deliberations. It could not be realized in isolation. 8 
Another problem that Lo had with liang-chih was that 
4Chan, "Synthesis," 138. 
5 Ching' 14. 
6 Ibid., 123. 
7 Ibid. 
8Ibid. I 124. 
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one would concentrate on the mind and not pay attention to 
or discuss the principles of heaven-and-earth and the myriad 
things. This would eliminate one's ability to realize a 
penetrating and unitary understanding of all reality. 9 This 
criticism shall be more evident below, yet it should be 
noted that, though Wang's thought emphasized the mind, he 
did not stress quietism as the emphasis on mind and Lo's 
frequent comparisons to Buddhism might suggest. Wang did 
see mind as li, but he also identified knowledge with 
action. Moral knowledge could not be realized through 
reflection before hand, but only through action. 10 
Although Wang stated the belief that mind is li, he 
also tried to get rid of distinctions and dualities. deBary 
notes that those in the Wang Yang-ming school spoke of li 
and ch'i in the same terms of hsin (mind) and ch'i and used 
them interchangeably to represent the vital force in man and 
the uni verse in the phrase, "Throughout Heaven-and-earth all 
is hsin/ch' i. 1111 In relation to Lo' s monism of ch' i and 
Wang's view of mind as li, it seems ironic that it was 
scholars from the Wang school who became forerunners of the 
trend towards a monism of ch'i in the seventeenth 
century . 12 
9 Ibid. 
10Berling, 108. 
11deBary, "Cultivation," 195. 
12Ibid. 
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Wang's view of moral principles as innate and 
understood through personal experience led to a moral 
relativism and individualism in the sixteenth century. 13 
Many Confucians saw a few of Wang's followers' actions to be 
of serious concern. Yu Ying-shih sees Lo as part of the 
intellectualism of the Ch'eng-Chu school and Wang Yang-ming 
as part of the anti-intellectualism in the tradition of Lu 
Hsiang-shan, with the biggest difference being the 
respective attitudes towards book learning and the 
transmission of knowledge. 14 It may be appropriate to use 
the terms intellectualism and anti-intellectualism, but was 
this the result of the different views of the mind and thus 
their approaches to cultivation? Or, was it their 
respective personalities that led to them to theories and 
positions that defined them best? It is hard to say which 
came fist, but their views, nonetheless, were different; and 
these differences come down to their view of the mind and 
the resultant approach to the investigation of things. 
Lo not only criticized Wang Yang-ming's positions, but 
also worried about the potential effects of his teachings. 
Lo wrote, 
Now you wish to save people from drowning in 
vulgar learning, but you have not yet curbed the 
incipient development of Ch' an. This may cause 
those who are committed to the learning of the 
sages and worthies to be confused about their 
13Handl in, 2 8 . 
14Bloom, Knowledge, 25. 
course, and I cannot help feeling the utmost 
concern in this regard. 15 
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Lo criticized Wang for being insufficiently thorough in 
research, for arbitrary theorizing, 16 and for taking 
selected pieces of Chu Hsi's ideas out of context to support 
his ideas. 17 Although the letters suggest a friendly tone, 
some of Lo's criticisms of Wang were direct. Lo felt that 
the study of the Way was difficult to apprehend and so one 
naturally should not neglect the study of it, but he felt 
Wang had neglected it and followed what he himself thought 
to be right and not the teachings of the sages and worthies. 
Lo wrote to Wang, "I am afraid that one cannot be satisfied 
with his own view and immediately regard it as the ultimate 
standard. 1118 
Lo worried that Wang's approach, which he thought was 
at the expense of intellectual cultivation, would undermine 
the Confucian commitment to intellectual understanding of 
the objective world. 19 Lo thought that Buddhism was 
dangerous, but that those Confucians, Wang included, whose 
primary concern was moral wholeness and an inner sense of 
being in control of oneself, were worse. The Buddhists, at 
15Ibid. , 178. 
16Ibid. , 179. 
17Ibid. I 182. 
18Ibid. , 184. 
19Ibid. I 14. 
176 
least, were overt in their beliefs, but these Confucians, Lo 
felt, had made serious concessions to Buddhism in their 
approach to knowledge and understanding of nature, yet 
maintained that they were Confucian. 20 
Wang Yang-ming's view of mind as li led him to a view 
of the investigation of things that varied from that of Lo. 
Lo criticized Wang for his view of the investigation of 
things as the rectification of the mind, an approach which 
Lo saw as exclusively internal and in opposition to the 
investigation of things external to oneself. Lo felt that 
Wang's approach separated him from things, and therefore he 
could not come to understand the ultimate unity of all 
things. Because of this Lo wrote to Wang, 
From my standpoint, external things are 
definitely "things." From the standpoint of 
principle, I too am a "thing," altogether merged in 
the unity of all being. Where then is the 
distinction of internal and external?21 
For Lo, the purpose and value of the investigation of 
things was that it was a way to perceive the unity of 
principle in all its diverse particularizations, a goal that 
could not be reached if one only concentrated on the mind. 
Lo saw Wang's use of the ideas "investigating things" and 
"extending this knowledge," as only a way to conceal his 
methods of "clarifying the mind," a phrase Lo used in 
20Ibid. 
21Ibid. I 177. 
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speaking of Ch' an. 22 Lo saw many who adhered to Wang's 
ideas as only trying to avoid the painstaking work of 
cultivation by taking shortcuts. Lo wrote, 
The tasks of the student are broad learning, 
careful inquiry, sober reflection, clear 
discrimination, and earnest practice.(a) Not one 
of these can be dispensed with. By proceeding on 
the basis of these five one may arrive at was is 
easy and simple. But if one dislikes the 
complexity involved in scholarship and yearns for a 
shortcut to the realm of ease and simplicity, this 
can hardly be called the ease and simplicity of 
principle. 23 
La's view of Wang Yang-ming's thought can be seen to 
some degree in a letter from Wang to Lo. Wang wrote, 
Your honor is skeptical about my theory of 
ko-wu because you undoubtedly believe that it 
affirms the internal and rejects the external; that 
it is entirely devoted to self-examination and 
introspection and neglects the work of explanation, 
study, and discussion; that it concentrates on the 
over-simplified fundamental principles and leaves 
out the full details; that it submerges itself in 
the extremes of Buddhist and Taoist lifeless 
contemplation, emptiness, and silence, and fails to 
take full account of the changing conditions of 
human affairs and the principles of things. If 
that were really the case, it would not only be a 
crime against the Confucian school and Master Chu 
Hsi; it would be a perverse doctrine to delude the 
people and a rebellious teaching to violate truth, 
and I should be punishable by death. 24 
Lo did not suggest that these horrible possibilities were 
what Wang desired, but what was possible within the realm of 
22Ibid. I 56. 
23 I bid. , 5 7 • ( a) Mean, 2 O : 19 . 
24Wei-ming Tu, Neo-confucian Thought in Action: Wang 
Yang-ming's Youth(1472-1509), (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1976), 176. 
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Wang's ideas. 
Wang, on the other hand, felt that the view of the 
investigation of things that Lo held led not to perceiving 
the unity, but to fragmentation. To investigate li in 
external things was both debilitating and fruitless. 25 
Wang saw the traditional Ch'eng-Chu version of the 
investigation of things as diverting people away from the 
basic principles of things and the fundamentals of life. 26 
Wing-tsit Chan points out that Chu Hsi shifted the 
chapters of the Great Learning to place the investigation of 
things before sincerity of the will, and that Wang Yang-ming 
reversed this order to return it to the arrangement as it 
was originally found in the Book of Rites. Chan views this 
as indicative of Chu Hsi's intellectual approach and Wang's 
moral approach. 27 
Wang thought that the original substance of the mind 
was one's nature (or li), and that it was originally 
correct. Incorrectness was the result of one's thoughts and 
will. His opinion of Lo and the Ch'eng-Chu approach to the 
investigation of things was clearly stated in the following, 
Later generations fail to realize that the 
highest good is inherent in their own minds, but 
exercise their selfish ideas and cunning and grope 
for it outside their minds, believing that every 
event and every object has its own peculiar 
25Berling, 67. 
26Chan, Source Book, 6 5 5 . 
27Ibid. 
definite principle. For this reason the law of 
right and wrong is obscured; the mind becomes 
concerned with fragmentary and isolated details 
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and broken pieces; the selfish desires of man become 
rampant and the Principle of Nature is at an end. 28 
Instead of being concerned with external things, which 
he thought of as fragmentary details, he emphasized moral 
values. 29 Although he spoke of not being concerned with 
external things, he did stress active involvement in human 
affairs. 30 Like Lo, the goal was to form one body with all 
things, but his approach was different. Wang's approach was 
well summarized in the following few sentences of his, 
Therefore, the extension of knowledge must 
consist in the investigation of things. A thing is 
an event. For every emanation of the will there 
must be an event corresponding to it. The event to 
which the will is diverted is a thing. To 
investigate is to rectify. It is to rectify that 
which is incorrect so it can return to its original 
correctness. To rectify that which is not correct 
is to get rid of evil, and to return to correctness 
is to do good. This is what is meant by 
investigation. 31 
Lo and Wang began with different fundamental ideas 
about the mind and consequently also differed in the 
approach to the investigation of things, but they both 
worked toward the idea of forming one body with all things 
and the concept of jen. Bloom offers the opinion that it 
could also be argued that both Lo and Wang eased the tension 
28Ibid. , 661. 
29Ibid. I 655. 
30Ibid. I 658. 
31Ibid. , 665-6. 
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between the ideal world and the real world of ordinary 
experience. 32 Both saw their Sung predecessors to have 
left unfinished business, which needed to be revised and 
brought to completion. 33 Despite these similarities, their 
differences were significant and Lo often painted Wang 
Yang-ming as Buddhist. 
Lo thought Wang Yang-ming's views and methods were too 
similar to those of Buddhism, and as a result many of Lo's 
criticisms of Wang's thought were the same as his of 
Buddhism. The conception of Lo as a defender of orthodox 
Confucianism developed out of his criticisms of Wang and of 
Buddhism. The later Confucian Kao P'an-lung (1562-1626), 34 
a member of the seventeenth century Tung-lin school, said 
the following of Lo, 
Lo inquired deeply into Ch'an and demonstrated 
the reasons for its differences[from Confucianism]. 
From the T'ang until the present no one has been so 
clear and thorough as he in refuting Buddhism. His 
contributions were extraordinary! 35 
Buddhism 
Although Buddhism may be argued to have been in decline 
in the Ming, it retained a significant intellectual and 
32Bloom, 'Abstraction,' 98. 
33Ibid. 
34Bloom, Knowledge, 221. 
35Ching, 217. 
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spiritual influence. 36 Lo conceded that there were some 
genuinely useful things to be found in Buddhism, but felt 
its subjective thought was a danger. Because of this, one 
of La's highest priorities was to expose what he thought to 
be the errors of Buddhism and demonstrate the "disastrous 
legacy" it had created for Confucians. 37 Some of its 
influence, Lo felt, could all too readily be seen in the 
thought of Wang Yang-ming. 
Lo said little about Taoism, but the meaning of the 
following passage that he wrote about Taoism also held for 
his view of Buddhism. He wrote, "In my ignorance I also 
thought a lot about these things in my early years, and it 
was only later that I came to see through them. 1138 His 
concern about Taoist thought seems minimal, but his feelings 
about Buddhism were clearly stated in this one sentence, 
The evil that comes of their truth, 
half-truth, extravagance, depravity, and 
evasiveness(a) is such that, were a sage king to 
appear, he would certainly seize upon the strategy 
of Han Yu(b) to attack them with fire.(c) 39 
Lo felt strongly about the problems he saw in Buddhism. 
Not only did he criticize it on specific philosophical 
36Bloom, Knowledge, 13-4. 
37Ibid. 
38Ibid. , 165. 
39Ibid., 166. (a) Alludes to Mencius, 2A:2:17. (b) Han 
Yu(768-824), the great statesman, poet, and leader of the 
Confucian assault on Buddhism in the T'ang. (c) I.e. to 
burn their books. 
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points, but he also criticized the Buddhist sutras as 
generally being products of the Chinese translators and not 
as they were in their original texts. 40 
Lo thought that Ch'an learning was superficial, 41 and 
fundamentally different from Confucian learning in that 
Buddhists ref erred to the nature as consciousness while the 
Confucians saw nature as principle. 42 Lo pointed to Chang 
Tsai, Ch'eng I, Ch'eng Hao, Chu Hsi, and himself as ones who 
had all studied Buddhism, but who, through the Confucian 
Way, had come to understand the errors of Ch'an and gave it 
up. 43 Lo strongly fought against Buddhism but did not 
totally discount the significance of it. He wrote, 
What we Confucians have apprehended is 
certainly a genuine perception, and what is 
apprehended by the adherents of Ch' an is also a 
genuine perception. It is only that what is 
perceived is different and that judgements 
concerning right and wrong, gain and loss are made 
on this basis. 44 
This was the danger of Buddhism. Because their perception 
of things, according to Lo, was limited, their decisions 
based on this limited view of reality could only lead to 
trouble eventually. 
The main point of criticism for Lo was the Buddhist 
40Ibid. I 169. 
41Ibid. I 136. 
42Ibid. I 135. 
43Ibid. I 137. 
44Ibid. I 152. 
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view of reality as mental. They saw things as illusionary 
and untrustworthy, which went directly against the 
traditional Confucian fundamentals and thus Lo's thought. 
The Buddhist view of reality naturally leant itself to 
concentrating on the mind and potentially extreme 
subjectivism. Lo thought heaven-and-earth and the myriad 
things were reality, and as such needed to be investigated, 
not ignored as illusionary. The Buddhist concentration on 
the mind and neglect of external things, Lo felt, limited 
their perception and thus their ability to ever realize the 
unity of all things and jen. 
Lo pointed to his own Buddhist experience of 
enlightenment, which he found elusive and unreliable, to 
demonstrate his own personal knowledge of the dangers of 
Buddhism. This experience led him to the understanding of 
the limitations of Buddhism and its meditative discipline, 
and to his commitment to the intellectual cultivation he 
pursued in Confucianism. 45 It was also because of his 
personal experience that he could comment on the attraction 
of Ch'an, "The evidence they offer is so clear and the inner 
coherence so compelling that even those with good powers of 
discrimination are usually unable to break free. 1146 Lo 
found Buddhism to be philosophically unsatisfying and he 
thought that Buddhists did not understand the ultimate 
45Ibid. , 8-9. 
46Ibid. , 142. 
truth. 47 
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His views of Buddhism did not lead him to 
emotional diatribes, but instead to intellectual and 
philosophical critiques of Buddhist doctrines. 48 
The typical criticisms of Buddhism in the Sung were of 
its quietistic practices, apathy in regards to politics, and 
the selfishness of its attempts to escape suffering. 49 
Lo's interests dealt more with the nature of knowledge and 
of material reality.w 
to the K'un-chih chi, 
Buddhism. 
These two themes were fundamental 
but also to La's criticisms of 
Lo sought a reliable order of approach, something he 
felt was not part of the ultimately unproductive notion of 
Buddhist enlightenment. Bloom notes that his insistence on 
a reliable order of approach was worked out in considerable 
detail in the process of developing his critique of 
Buddhism. 51 After working out the essentials of his 
philosophy through his deliberations on the classics and 
Nee-Confucian writings of the Sung, Yuan, and early Ming, Lo 
went back to reexamine parts and aspects of Buddhist 
philosophy which had long interested and troubled him. 52 
47Berling, 55. 
48Ibid. 
49Bloom, Knowledge, 14. 
50Ibid. I 10. 
51Bloom, 'Abstraction, ' 1O3 . 
52Bloom, Knowledge, 9-10. 
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Lo's main critique of Buddhism, as with Wang Yang-ming, 
was the concentration upon the mind and the idea that the 
mind was nature. Lo wrote, 
Generally speaking, the Buddhists have insight 
into the mind, but lack insight into the nature. 
But considering theirs to be the supreme and 
mysterious Way, they are unaware that there are 
truths they cannot discover in an entire lifetime. 
Thus they presume to advance their theories, 
thereby misleading later generations so that they 
abandon human relationships and destroy the 
principle of nature. Can the pernicious influence 
of this disastrous legacy be expressed in words?53 
Though Lo saw the problems with Buddhism to be 
philosophical, specifically their view of mind as nature, he 
also thought these philosophical problems resulted in 
serious social problems. Lo felt that one had to understand 
the oneness of li from the standpoint of its diversity in 
particularizations before it could truly and thoroughly be 
perceived. 54 Buddhist concentration on the mind, to the 
exclusion of things(particularizations), necessarily limited 
their understanding. For this reason the Buddhist could 
come to a partial understanding of reality, which Lo felt 
could allow others to think their ideas correct when they 
were actually wrong. 55 
Lo related this partial understanding and the need to 
consider external things in the following way, "The Way is 
53Ibid. I 51-2. 
54Ibid. I 157. 
55Ibid. 
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constituted of principles shared in common by heaven and 
earth and all things and is not something that I alone 
possess. 1156 Lo was using this in contrast to the comment 
commonly attributed to Buddha, "'Above heaven and below, I 
alone am to be revered.'"~ Lo felt that was a ridiculous 
idea, as well as dangerous. In order to truly understand 
the unity of all things and jen, one had to consider all 
things. Bloom points out that it was this same point of 
excessively emphasizing the mind that led the Ch'eng 
brothers to revive the doctrine of the investigation of 
things from the Great Learning. 58 
The emphasis on the mind as nature, a philosophical 
basis for Buddhist practice led to results that were seen in 
daily life. A traditionally Confucian criticism of Buddhism 
was the practice of severing one's ties with family. Lo 
wrote of this, "The Buddhists sever the root, so that the 
source of production and transformation is cut off, and yet 
they still vociferously contend that is they who perceive 
the nature. 1159 In this practical way, the Buddhists, by 
leaving the family and not marrying, 
themselves off from having children. 
theoretically cut 
Thus they cut 
themselves off from one of the most fundamental natural 
56Ibid. I 160. 
57Ibid. 
58Bloom, 'Abstraction,' 104. 
59Bloom, Knowledge, 78. 
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processes of production. Since the Way was one of constant 
production and reproduction, the Buddhists had severed 
themselves from the nature and the Way. By severing 
themselves from the nature, Lo wondered how they could be in 
accordance with the naturalness of principle. Lo felt that 
if they could leave the family and thus reject the five 
relationships, what would they not neglect?60 
La's views and criticisms of Buddhism were necessarily 
philosophically based. Lo began and pursued a consistent 
philosophy that not only would provide a metaphysics that 
showed the ultimate unity of reality, but also would produce 
an ultimate unity of Confucian thought. As Buddhist 
doctrines varied from the reality of nature as Lo saw it, 
and as these Buddhist doctrines could distract others from 
the true Way, they impeded the arrival of social harmony and 
thus had to be thoroughly discredited. 
A Position of Orthodoxy 
Lo saw himself as an heir to a constantly evolving 
tradition, one in which Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi each represented 
a constructive response to the challenges of Buddhism and 
Taoism as they encountered them in their lives. 61 Lo did not 
consider Confucian thought to be a closed system. An orthodox 
Confucian had man and society at heart and provided socially 
60Ibid. I 107-8. 
61Ibid. I l. 
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constructive responses to the challenges not only of Buddhism 
and Taoism but also of those within Confucianism who had 
strayed. Lo wrote, "To attack heterodox doctrines and expose 
heretical views is the traditional role of the Confucian 
school. 1162 
Despite the philosophical differences between Lo and his 
predecessors Chu Hsi and Ch'eng I, Lo continued to consider 
himself a proponent of the Ch'eng-Chu tradition. The 
commitment to a specific metaphysical doctrine was not as 
crucial to the continuity of the Nee-Confucian tradition as 
the perspective on man and society which was at its heart. 63 
This was especially important since Lo did not feel that 
either Ch'eng I or Chu Hsi had been able to recover the unity 
in their thought. 
Lo did not dare to quickly disregard the thoughts and 
concepts of Ch'eng and Chu. He patiently tried to reconcile 
the concept that nature is li for an extended period of time. 
After coming to an understanding through the idea of 
"principle is one; its particularizations diverse," he felt, 
"Finding that it was consistent in every instance, I began to 
feel overwhelming self-confidence and knew that the words of 
these two gentlemen[Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi] would certainly not 
lead me astray. 1164 Bloom suggests, though, that without the 
62Ibid., 53. 
63Bloom, 'Abstraction, ' 108. 
64Bloom, Knowledge, 172. [] mine. 
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concept "principle is one; its particularizations diverse," 
that Lo may not have been able to remain within the Ch'eng-Chu 
school. 65 Blo's suggestion has merit, but remains moot due 
to the existence of the concept. 
Lo valued the ideas and writings of Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi, 
which he thought probed the furthest depths and attained the 
utmost subtlety, yet he did not feel that either had been able 
to reach a final integration. 66 Lo's search to recover that 
ultimate unity and that final integration led him to 
concentrate on and value the thoughts of the ancient 
Confucians as much as his immediate predecessors. 
In this drive to return to unity, Lo's ideas in the end, 
were more similar to the classical ideas than to those of Chu 
Hsi. 67 An example of this may be seen in Lo' s emphasis on 
the significance of sense experience, which was a clear break 
from the thought of the Sung, but was more a returning to the 
earlier tradition. 68 
As a Confucian within the Ch'eng-Chu tradition, Lo highly 
respected and valued the work of his predecessors. At the 
same time, as a Confucian, he felt it was his duty to clarify 
and solve problems regarding the pursuit of the Way. He knew 
the dangers of such a task and assumed full responsibility for 
65Bloom, 'Abstraction, ' 9 5. 
66Ibid. I 109. 
67Ibid. , 84. 
68Bloom, Knowledge, 40-1. 
his actions and views. He wrote, 
I do not presume to discuss our Confucian 
predecessors lightly. But if I do not correct his 
error, then the Way will not be perceived,(a) and 
if anyone wanted to blame me, I could not be 
excused. 69 
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Lo's opinion that Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi had not been 
able to achieve a final unity centered primarily upon their 
dualistic view of li and ch' i. 70 Lo said of Chu' s view 
regarding li and ch' i, "This is precisely what I mean by 
suggesting that I doubt he finally achieved unity. 1171 
Since they had not been able to do so, Lo felt that he 
must try to find a way to reconcile them and recover the 
ultimate unity. 72 such a process of reconciliation and 
recovery, in Lo's mind, could only be accomplished by one 
who genuinely honored and trusted Ch' eng I and Chu Hsi. 73 
Lo saw himself as just such a person, and this was why he 
devoted all his mind to this task and dared not be 
neglectful. 74 His compulsion to confront certain problems 
within their thought, thus was not one of an outsider 
attacking a tradition, but one driven by fidelity to his own 
tradition. 
69Ibid. , 145. (a) Quoting Mencius, 3A: 5: 2. 
7 °Meskill, 16. 
71Bloom, Knowledge, 69. 
72Ibid. I 59. 
73Ibid. I 63. 
74Ibid. 
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Lo did not feel that orthodoxy meant the stagnation of 
blindly accepting received doctrines, but that it was a 
necessity to draw upon the strengths of the tradition while 
also contributing actively to its life. 75 Lo felt he could 
offer suggestions in the hope that they would help to 
recover the ultimate unity, without thinking that they would 
be the final additions. As an introduction to some of his 
ideas at one point, he wrote, "In the hope of recovering the 
ultimate unity, I have set forth the following points. 1176 
Lo criticized Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi, but was even more 
critical of those in the early Ming who adopted their ideas 
and neglected their duty of dealing with their philosophical 
inconsistencies. It was necessary to carefully work through 
these inconsistencies in order to recover the ultimate 
unity. 77 
Although Lo agreed with much of Ch'eng Hao's thought 
and felt his thought often showed an understanding unequaled 
by Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi, he criticized Ch'eng Hao for having 
often made slight mistakes. 78 One of the most worrisome 
for Lo was some of Ch'eng Hao's comments which Lo thought 
were extremely Buddhistic. In part II, section 38 of the 
K'un-chih chi, Lo worried about these comments because, 
75Ibid. I 2. 
76Ibid. I 155. 
77Ibid. I 15-6. 
78Ibid. I 122-3. 
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though, they appeared to obviously resemble those of 
Buddhism, Ch'eng Hao did not see that they did. 79 
Who better than those who attempted to follow the 
teachings of another to offer criticisms and possible 
improvements? Lo wrote, "Shouldn't those who study his[Chu 
Hsi's] teachings seek a means to reconcile them and recover 
the ultimate uni ty? 1180 Lo said of another Confucian 
scholar who attempted to reconcile Ch'eng I and Chu Hsi's 
interpretations of the Book of Changes, "He may be described 
as one who was earnestly dedicated to honoring and trusting 
Ch' eng and Chu. nsi 
Lo, as a def ender of orthodoxy, thought those who 
followed the prevailing trend of Wang Yang-ming and 
disparaged Chu Hsi, displayed only their lack of exploration 
into the matter in depth and their "own meanness" which 
could not hurt "Master Chu" in the least. 82 In the same 
vein, Lo stated, 
It has long been time that those who are 
committed to the learning of the Way(tao-hsiieh) 
have all honored and trusted Ch'eng and Chu. 
Recently those who prate about the learning of the 
Way arrogantly place themselves above Ch' eng and 
Chu, yet if one considers their attainments, they 
are things that the Ch' engs and Chu learned in 
their earlier years and later discarded. Isn't it 
79Ibid., 135. 
80Ibid. , 109. [ ] mine. 
81Ibid., 114. The scholar Lo was speaking of was Liu 
Pao-chai (Ting-chih, 1409-1469). 
82Ibid. , 62. 
mistake to devote one's entire life to seeking 
the Way only to collect what able and virtuous 
men of an earlier day discarded, considering this 
as one's personal treasure and turning around and 
criticizing them?83 
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Ch'eng and Chu were men who certainly never considered their 
learning complete, 84 and as such may have been seen as 
superior to those who so arrogantly disparaged them. 
The Question of orthodoxy 
Lo certainly saw himself as orthodox, as a defender of 
the Ch'eng-Chu tradition, more importantly the Confucian 
tradition, but modern scholars have not all agreed that his 
philosophical views allow him to remain within the 
Ch'eng-Chu tradition. Despite his earlier established 
reputation as a def ender of Ch' eng-Chu orthodoxy, his 
placement within or outside of the tradition remains a point 
of contention. 
The placement of Lo as orthodox or not depends largely 
on the definition of orthodoxy. If one defines orthodoxy to 
be a fixed set of doctrines handed down from generation to 
generation which requires strict devotion and adherence, 
La's philosophical attempts at returning Confucian thought 
to a unity make it difficult to include him as a dedicated 
follower of Ch'eng-Chu orthodoxy. 85 On the other hand, if 
83Ibid. 
84Ibid. 
85Ibid. I 22-3. 
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the heart of orthodoxy can be defined as a concept of 
tradition which provides stability and capacity for growth 
instead of rigid, stagnant doctrines, Lo can more readily be 
seen as orthodox. 86 
Lo approached orthodoxy with a concern for the 
dispositions, purposes, and motives of his predecessors. 87 
Bloom notes of La's view of himself and orthodoxy, that even 
though he made significant shifts in the emphasis on 
Ch'eng-Chu philosophy, "· .. he could without any sense of 
ambivalence or contradiction consider himself to have 
remained faithful to the tradition in terms of its 
underlying intellectual and spiritual orientation. 1188 A 
conception of orthodoxy that gives this ability and 
allowance of criticism from within, Bloom further notes, 
truly is evidence of the vitality and flexibility of the 
tradition. 
In a letter to Lo, Wang Yang-ming gave testimony that 
though orthodoxy may be flexible, the flexibility had 
limits. Wang noted that he had trouble bringing himself to 
contradict Master Chu, but could not deceive himself either. 
Wang further commented on the gravity he felt in opposing 
Chu Hsi's ideas and the grief he felt as a result of doing 
86Ibid. I 23. 
87Ibid. 
88Bloom, 'Abstraction, ' 7 5. 
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so. 89 
In speaking of orthodoxy, deBary looks back to the 
Neo-Confucians of the Sung. They insisted on orthodoxy, and 
yet at the same time exercised the right to question and 
reconsider the established standard of orthodoxy on the 
basis of both new experience and fresh evidence. 90 With 
such a framework, they put forth the doctrines of Ch'eng and 
Chu, but also created a model that allowed critical review, 
and reinterpretation. In this way, there was a higher value 
in orthodoxy placed upon inner-reflection and rational 
judgement than on mechanical adherence to established 
formulations or accepted views. 91 deBary's definition of 
Nee-Confucianism as originally embracing a critical method 
and spirit of doubt allow one to include Lo within the 
orthodox tradition. 
A few modern scholars have viewed Lo as orthodox. In 
the early 1940s, in his work Ming-tai ssu-hsiang shih (A 
History of Ming Thought), Jung Chao-tsu characterized Lo as 
a "latter-day stalwart of the Chu Hsi school," an opinion 
that Yil Ying-shih agreed with. 92 Both Jung and Yil viewed 
Lo as a defender of the Ch'eng-Chu tradition and critical of 
89TU, 161. 
90deBary, "Introduction," 25. 
91Ibid. 
92Bloom, Knowledge, 23. 
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Wang Yang-ming and those who held similar ideas. 93 In the 
midst of the dominance of Wang Yang-ming, Jung notes, it was 
Lo who clung to and upheld the older style of learning from 
the Sung. 94 
Japanese scholars seem to view Lo' s position 
differently. In his 1961 article "Ra Kinjun to Ki no 
Tetsugaku" (Lo Ch' in-shun and the Philosophy of Ch' i) , 
Yamashita Ryuji describes La's thought as a reaction against 
the thought of Chu Hsi and not a defense of it. 95 The 
scholar Abe Yoshio, although primarily concerned with La's 
influence in Japan, emphasized his perception of La's break 
with the Ch'eng-Chu tradition. 96 In an article in 
1951, Yamanoi Yu concentrates on La's monism of ch'i, and 
concludes that this represents a decisive break from the 
established orthodoxy," a point that Yamashita agrees 
with. Abe, too, agrees that the emphasis on ch'i led to 
doubts of Chu Hsi's concentration on li and that La's stance 
was a clear departure. 98 
Some mainland scholars have taken a different approach 
to La's thought. In 1957, Zhang Dainan wrote of Lo as one 
93Ibid. , 26. 
94Ibid. I 24-5. 
95Ibid. , 24. 
96Ibid. 
97Ibid. I 27. 
98Ibid. I 29. 
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of two of the most important materialist philosophers of the 
Ming, whose achievement lay in debating the "objective 
idealism" of the orthodox Ch'eng-Chu school and the 
"subjective idealism" of the Lu-Wang school. 99 Within this 
framework, Lo could not be orthodox. Zhang's assessment is 
common among Marxist scholars who view intellectual history 
as one of constant clashes between idealism and 
materialism.w0 As a proponent of a monism of ch'i, Lo is 
seen by these scholars as a materialist, who naturally would 
be in opposition to both Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-ming. 
Although the Marxist scholars may see Lo as a materialist, 
they also point to La's view of human nature as an 
unfortunate link to those of the Sung, Confucius, and 
Mencius • 101 
Bloom contends that the differences in the opinions of 
these scholars varies little and is primarily due to the 
different problems they approach in their research and thus 
their perception of where Lo stands. 102 As a result, they 
tend to come down on either one side or the other of his 
position in relation to orthodoxy. 103 
The arguments and rationales of the scholars may never 
99Ibid., 23. 
100Ibid. I 34. 
101Ibid. I 37. 
102Ibid. I 24. 
103Ibid. I 23. 
198 
be decided one way the other, but neither do they have any 
impact on how Lo perceived himself. Among other scholars of 
the Ming and Ch'ing, Lo had established a reputation of 
orthodoxy, and in his own view his motivation to return 
Confucianism to unity was purely driven by loyalty to 
Confucianism and the orthodox tradition he saw himself a 
part of. Despite his intentions, desires, and efforts, Lo 
did not feel he had succeeded in putting together the 
philosophical puzzle left to him. In a letter to Wang 
Yang-ming he wrote, 
Truly the Way is not easy to apprehend, but 
surely the study of it cannot be neglected. I am 
afraid that one cannot be satisfied with his own 
view and immediately regard it as the ultimate 
standard. I am not one who knows the Way, but I 
have put forth effort to seek it over the course of 
many years. In my rapidly declining years I 
realize that I have accomplished nothing. Still, I 
desire to discuss learning with the best of this 
generation. 104 
w 4Ibid., 184. The significance of La's feelings here 
may be discounted by many factors--a politeness in 
correspondence, the factor that he lived twenty-years after 
this, the K'un-chih chi was not published until eight years 
later--all of which many have altered his true feelings of 
the statement, but it shows his diligence, humility, and 
desire in the end to reach his goal. 
CONCLUSION 
La's reputation as an orthodox Confucian came from his 
dedication to Ch'eng-Chu thought, and his mission to 
discredit Wang Yang-ming and Buddhism. These were the 
manifestations of his desire to return Confucian thought to 
unity. The changes Lo made in Confucian philosophy had a 
significant impact on others, and his philosophy can be 
attributed to his loyalty to Confucianism and his desire for 
its return to unity. 
La's orthodoxy could be the single most important 
factor in his life and thought, if one can truly be singled 
out from a person's life. His orthodoxy was not limited to 
a strict adherence to the definition put forth by the Ming 
government, the civil service exams, or only to the thought 
of Sung Confucians. Many only claimed "orthodoxy" as a 
means to the end goals of status, wealth, and political 
power. These men followed the external dictates of 
orthodoxy without internalizing the humanitarian 
motivations. Others considered themselves orthodox, and 
followed only the thoughts and views that had been 
established in the Sung. Orthodoxy for Lo needed to include 
Confucius, Mencius, and their latter day interpreters. He 
attempted to draw together the Classical Confucian thinkers 
with the thought of the sung Confucians. His fidelity to 
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the Confucian tradition motivated his search to show its 
continuity and its ultimate unity. To achieve an ultimate 
unity of Confucian philosophy would further the cause of 
Confucianism and thus improve social mores. 
One aspect of Lo's task was the necessity to show the 
weaknesses and limitations of the thought of Wang Yang-ming 
and Buddhism. This was not the focal point for Lo, but 
rather an outcome of the development of his thought and the 
contradictions that Wang and Buddhism posed in relation to 
Lo's thought. 
Chapter One provides context for Lo's life and the 
distinctiveness of his thought. His time was not conducive 
to his dedication to Confucian thought and practice. His 
adherence to Confucian values was noted by his 
contemporaries, who praised his virtue in and out of office. 
The events of his day highlight his determination and 
unswerving loyalty to Confucianism. 
The next three chapters deal with the four questions 
posed by Kasoff. They are ordered so the answers to each 
question provide a framework which gradually builds a 
foundation of understanding. The foundation begins with the 
fundamentals of La's philosophy, moves to some implications 
of his thought, then to how these things fit into the big 
picture of one's life, one's goal in life, and finally how 
to achieve that goal. 
Chapter Two begins with the foundations of Lo's search 
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for unity. The shift in emphasis from li to ch'i provided 
a basis for understanding unity at the most basic level. 
Ch' i composed everything and displayed the unity of all 
things. Li, as it was originally one, also showed the unity 
of all things as did La's conception of the Great Ultimate. 
This chapter includes significant changes he made in the 
thought of his sung predecessors, but it was precisely these 
changes that evidence his orthodoxy and his drive for unity. 
The discussion of Lo' s conception of li, ch' i, the idea 
"principle is one; its particularizations di verse," the 
Great Ultimate, yin and yang, and change establish the 
starting point of understanding La's philosophy and its 
significance. 
Chapter Three answers the second question by discussing 
some important implications of La's monism. His notion of 
one nature as opposed to the Sung conception of two natures, 
helped to move Confucianism closer to unity. This 
conception of one nature resulted in the reestablishment of 
the importance of feelings and desires and their natural 
existence as part of the nature. Probably the most 
controversial aspect of La's thought, the relationship of 
mind and nature, was shown to be one of interdependence but 
distinction. The distinction was necessary to combat the 
possible negative consequences that could be seen in 
Buddhism if one confused mind with nature. This distinction 
was not contrary to unity, but allowed one to conceptualize 
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the ultimate unity and realize it for oneself without being 
limited by concentrating exclusively on the mind. 
The second and third chapters provide the pieces that 
make up the framework of Lo' s philosophy. Chapter Four 
answers the last two questions and provides the purpose and 
motivation of Confucianism and the path to get to the end 
goal of sagehood. The answer to the third question 
discusses Lo's conception of why evil existed in the world 
and the end goal one needed to reach to help overcome that 
evil for oneself, the ruler, and society. To realize the 
ultimate unity for oneself, become a sage, embody the virtue 
of humanity, and help bring harmony to society was the goal 
of all true Confucians. The last question concludes Lo's 
approach. The answer to this question deals with how the 
Confucian needed to pursue sagehood. 
The last chapter, Chapter Five, returns to discuss the 
outward manifestations of Lo 1 s orthodoxy: his battles 
against Wang Yang-ming and Buddhism. These battles are the 
easiest way to see Lo's orthodoxy and desire for a return to 
unity, but they are only one aspect of his orthodoxy. The 
main evidence of Lo's orthodoxy is found in his philosophy 
and his effort to return to unity within it; but, underlying 
his philosophical strivings to return to unity and its 
necessary battles with Wang and Buddhism, was his loyalty to 
Confucianism and his desire to return Confucian thought to 
unity. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Atwell, William S. "From Education to Politics: The Fu 
She." In Wm. Theodore deBary, ed. The Unfolding of 
Neo-Confucianism. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1975. 
Berling, Judith A. The Syncretic Religion of Lin Chao-en. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1980. 
Bloom, Irene, trans. Knowledge Painfully Acquired: The 
K'un-chi chi by Lo Ch'in-shun. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1987. 
"On the 'Abstraction' of Ming Thought: Some 
Concrete Evidence from the Philosophy of 
Lo Ch' in-shun. " In Wm. Theodore deBary and Irene 
Bloom, eds. Principle and Practicality: Essays in 
Neo-Confucianism and Practical Learning. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1979, pp. 69-125. 
Chai, Ch'u. "Nee-Confucianism of the Sung-Ming Periods," 
Social Research, v.18(1951): 370-392. 
Chan, Wing-tsit. "The Ch'eng-Chu School of Early Ming." 
In Wm. Theodore deBary, ed. Self and Society in Ming 
Thought. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970. 
"The Hsing-li ching-i and the Ch'eng-Chu School 
of the Seventeenth Century." In Wm. Theodore deBary, 
ed. The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism. New York: 
,Columbia University Press, 1975. 
_____ , trans. Instructions for Practical Living and 
Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-ming. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1963. 
Neo-Confucianism, Etc.: Essays. Hong Kong: 
Oriental Society, 1969. 
A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963. 
"Synthesis in Chinese Metaphysics," The Chinese 
Mind: Essentials of Chinese Philosophy and 
Culture. Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967. 
204 
Chao, Kang. Man and Land in Chinese History. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1986. 
Cheng, Chung-ying. New Dimensions of Confucian and 
Neo-Confucian Philosophy. Albany: State University 
New York Press, 1991. 
"Practical Learning in Yen Yuan, Chu Hsi 
and Wang Yang-ming." In Wm. Theodore deBary and Irene 
Bloom, eds. Principle and Practicality: Essays in 
Neo-Confucianism and Practical Learning. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1979, pp. 37-67. 
"Reason, Substance, and Human Desires in 
Seventeenth-Century Neo-Confucianism." In Wm. Theodore 
deBary, ed. The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1975. 
~~~~-' trans. Tai Chen's Inquiry into Goodness. 
Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1971. 
Ch'ien, Edward T. "Chiao Hung and the Revolt against 
Ch'eng-Chu Orthodoxy." In Wm. Theodore deBary, ed. 
The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1975. 
Ching, Julia, ed. 
Tsung-hsi. 
1987. 
The Records of Ming Scholars by Huang 
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
Crawford, Robert. "Chang ChU-cheng's Confucian Legalism." 
In Wm. Theodore deBary, ed. Self and Society in Ming 
Thought. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970. 
Crawford, Robert B., Harry M. Lamley, and Albert B. Mann. 
"Fang Hsiao-ju in the Light of Early Ming Society," 
Monumenta Serica, vol.XV(1956): 303-327. 
deBary, Wm. Theodore. "Individualism and Humanitarianism in 
Late Ming Thought." In Wm. Theodore deBary, ed. Self 
and Society in Ming Thought. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1970. 
"Introduction." In Wm. Theodore deBary, ed. 
The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1975. 
The Message of the Mind in Neo-Confucianism. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1989. 
205 
"Nee-Confucian Cultivation and the Seventeenth 
Century 'Enlightenment. '" In Wm. Theodore de Bary, ed. 
The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1975. 
~~~~-' ed. Sources of Chinese Tradition, vol.1. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1960. 
Elman, Benjamin A. From Philosophy to Philology: 
Intellectual and Social Aspects of Change in Late 
Imperial China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1984. 
Farmer, Edward L. Early Ming Government: The Evolution 
of Dual Capitals. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1976. 
Fung, Yu-lan. A History of Chinese Philosophy: 
The Period of Classical Understanding. 
Princeton University Press, 1953. 
Volume II, 
Princeton: 
"Why China Has No Science--An Interpretation of 
the History and Consequences of Chinese Philosophy," 
The International Journal of Ethics, v.32(1921-2): 
237-263. 
Greenblatt, Kristin Yu. "Chu-hung and Lay Buddhism in the 
Late Ming." In Wm. Theodore deBary, ed. The Unfolding 
of Neo-Confucianism. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1975. 
Handlin, Joanna F. Action in Late Ming Thought: The 
Reorientation of Lu K'un and Other Scholar Officials. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. 
Ho, Ping-ti. studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959. 
Hsia, C.T. "Time and the Human Condition in the Plays of 
T'ang Hsien-tsu. 11 In Wm. Theodore deBary, ed. Self 
and Society in Ming Thought. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1970. 
Hsu, Sung-peng. A Buddhist Leader in Ming China: The 
Life and Thought of Han-shan Te-Ch'ing, 1546-1623. 
University Park: The Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 1979. 
Huang, Ray. 1587, A Year of No Significance: The Ming 
Dynasty in Decline. New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1981. 
206 
Hucker, Charles o., ed. Chinese Government in Ming Times: 
Seven Studies. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1969. 
A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial 
China. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985. 
Hurvitz, Leon. "Chu-hung's One Mind of Pure Land and Ch'an 
Buddhism." In Wm. Theodore deBary, ed. Self and 
Society in Ming Thought. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1970. 
Jen, Yu-wen. "Ch'en Hsien-chang's Philosophy of the 
Natural. " In Wm. Theodore deBary, ed. Self and Society 
in Ming Thought. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1970. 
Kasoff, Ira E. 
New York: 
The Thoughts of Chang Tsai(1020-1077). 
Cambridge University Press, 1984. 
Kengo, Araki. "Confucianism and Buddhism in the Late Ming." 
In Wm. Theodore deBary, ed. The Unfolding of 
Neo-Confucianism. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1975. 
Liu, Ts'un-yan. "Taoist Self-Cultivation in Ming Thought." 
In Wm. Theodore deBary, ed. Self and Society in Ming 
Thought. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970. 
McMorran, Ian. "Wang Fu-chih and the Nee-Confucian 
Tradition. " In Wm. Theodore de Bary, ed. The Unfolding 
of Neo-Confucianism. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1975. 
Meskill, John. Academies in Ming China: A Historical Essay. 
Tuscon: The University of Arizona Press, 1982. 
Parsons, James B. "The Ming Dynasty Bureaucracy: 
Aspects of Background Forces," Monumenta Serica, 
vol.XXII(1963): 343-406. 
"The Ming Dynasty Bureaucracy: A Supplementary 
Analysis," Monumenta Serica, vol.XXIX(1970-1): 
456-483. 
Peterson, Willard J. "Fang I-chih: Western Learning and 
the 'Investigation of Things.'" In Wm. Theodore 
deBary, ed. The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1975. 
207 
Sakai, Tadao. "Confucianism and Popular Educational Works." 
In Wm. Theodore deBary, ed. Self and Society in Ming 
Thought. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970. 
Seidel, Anna. "A Taoist Immortal of the Ming Dynasty: 
Chang San-f eng." In Wm. Theodore de Bary, ed. Self and 
Society in Ming Thought. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1970. 
Sung, Z.D. The Text of the Yi King. Shanghai: 
Wenhua Tushu Gongci Yinxing, 1983. 
Taylor, Romeyn. "Social Origins of the Ming Dynasty," 
Monumenta Serica, vol.XXII(1963): 1-78. 
Tu, Wei-ming. Neo-Confucian Thought in Action: Wang 
Yang-ming's Youth(1472-1509). Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1976. 
Vanderstappen, Hanie. "Painters at the Early Ming Court 
(1368-1435) and the Problem of a Ming Painting 
Academy," Monumenta Serica, vol.XV(1956): 259-302. 
Wakeman, Frederic Jr. "The Price of Autonomy: 
Intellectuals in Ming and Ch'ing Politics," Daedalus, 
101 (Spring 1972): 35-70. 
Wilhelm, Hellmut. "On Ming Orthodoxy," Monumenta Serica, 
vol.XXIX(l970-l): 1-26. 
Articles in Chinese 
Li, Cun-san, "Luo Qinshun de ru shi zhi bian," Zhongzhou 
Xuekan, no.3(1993): 72-76. 
Yu, Hua-min, "Luo Qinshun dui li xue de fazhan ji yu Wang 
Shou-ren de lun zheng," Xue Hai, no.5(1993): 21-5. 
